% Encoding: UTF-8 @InProceedings{ColomboBucherSprenger2017, author = {Colombo, Matteo and Bucher, Leandra and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, title = {{Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generalizability, and Causal Framing}}, year = {2017}, address = {Austin/TX}, pages = {1806--1811}, publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, annotation = {Empirical Study on the interrelation between causal, explanatory and probabilistic judgments. (See also the \mkbibquote{Frontiers} article from 2017 by the same authors.)}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @InProceedings{ColomboPostmaSprenger2016, author = {Colombo, Matteo and Postma, Marie and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, title = {{Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Inference}}, year = {2016}, editor = {Papafragou, A. and Grodner, D. and Mirman, D. and Trueswell, J.C.}, pages = {432--437}, publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, annotation = {Explorative study about psychological assocations between explanatory power and other cognitive values.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{ColomboSprenger2014, author = {Colombo, Matteo and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Analysis}, title = {{The Predictive Mind and Chess-Playing. A Reply to Shand (2014)}}, year = {2014}, pages = {603--608}, volume = {74}, annotation = {A short discussion piece of Shand's arguments about human cognition, put forward in the very same journal, with an application to chess-playing.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{DawidHartmannSprenger2015, author = {Dawid, Richard and Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, title = {{The No Alternatives Argument}}, year = {2015}, issn = {0007-0882}, pages = {213--234}, volume = {66}, abstract = {Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light ofnewevidence? These aresomeof the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument') is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.}, annotation = {Investigates scope and validity of the argument that scientists' failure to find an alternative to an existing theory constitutes evidence for that particular theory.}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt045}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjps/axt045}, } @InCollection{HartmannSprenger2011, author = {Hartmann, S. and Sprenger, J.}, booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, title = {{Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences}}, year = {2011}, address = {London}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian C and Zamora Bonilla, Jes\'us}, pages = {594--612}, annotation = {Overview of the development of mathematical and statistical modeling in the social sciences, with special attention on methodological problems.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @InCollection{HartmannSprenger2010Bayes, author = {Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Epistemology}, publisher = {Routledge}, title = {{Bayesian Epistemology}}, year = {2010}, address = {London}, editor = {Pritchard, Duncan}, pages = {609--620}, annotation = {Introduction to Bayesian epistemology that explains the principles of probabilistic modeling and presents some applications, such as formal accounts of coherence and confirmation.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.21}, } @InProceedings{LaiKrahmerSprenger2014, author = {Lai, Jun and Krahmer, Emiel and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society}, title = {{Studying Frequency Effects in Learning Center-embedded Recursion}}, year = {2014}, address = {Austin/TX}, editor = {Bello, P. and Guarini, M. and McShane, M. and Scassellati, B.}, pages = {797--802}, publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, annotation = {Short article about the learning of recursive structures in an artifical grammar paradigm, comparing various modalities for presentation of the input.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @InProceedings{LaiKrahmerSprenger2015, author = {Lai, Jun and Krahmer, Emiel and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society}, title = {The Learnability of Auditory Center-embedded Recursion}, year = {2015}, address = {Austin/TX}, editor = {Noelle, D.C.}, pages = {1237--1243}, publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, annotation = {Extends the 2014 paper by the same authors in the direction of learning recursive structures in the auditory modality.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{MuldoonEtAl2014Norms, author = {Muldoon, Ryan and Lisciandra, Chiara and Bicchieri, Cristina and Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, title = {On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms}, journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics}, year = {2014}, volume = {13}, pages = {3-22}, annotation = {A probabilistic model for the emergence of descriptive norms, such as fashions or conventions. We study the impact of social sensitivity and extend the model in order to study more complex equilibria.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.21}, } @Article{Nardini2013, author = {Nardini, Cecilia and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Bias and Conditioning in Sequential Medical Trials.