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The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo's Reference Bayesianism. Special issue of Rationality, Markets and Morality on "Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They Meet in 2011 and Beyond?", edited by D. Mayo, A. Spanos and K. Staley.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (with Remco Heesen). Mind, in press.
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth (with Stephan Hartmann). Forthcoming in Synthese.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.
Philosophy Compass 6: 497--508.
Science without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling. Synthese 180: 65--76.
The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach). Philosophy of Science 78: 105--127. 2011.
The Weight of Competence Under a Realistic Loss Function (with Stephan Hartmann). The Logic Journal of the IGPL 18: 346--352. 2010.
Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions
and the Monty Hall Problem. Synthese 174: 331--340. 2010.
Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation (with Stephan Hartmann and Gabriella Pigozzi). Journal for Logic and Computation 20: 603--617. 2010.
Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials.
Philosophy of Science 76: 637--649. 2009.
Statistics between Inductive Logic and Empirical Science,
Journal of Applied Logic 7: 239--250. 2009.
Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers (with Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini). Episteme 6: 110--129. 2009.
The Ethics of Statistical Testing (with David Teira), to appear in Christoph Luetge (ed.): Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Berlin: Springer.
Discussion: Integrated Objective Bayesian Estimation and Hypothesis Testing (by José M. Bernardo), to appear in José M. Bernardo et al. (eds.): Bayesian Statistics 9: Proceedings of the Ninth Valencia International Meeting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences (with Stephan Hartmann), in Ian C. Jarvie and Jesús Zamora Bonilla (eds.): The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, 594--612. London: SAGE. 2011.
Bayesian Epistemology (with Stephan Hartmann), in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.): Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 609--620. London: Routledge. 2010.
Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation, in Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann and John Woods (eds.): Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 10 (Inductive Logic), 231--260. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 2010.
Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications, in M. Suárez et al. (eds.): EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. I, 289--297. Berlin: Springer. 2010.
Guest Editor of a Special Issue of The European Journal for Philosophy of Science:
"The Future of Philosophy of Science" (with Stephan Hartmann).
Guest Editor of a Special Issue of The Logic Journal of the IGPL: "Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology"
(with Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini).
Guest Editor of The Reasoner, Volume 4, No. 10 (October 2010). Editorial on Philosophy in Africa.
Guest Editor of The Reasoner, Volume 3, No. 7 (July 2009). Editorial and Interview with Mark Colyvan.
R. Haenni, J.W. Romeijn, G. Wheeler and J. Williamson: Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks, Springer: Berlin, 2011. Forthcoming in Metascience.
Article on the Precautionary Principle in Decision Point, Volume 48 (April 2011).
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
What is a Bayesian Model Selection Procedure?. Supersedes my paper on simplicity in model selection which can be found below.
A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.
Convergence of Opinion through Mutual Respect: Scope and Limits (with Mark Colyvan and Carlo Martini).
On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms (with Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, and Stephan Hartmann).
The Ambiguity of Justification and Support.
The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein)
The Precautionary Approach and the Role of Scientists in Environmental Decision-Making
(Given at the PSA 2010, in a symposium with James Justus, Katie Steele and ecologist Helen Regan. The piece might eventually appear in the PSA
proceedings.)
The Weight of Simplicity in Statistical Model Comparison. Got rejected, but helped me to write a paper on Bayesian model selection that is currently under review.
Towards a Bayesian Account of Explanatory Power. Contributed paper given at the PSA 2010 conference.
Disagreement Under the Veil of Ignorance (joint project with Mark
Colyvan, Chiara Lisciandra, Carlo Martini, Ryan Muldoon and Giacomo
Sillari that might have fallen asleep).
Bayesian Philosophy of Science (with Stephan Hartmann).