home | vita | CV (pdf) | pictures | grants | papers | talks | research

2014

Explanatory and Causal Reasoning, Probabilified.
Keynote at the conference "Non-Causal Explanations in the Sciences", Munich.

Explanatory and Causal Reasoning, Probabilified.
Second Workshop on Explanatory Power, Bochum.

Corroboration and Evidential Support: An Explication of Popper's Criticial Rationalism.
SILFS 2014 (Congress of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science), Rome.

A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.
41st Philosophy of Science conference, Dubrovnik.

An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (III): From Evidential Support to a Measure of Corroboration.
TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.

Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Reasoning.
3rd meeting of the DFG priority program 1516 "New Frameworks of Rationality", Schloss Etelsen.

Corroboration and Evidential Support: An Explication of Popper's Criticial Rationalism.
Keynote at the Philogica III conference (Third Colombian congress of Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science), Bogota.

2013

Measuring Explanatory Power.
ANT Cluster on Mind and Cognition, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Modeling Expertise in Group Decisions.
Workshop "Deliberation, Aggregation, Consensus", Ecole normale supérieure, Paris.

Measuring Explanatory Power.
Workshop "Operationalization 2013", Freiburg University, Freiburg/Germany.

An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (II): The Problem of Old Evidence.
Tutorial in the TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.

An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (I): Confirmation Measures.
Tutorial in the TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.

A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.
Workshop on the History of Economic Modeling, London School of Economics, LSE.

Beyond the Randomized Controlled Trial: Designing and Interpreting Experiments in Medicine. Symposium with Cecilia Nardini, Roger Stanev, and David Teira.
Biennal Meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA13), Helsinki.

Tutorial on "Theory Change: From Popper to Bayes (and back)".
Second Reasoning Club Conference, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa.

Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
NVWF Conference "Philosophy of Science in a Forest", Leusden.

Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
Annual IUC conference on Philosophy of Science, Dubrovnik.

Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Conference ``Models and Decisions'', Munich.

A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

2012

Commentary on R. Morey and J.W. Romeijn: "Science and belief: A plea for epistemic statistics"
Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, Rotterdam.

A Bayesian Network Model of Disagreement.
Conference Epistemic groups and collaborative research in science, Nancy.

Testing a Precise Null Hypothesis: The Case of Lindley's Paradox.
Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, San Diego.

Measuring the Grammar of Explanatory Power (with Matteo Colombo).
Workshop Operationalizing Epistemic Concepts, Aachen.

The No Alternatives Argument.
Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW) 2012, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, München.

Probabilistic Explications of Explanatory Power.
Workshop on Explanatory Power, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum.

The No Alternatives Argument.
5th Sydney-Tilburg Conference: The Progress of Science, Tilburg.

Judgement and Behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Impact of Moral and Strategic Considerations.
Erasmus Institute in Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) Research Seminar, Rotterdam.

Explanatory Power: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations (with Matteo Colombo).
DFG Priority Program "New Frameworks of Rationality, Tutzing.

Objectivity, Bayesianism and Climate Models.
Workshop on Radical Uncertainty (R&D Network), Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich.

Explaining Language: Philosophical Perspectives on e-humanities.
Launch Meeting of the e-Humanities Lab, Tilburg School of Humanities, Tilburg.

Judgement and Behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Impact of Moral and Strategic Considerations.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

2011

The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (presented by Dominik Klein).
Conference The Collective Dimension of Science, Nancy.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Departmental Seminar, Philosophy Department of Uppsala University, Uppsala.

Climate Models, Robustness and Bayesianism. Part of a symposium on the reliability of climate models, with Seamus Bradley, Arthur Petersen, Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl.
Biennal Meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA11), University of Athens, Athens.

The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein).
Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philosophy Workshop, TiLPS, Tilburg University.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Causality and Explanation in the Sciences (CaEitS 2011), University of Ghent, Ghent.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Seventh Congress of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 7), Milan.

Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
Departmental Colloquium, Institute of Philosophy, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
Decisions, Games and Logic Workshop (DGL11), Maastricht.

The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein).
Workshop on Expert Judgment, TU Delft, Delft.

Réalité privée et langage: peut-on instituer une règle?
UFR de Lettres et Philosophie, Université de la Bourgogne, Dijon.

Consensus Through Mutual Respect: Scope and Limits.
3rd meeting of the NWO-funded network "Rationality and Decision", London School of Economics, London.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
4th Sydney-Tilburg Conference The Authority of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney.

How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
Philosophy Seminar, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland, Brisbane.

Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
Research Seminar, Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA), University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

The Precautionary Principle: Robust Environmental Decisions.
Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.
Philosophy Seminar Series, Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

2010

How Objective is Objective Bayesianism?
REHSEIS Workshop on Philosophy and Statistics, Université Paris VII (Denis Diderot), Paris.

The Precautionary Principle: Robust Environmental Decisions.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Symposium on Environmental Decision-Making (with James Justus, Helen Regan, and Katie Steele).
Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Montréal.

Towards a Bayesian Account of Explanatory Power.
Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Montréal.

Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Departmental Seminar, Section Philosophy & Ethics of TU Eindhoven, Eindhoven.

How objective (and how Bayesian) is Objective Bayesianism?
Pluralism in the Foundations of Statistics, University of Kent, Canterbury.

The Logic of Explanatory Power (presented by Jonah Schupbach).
Formal Epistemology Workshop 2010, University of Konstanz, Konstanz.

The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (presented by Remco Heesen).
Formal Epistemology Workshop 2010, University of Konstanz, Konstanz.

The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations.
Hoernlé Research Seminar, Philosophy Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Evidence and Stopping Rules in Sequential Trials.
Bayesian Statistics 9, Valencia/Benidorm.

Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Modeling in the Social and Behavioral Sciences I, IHPST Paris, Paris.

Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Philosophy of Science in a Forest, Internationale Schol voor Wijsbegeerte, Leusden.

Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness
Departmental Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Statistical Evidence, Objectivity and Public Policy.
3rd Sydney-Tilburg Conference The Future of Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Philosophy of Science as Scientific Philosophy (with Stephan Hartmann).
Scientific Philosophy: Past and Future, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Scientific Philosophy (with Stephan Hartmann).
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations
Formal Philosophy Seminar, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven.

The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (with Remco Heesen)
Choice Group, London School of Economics, London.

2009

The Virtue of Simplicity Revisited: A Model Averaging Perspective.
EPSA 09, Amsterdam.

The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach).
European Science Foundation Workshop on "Physical and Philosophical Perspectives on Probability, Explanation and Time", Woudschouten.

The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach).
PROGIC 09, Groningen.

Commentary on Alvin Goldman's work in Social Epistemology.
4th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Köln.

The Virtue of Simplicity Revisited: A Model Averaging Perspective.
Modeling the World - Perspectives from Biology and Economics, TINT Conference, Helsinki.

The Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem.
Colloquium Talk, Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA), Melbourne.

How Much Do Experts Count? (with Stephan Hartmann)
2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference Evidence, Science and Public Policy, Sydney.

The Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem.
2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference Evidence, Science and Public Policy, Sydney.

Artefactual Probability.
Philosophical Society, Australian National University, Canberra.

Commentary on Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker: "Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preference: Experimental arguments based on prospect theory".
Erasmus Institute in Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) Research Seminar, Rotterdam.

Sources of Disagreement Among Rational Agents.
3rd VAF conference, Tilburg.

2008

Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials.
Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting, Pittsburgh.

Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials.
2nd Meeting on Philosophy, Probability and Scientific Method, Valencia.

Compromise, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation.
6th conference of the International Network for Economic Methodology (INEM), Madrid.

Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation.
Bayes Savaged in the Extreme Conference, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen.

Pragmatism in Formal Modeling: Two Case Studies.
Pragmatism and Naturalism Workshop, Tilburg.

2007

Science without models: Resampling simulations in statistical inference.
London-Paris-Tilburg Workshop in Philosophy of Science, Paris.

Statistics do not require frequentist justifications.
First Conference of the European Association for Philosophy of Science (EPSA), Madrid.

Science without models: Resampling simulations in statistical inference.
Models and Simulations 2, Tilburg University.

Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science.
Third PROGIC workshop, Canterbury.

Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science.
TiLPS Colloquium, Tilburg.

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation.
Annual meeting of the British Society for Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Bristol.
--->Download PDF slides

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation.
Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), Pittsburgh.
--->Download PDF slides

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation.
Annual meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science / Société canadienne pour l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences (CSHPS/SCHPS), Saskatoon.
--->Download PDF slides

Falsificationist confirmation.
35th annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy (SEP), Vancouver.

Surprise and evidence in statistical model checking.
Foundations of the Formal Sciences VI, Amsterdam.
--->Download PDF slides

2006

Bayeisanism, unification and coherence.
GAP.6 conference, Berlin.
--->Download PDF slides

Bayesian confirmation: No inductive logic.
Philosophical Research Colloquium, University of Düsseldorf.