}}, year = {2013}, issn = {00318248}, pages = {1053--1064}, volume = {80}, abstract = {Randomized controlled trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based medicine. Usually they are monitored for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from trials stopped early is often charged with bias toward implausibly large effects. To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that conditional hypothesis tests give a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and significantly improve the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]}, annotation = {A suggestion to improve the practice of clinical trials by adopting a particular statistical framework: conditional frequentist reasoning, a compromise between Bayesian and frequentist methods.}, keywords = {CLINICAL trials,EVIDENCE-based medicine,FREQUENTIST statistics,RANDOMIZED controlled trials,RESEARCH bias}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, url = {http://offcampus.lib.washington.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=93642180&site=ehost-live}, } @InProceedings{Sprenger2012b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Bayesian Statistics 9: Proceedings of the Ninth Valencia International Meeting}, title = {{Discussion: Integrated Objective Bayesian Estimation and Hypothesis Testing}}, year = {2012}, address = {London}, editor = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M}, pages = {47--48}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, annotation = {Short discussion contribution on Jos\'{e} Bernardo's reference prior approach to hypothesis testing and parameter estimation.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2010b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Handbook of the History of Logic}, publisher = {North-Holland}, title = {{Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation}}, year = {2010}, address = {Amsterdam}, editor = {Gabbay, Dov M and Hartmann, Stephan and Woods, John}, pages = {235--263}, volume = {10}, annotation = {Handbook article that connects Hempel's writings on confirmation with modern, probabilistic approaches to the paradox of the ravens.}, doi = {10.1016/B978-0-444-52936-7.50007-0}, issn = {18745857}, keywords = {Confirmation,Inductive Logic,Logic}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2015b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{A Novel Solution of the Problem of Old Evidence}}, year = {2015}, pages = {383-401}, volume = {82}, annotation = {Provides an elegant solution to the dynamic Problem of Old Evidence in the tradition of the approaches by Jeffrey and Earman, but with more plausible assumptions.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2013, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, title = {{The Role of Bayesian Philosophy within Bayesian Model Selection}}, year = {2013}, pages = {101--114}, volume = {2}, annotation = {An analysis of how much Bayesian reasoning there actually is in model selection procedures that are commonly classified as ``Bayesian''.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2013a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, title = {{A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation}}, year = {2013}, issn = {01650106}, pages = {727--738}, volume = {78}, abstract = {This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.}, annotation = {Synthesizes two different and allegedly opposed research programs in confirmation theory by means of a particular logical tool.}, doi = {10.1007/s10670-013-9487-7}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2013b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Testing a Precise Null Hypothesis: The Case of Lindley's Paradox.}}, year = {2013}, issn = {00318248}, pages = {733--744}, volume = {80}, abstract = {Testing a point null hypothesis is a classical but controversial issue in statistical methodology. A prominent illustration is Lindley's Paradox, which emerges in hypothesis tests with large sample size and exposes a salient divergence between Bayesian and frequentist inference. A close analysis of the paradox reveals that both Bayesians and frequentists fail to satisfactorily resolve it. As an alternative, I suggest Bernardo's Bayesian Reference Criterion: (i) it targets the predictive performance of the null hypothesis in future experiments; (ii) it provides a proper decision-theoretic model for testing a point null hypothesis; (iii) it convincingly addresses Lindley's Paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]}, annotation = {An analysis of Lindley's Paradox and the rationale behind point null significance testing with the help of Bernardo's reference prior approach.}, keywords = {BAYESIAN analysis,Dennis,FREQUENTIST statistics,INFERENTIAL statistics,LINDLEY,PARADOX,STATISTICAL hypothesis testing,STATISTICS -- Methodology}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, url = {http://offcampus.lib.washington.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=93642178&site=ehost-live}, } @Article{Sprenger2012, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Rationality, Markets and Morals}, title = {{The Renegade Subjectivist : Jos{{\'{e}}} Bernardo's Reference Bayesianism}}, year = {2012}, pages = {1--13}, volume = {3}, abstract = {This article motivates and discusses JosE Bernardo's attempt to reconcile the subjective Bayesian framework with a need for objective scientific inference, leading to a special kind of objective Bayesianism, namely reference Bayesianism. We elucidate principal ideas and foundational implications of Bernardo's approach, with particular attention to the classical problem of testing a precise null hypothesis against an unspecified alternative.}, annotation = {A critical, but sympathetic comment on Bernardo's reference Bayesianism from a philosophical point of view.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/rmm/journl/v3y2012i50.html}, } @Article{Sprenger2011c, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, title = {{Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.}}, year = {2011}, number = {7}, pages = {497--508}, volume = {6}, abstract = {Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a sound and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of H-D confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the H-D method is also highly relevant for scientific practice.}, annotation = {Positioned overview of the history and current state of hypothetico-deductive confirmation.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2010a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association}, publisher = {Springer}, title = {{Statistical inference without frequentist justifications}}, year = {2010}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {9789048132621}, pages = {289--297}, abstract = {In modern science, inductive inference often amounts to statistical inference. Statistical techniques have steadily conquered terrain over the last decades and extended their scope of application to more and more disciplines. Explanations and predictions, in high-level as well as in low-level sciences, are nowadays fueled by statistical models. However, this development did not occur because scientists believe the underlying systems to be irreducibly stochastic. This might sometimes be the case, but certainly not in general. Rather, even traditionally “deterministic” sciences (such as several branches of physics, psychology and economics) use statistics to model noise and imperfect measurement and to express their uncertainty about the nature of the data-generating process. A wide spectrum of techniques can be used to draw valid conclusions from data: Hypothesis tests help scientists to see which of two competing hypotheses is better supported. Confidence intervals narrow down the set of values of an unknown model parameter which is compatible with the observations. And so on.}, annotation = {Develops an anti-metaphysical conception of probability which is able to account for the use of probabilistic inference in statistical modeling.}, doi = {10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8{\_}25}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.13}, } @Article{Sprenger2010c, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Synthese}, title = {{Probability, rational single-case decisions and the Monty Hall Problem}}, year = {2010}, number = {3}, pages = {331--340}, volume = {174}, abstract = {The application of probabilistic arguments to rational decisions in a single case is a contentious philosophical issue which arises in various contexts. Some authors (e.g. Horgan, Philos Pap 24:209–222, 1995; Levy, Synthese 158:139–151, 2007) affirm the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases while others (Baumann, Am Philos Q 42:71–79, 2005; Synthese 162:265–273, 2008) deny it. I demonstrate that both sides do not give convincing arguments for their case and propose a new account of the relationship between probabilistic reasoning and rational decisions. In particular, I elaborate a flaw in Baumann's reductio of rational single-case decisions in a modified Monty Hall Problem}, annotation = {Rebuts an argument by Baumann against the standard solution of the Monty Hall Problem, and defends the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases.}, keywords = {Decision Theory,Monty Hall Problem,Probability,Rationality}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2009a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials}}, year = {2009}, issn = {0031-8248}, pages = {637--649}, volume = {76}, abstract = {To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and fre- quentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions.Toresolve the deadlock, I suggest a three-part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision-theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre-experimental rel- evance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, post- experimental irrelevance.}, annotation = {Defends the Bayesian position on the post-experimental irrelevance of experimental design and stopping rules, both from a methodological and a decision-theoretic perspective.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{SprengerStegenga2017, author = {Jan Sprenger and Jacob Stegenga}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures}}, year = {2017}, number = {5}, pages = {840--852}, volume = {84}, annotation = {Argues on epistemic and decision-theoretic grounds for aboslute and against relative outcome measures in medicine (e.g., Risk Ratio, Absolute/Relative Risk Reduction).}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.01.12}, } @Article{Sprenger2020a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Conditional Degree of Belief}}, year = {2020}, number = {2}, pages = {319--335}, volume = {87}, annotation = {Proposes a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief and explores the implications for Bayesian inference with statistical models.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.20}, } @Article{Sprenger2018a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {{Philosophical Review}}, title = {{Foundations for a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength}}, year = {2018}, pages = {371--398}, volume = {127}, annotation = {Axiomatic treatment and representation theorems for probabilistic measures of causal strength, with a normative argument for a particular measure.}, } @Article{Sprenger2018b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, title = {{Two Impossibility Results for Popperian Corroboration}}, year = {2018}, pages = {139--159}, volume = {69}, annotation = {Motivates the need for a concept of corroboration in hypothesis testing that is distinct from evidential support, and demonstrates impossibility results for an explication along Popperian lines.}, } @Article{Sprenger2018d, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, title = {{The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism}}, year = {2018}, pages = {539--558}, volume = {8}, annotation = {Argues that classifying subjective Bayesian inference as ``non-objective'' is based on an outdated image of objectivity that neglects recent philosophical progress.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.03.14}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2023Conf, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {The Paradoxes of Confirmation}, booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2023}, editor = {Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio}, pages = {113--123}, address = {London}, annotation = {Survey article on the Bayesian and non-Bayesian paradoxes of confirmation in philosophy of science.}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2022Hempel, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Hempel and Confirmation Theory}}, booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2022}, editor = {Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Thomas Uebel}, pages = {248--256}, address = {London}, annotation = {Survey article on Hempel's contributions to confirmation theory at various stages of his career.}, } @InCollection{sep-scientific-objectivity, author = {Reiss, Julian and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, title = {{Scientific Objectivity}}, year = {2014/20}, editor = {Zalta, Ed}, annotation = {Encyclopedia entry covering different aspects of objectivity in science. Substantial revisions in 2020.}, keywords = {enc}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/}, } @InCollection{MartiniSprenger2016, author = {Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {{Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise}}, year = {2017}, address = {New York}, editor = {Boyer-Kassem, Thomas and Mayo-Wilson, Conor and Weisberg, Michael}, pages = {180--201}, annotation = {An overview on probability and judgment aggregation methods, with a focus on the role of experts and differential weighting procedures.}, } @Article{vanDongenEtAl2019, author = {{van Dongen}, N. N. N. and {van Doorn}, J. B. and Gronau, Q. F. and {van Ravenzwaaij}, D. and Hoekstra, R. and Haucke, M. N. and Lakens, D. and Hennig, C. and Morey, R. D. and Homer, S. and Gelman, A. and Sprenger, J. and Wagenmakers, E.--J.}, journal = {The American Statistician}, title = {Multiple Perspectives on Inference for Two Simple Statistical Scenarios}, year = {2019}, pages = {328--339}, volume = {73}, annotation = {Shows how exemplary datasets are analyzed by exponents of different statistical schools, and compares the conclusions they draw.}, } @Article{WhelanSarmientoSprenger2018, author = {Garvan Whelan and Roberto Sarmiento and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {{Production, Planning and Control}}, title = {Universal-deterministic and probabilistic hypotheses in operation management research: a discussion paper}, year = {2018}, pages = {1306--1320}, volume = {29}, annotation = {Describes the relevance of Popper's philosophy of science for hypothesis formation and inference in operations managament research.}, } @Article{ColomboEtAl2018inconsistencies, author = {Matteo Colombo and Georgi Duev and Michêle Nuijten and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, title = {Statistical reporting inconsistencies in experimental philosophy}, year = {2018}, pages = {e0194360}, volume = {13}, annotation = {Investigates the rates of statistical reporting errors in experimental philosophy research and compares them to other behavioral disciplines.}, eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194360}, } @Article{Cova2018, author = {Florian Cova and Brent Strickland and Angela Abatista and Aur\'elien Allard and James Andow and Mario Attie and James Beebe and Renatas Berninas and Jordane Boudesseul and Matteo Colombo and Fiery Cushman and Rodrigo Diaz and Noah N\textquoteright{}Djaye Nikolai van Dongen and Vilius Dranseika and Brian D. Earp and Antonio Gait\'an Torres and Ivar Hannikainen and Jos\'e V. Hern\'andez-Conde and Wenjia Hu and Fran\c{c}ois Jaquet and Kareem Khalifa and Hanna Kim and Markus Kneer and Joshua Knobe and Miklos Kurthy and Anthony Lantian and Shen{-}yi Liao and Edouard Machery and Tania Moerenhout and Christian Mott and Mark Phelan and Jonathan Phillips and Navin Rambharose and Kevin Reuter and Felipe Romero and Paulo Sousa and Jan Sprenger and Emile Thalabard and Kevin Tobia and Hugo Viciana and Daniel Wilkenfeld and Xiang Zhou}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, title = {Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy}, year = {2018}, number = {1}, pages = {1--36}, annotation = {Collaborative replication project for a representative samples of papers in experimental philosophy.}, doi = {10.1007/s13164-018-0400-9}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, } @Article{RomeroSprenger2021, author = {Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Synthese}, title = {Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way}, year = {2021}, pages = {5803--5823}, volume = {198}, annotation = {Comparison of meta-analytic accuracy of replication research under a Bayesian and a frequentist approach to judging the relevance of research findings.}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02697-x}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media Llc}, } @InCollection{sep-paradox-simpson, author = {Sprenger, Jan and Weinberger, Naftali}, booktitle = {The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, title = {{Simpson’s Paradox}}, year = {2021}, editor = {Edward N. Zalta}, annotation = {Encyclopedia entry that characterizes Simpson's paradox mathematically and explains its significance for causal reasoning and philosophical research questions.}, keywords = {enc}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/paradox-simpson/}, } @Article{vanDongen2021-VANIAT-8, author = {Noah {van Dongen} and Matteo Colombo and Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, title = {Intuitions About the Reference of Proper Names: A Meta-Analysis}, year = {2021}, number = {4}, pages = {745--774}, volume = {12}, annotation = {Meta-analysis of experimental philosophy research on the intercultural variation in judgments on the referents of proper names.}, doi = {10.1007/s13164-020-00503-8}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, } @Article{ERS2021JPLa, author = {\'Egr\'e, Paul and Rossi, Lorenzo, and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, title = {{De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals. Part I: Trivalent Semantics and Validity}}, year = {2021}, pages = {187--213}, volume = {50}, annotation = {Develops a truth-functional semantics for indicative conditionals with three truth values and studies the appropriate relations of logical consequence.}, } @Article{ERS2021JPLb, author = {\'Egr\'e, Paul and Rossi, Lorenzo, and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, title = {{De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals. Part II: Proof Theory and Algebraic Semantic}}, year = {2021}, pages = {215--247}, volume = {50}, annotation = {Provides soundness and completeness theorems for the logics developed in Part I, and studies their algebraic properties.}, } @PhdThesis{Sprenger2008Thesis, author = {Jan Sprenger}, school = {Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bonn}, title = {{Confirmation and Evidence}}, year = {2008}, keywords = {thesis}, } @MastersThesis{Sprenger2005MA, author = {Jan Sprenger}, school = {Department of Mathematics, University of Bonn}, title = {{Skalenlimiten interagierender Teilchensysteme}}, year = {2005}, type = {mathesis}, keywords = {thesis}, } @Article{Sprenger2011review, author = {Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Metascience}, title = {A unifying framework for probabilistic reasoning}, year = {2011}, note = {Review of R.~Haenni, J.W.~Romeijn, G.~Wheeler and J.~Williamson: “Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks”}, pages = {459--462}, volume = {21}, keywords = {review}, } @InCollection{PedenSprenger2022, author = {William Peden and Jan Sprenger}, booktitle = {{Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics}}, publisher = {Routledge}, title = {{Significance Testing in Economics}}, year = {forthcoming}, address = {London}, editor = {Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss}, annotation = {Survey article on history and methodological problems of significance testing in economics.}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2016francais, author = {Jan Sprenger}, booktitle = {Les méthodes bayésiennes, sciences et épistémologie}, publisher = {Éditions matériologiques}, title = {Bayésianisme versus fréquentisme en inférence statistique}, year = {2016}, address = {Paris}, editor = {Isabelle Drouet}, pages = {167--192}, annotation = {Abridged and revised version in French of the homonymous article for the OUP handbook.}, } @Book{SprengerHartmann2019, author = {Sprenger, Jan, and Hartmann, Stephan}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {Bayesian Philosophy of Science}, year = {2019}, address = {Oxford}, annotation = {Research monograph applying Bayesian reasoning to various topics in philosophy of science.}, } @InCollection{SprengerTeira2013, author = {Jan Sprenger and David Teira}, booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics}, publisher = {Springer}, title = {{The Ethics of Statistical Testing}}, year = {2013}, address = {Berlin}, editor = {Christoph Luetge}, pages = {1535--1549}, annotation = {Handbook article on methodology and ethical issues in statistical hypothesis testing.}, } @Article{Sprenger2016b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, title = {{The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument}}, year = {2016}, pages = {173--189}, volume = {6}, annotation = {Gives an analysis of scope and limits of a probabilistic No Miracles Argument, focusing on a situation where scientific knowledge is stable over time.}, } @Article{KleinSprenger2015, author = {Dominik Klein and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, title = {{Modelling Individual Expertise in Group Judgements}}, year = {2015}, number = {1}, pages = {3--25}, volume = {31}, annotation = {Analysis under which circumstances a differential weighting of opinions is beneficial to group accuracy, compared to straight averaging.}, } @Article{MartiniColyvanSprenger2013, author = {Carlo Martini and Jan Sprenger and Mark Colyvan}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, title = {Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect}, year = {2013}, number = {4}, pages = {881--898}, volume = {78}, annotation = {Explores the rationality of consensus procedures that are based on the group members' mutual respect for each other, with application to factual and value-related disagreements.}, } @Article{MuldoonEtAl2014Disagreement, author = {Ryan Muldoon and Chiara Lisciandra and Mark Colyvan and Carlo Martini and Giacomo Sillari and Jan Sprenger}, title = {Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2014}, volume = {170}, number = {3}, pages = {377--394}, annotation = {Discusses whether rational disagreement can persist under the conditions of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and explores scope and limits of formal models that tackle this question.}, } @Article{Sprenger2012PSA, author = {Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {Environmental Risk Analysis: Robustness Is Essential for Precaution}, year = {2012}, number = {5}, pages = {881--892}, volume = {79}, annotation = {An analysis of what the Precautionary Principle implies for environmental risk analysis based on scientific models, with applications to risk assessment.}, } @Article{SchupbachSprenger2011, author = {Schupbach, Jonah N. and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, title = {{The Logic of Explanatory Power}}, year = {2011}, pages = {105--127}, volume = {78}, annotation = {Sets up and defends a specific probabilistic measure of explanatory power arguing from first principles.}, keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning}, } @Article{Sprenger2011Models, author = {Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Synthese}, title = {Science Without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling}, year = {2011}, number = {1}, pages = {65--76}, volume = {180}, annotation = {A case study on data-driven inference in statistics and the interplay of top-down and bottom-up modeling, conducted with the help of bootstrap resampling techniques.}, } @Article{SprengerHeesen2011, author = {Jan Sprenger and Remco Heesen}, journal = {Mind}, title = {The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations}, year = {2011}, number = {479}, pages = {819--832}, volume = {120}, annotation = {Explores the scope of the ``weak expectations'' approach by Easwaran (2008, Mind): they do not have normative force by themselves, but they are the intersubjective consensus value in a bounded utility framework.}, } @Article{Sprenger2009b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, title = {{Statistics between Inductive Logic and Empirical Science}}, year = {2009}, issn = {0031-8248}, pages = {239--250}, volume = {7}, abstract = {To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and fre- quentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions.Toresolve the deadlock, I suggest a three-part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision-theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre-experimental rel- evance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, post- experimental irrelevance.}, annotation = {Argues that the ``inductive logic'' understanding of statistics is misplaced: in actual practice, statistics more and more resembles an empirical science than a branch of mathematics.}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2018.04.27}, } @Article{HartmannMartiniSprenger2009, author = {Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Episteme}, title = {Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers}, year = {2009}, number = {2}, pages = {110--129}, volume = {6}, annotation = {Generalizes Elga's notion of an epistemic peer, and shows under which conditions networks of epistemic peers will achieve consensus on their opinions}, } @Article{HartmannSprenger2012JA, author = {Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Synthese}, title = {Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth}, year = {2012}, pages = {209--221}, volume = {187}, annotation = {Conducts an epistemic analysis of judgment aggregation procedures that aim not only at a correct decision, but also at the right \mkbibquote{reasons} for that decision.}, } @Article{HartmannSprenger2010Weight, author = {Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, title = {The Weight of Competence Under a Realistic Loss Function}, year = {2010}, number = {2}, pages = {346--352}, volume = {18}, annotation = {Argues for a more realistic loss function in information pooling problems, and determines the optimal relative weights of individual contributions, dependent on the competence of the sources.}, } @Article{Sprenger2017comment, author = {Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A}, title = {{Discussion: Beyond Subjective and Objective in Bayesian Statistics}}, year = {2017}, pages = {1119}, volume = {180}, annotation = {Invited commentary on a paper by Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig on objectivity in Bayesian inference in the same journal issue.}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2016c, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Handbook of Philosophy of Probability}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {{Bayesianism and Frequentism in Statistical Inference}}, year = {2016}, address = {Oxford}, editor = {Hájek, Alan and Hitchcock, Christopher}, pages = {382--405}, annotation = {Handbook article that contrasts Bayesian and frequentist approaches to statistical inference, with particular attention to hypothesis testing.}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2016a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Handbook of Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {{Confirmation and Induction}}, year = {2016}, address = {Oxford}, editor = {Humphreys, Paul W.}, pages = {185--209}, annotation = {Survey article on confirmation theory, both from a qualitative and a probabilistic/statistical angle.}, } @Article{HartmannPigozziSprenger2010, author = {Stephan Hartmann and Gabriella Pigozzi and Jan Sprenger}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, title = {Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation}, year = {2010}, pages = {603--617}, volume = {20}, annotation = {Combines analytical methods and numerical simulations in order to compare the epistemic value of various judgment aggregation procedures.}, } @Article{ColomboBucherSprenger2017b, author = {Colombo, Matteo and Bucher, Leandra and Sprenger, Jan}, journal = {{Frontiers in Psychology}}, title = {{Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance}}, year = {2017}, pages = {1430}, volume = {8}, annotation = {Theoretical and empirical study about how probabilistic, causal and explanatory judgments interact, and how one can predict the latter.}, doinote = {\doi{10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01430}}, timestamp = {4 September 2017}, } @Article{vanDongenEtAl2022Severity, author = {Noah van Dongen and Jan Sprenger and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers}, title = {{A Bayesian Perspecitve on Severity: Risky Predictions and Specific Hypotheses}}, journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin and Review}, year = {2023}, volume = {30}, pages = {516--533}, annotation = {Critique of Mayo's error statistics, and outline of an account of severity in Bayesian statistical inference.}, } @InCollection{vanDongenSprenger2023SAGE, author = {Sprenger, Jan and van Dongen, Noah}, title = {Statistical Inference, Bayesian}, booktitle = {SAGE Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, year = {forthcoming}, editor = {James Mattingly}, volume = {2}, pages = {856--858}, address = {Thousand Oaks/CA}, annotation = {Encyclopedia entry on Bayesian statistical inference}, keywords = {enc}, } @InCollection{ERS2023Gibbard, author = {\'Egr\'e, Paul and Rossi, Lorenzo, and Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Gibbardian Collapse and Trivalent Conditionals}}, booktitle = {{Conditionals: Logic, Linguistics and Psychology}}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2023}, editor = {Stefan Kaufmann and David Over and Ghanshyam Sharma}, pages = {37--72}, address = {New York}, annotation = {Analysis of Gibbard's collapse result for indicative conditionals in trivalent semantics.}, } @Article{vanDongen2024Expl, author = {Noah {van Dongen} and Riet {van Bork} and Adam Finnemann and Jonas Haslbeck and Han L. J. {van der Maas} and {Donald J.} Robinaugh and Jill {de Ron} and Jan Sprenger and {Denny Borsboom}}, title = {Productive Explanation: A Framework for Evaluating Explanations in Psychological Science}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {forthcoming}, annotation = {Develops a multi-level explanation framework for psychological science connecting theories, models, phenomena and (structured) data.}, } @Article{LissiaSprenger2024, author = {Lina Maria Lissia and Jan Sprenger}, title = {The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox}, journal = {Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {forthcoming}, annotation = {Sets up a deontic version of the preface paradox and argues that weakening standard deontic/doxastic logic is a promising strategy to tackle it.}, } @Article{Sikorski2024C+C, author = {Michal Sikorski and Noah {van Dongen} and Jan Sprenger}, title = {Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, year = {forthcoming}, annotation = {Reports two experiments on the relationship between conditional claims, causal claims and statistical relationships.}, } @Article{RosellaSprenger2024, author = {Giuliano Rosella and Jan Sprenger}, title = {Causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents}, journal = {Annals of Pure and Applied Logic}, year = {2024}, volume = {175}, number = {9}, pages = {e: 103336}, annotation = {Develops a framework for the evaluation of counterfactual probabilities with disjunctive antecedents.}, } @Article{ERS2023C+U, author = {\'Egr\'e, Paul and Rossi, Lorenzo, and Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Certain and Uncertain Inference with Trivalent Conditionals}}, journal = {{Australasian Journal of Philosophy}}, year = {forthcoming}, annotation = {Shows how a trivalent semantics for conditionals yields Adams's logic for certainty- and probability-preserving inference.}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2025C3, author = {Jan Sprenger}, title = {The Conditional in Three-Valued Logic}, booktitle = {Handbook of Three-Valued Logic}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {forthcoming}, editor = {Paul Égré and Lorenzo Rossi}, annotation = {Overview article on the use of the conditional in trivalent logic.}, } @Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:bibtex;}