% Encoding: UTF-8 @STRING{j-amer-stat="The American Statistician" } @STRING{j-ann-hist-comput="Annals of the History of Computing" } @STRING{j-ann-math-stat="Annals of Mathematical Statistics" } @STRING{j-ann-stat="Annals of Statistics" } @STRING{j-biometrika="Biometrika" } @STRING{j-british-j-philos-sci="British Journal for the Philosophy of Science" } @STRING{j-demography="Demography" } @STRING{j-dialectica="Dialectica: International Review of Philosophy of Knowledge" } @STRING{j-j-am-stat-assoc="Journal of the American Statistical Association" } @STRING{j-j-r-stat-soc-ser-a-general="Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General)" } @STRING{j-j-r-stat-soc-ser-b-methodol="Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological)" } @STRING{j-j-r-stat-soc-ser-b-stat-methodol="Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Statistical Methodology)" } @STRING{j-j-r-stat-soc-suppl="Supplement to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society" } @STRING{j-math-intel="The Mathematical Intelligencer" } @STRING{j-philos-sci="Philosophy of Science" } @STRING{j-proc-amer-phil-soc="Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society" } @STRING{j-stat-sci="Statistical Science" } @STRING{j-stud-hist-philos-mod-phys="Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics" } @STRING{j-stud-hist-philos-sci="Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A" } @STRING{j-stud-hist-philos-sci-c="Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences" } @STRING{j-synthese="Synthese" } @STRING{pub-american-philosophical-society="American Philosophical Society" } @STRING{pub-american-philosophical-society:adr="Philadelphia, PA, USA" } @STRING{pub-ashgate="Ashgate" } @STRING{pub-ashgate:adr="Aldershot, Hampshire, England" } @STRING{pub-basic="Basic Books" } @STRING{pub-basic:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-birkhauser="Birkhäuser" } @STRING{pub-birkhauser:adr="Cambridge, MA, USA; Berlin, Germany; Basel, Switzerland" } @STRING{pub-blackwell="Blackwell" } @STRING{pub-blackwell:adr="Oxford, UK" } @STRING{pub-cambridge="Cambridge University Press" } @STRING{pub-cambridge:adr="Cambridge, UK" } @STRING{pub-clarendon="Clarendon Press" } @STRING{pub-clarendon:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-doubleday="Doubleday" } @STRING{pub-doubleday:adr="Garden City, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-dover="Dover Publications, Inc." } @STRING{pub-dover:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-duke= "Duke University Press" } @STRING{pub-duke:adr="Durham, NC, USA" } @STRING{pub-dunod="Dunod" } @STRING{pub-dunod:adr="Paris, France" } @STRING{pub-elsevier="Elsevier" } @STRING{pub-elsevier:adr="Amsterdam, The Netherlands" } @STRING{pub-greenwood="Greenwood Press" } @STRING{pub-greenwood:adr="88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, USA" } @STRING{pub-harper-row="Harper \& Row" } @STRING{pub-harper-row:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-harvard="Harvard University Press" } @STRING{pub-harvard:adr="Cambridge, MA, USA" } @STRING{pub-hutchinson="Hutchinson" } @STRING{pub-hutchinson:adr="London, UK" } @STRING{pub-indiana="Indiana University Press" } @STRING{pub-indiana:adr="Bloomington, IN, USA" } @STRING{pub-iop = "Institute of Physics Publishers" } @STRING{pub-iop:adr="Bristol, UK" } @STRING{pub-johns-hopkins="The Johns Hopkins University Press" } @STRING{pub-johns-hopkins:adr="Baltimore, MD, USA" } @STRING{pub-joseph-henry="Joseph Henry Press" } @STRING{pub-joseph-henry:adr="Washington, DC, USA" } @STRING{pub-kluwer="Kluwer Academic Publishers" } @STRING{pub-kluwer:adr="Norwell, MA, USA, and Dordrecht, The Netherlands" } @STRING{pub-macmillan="Macmillan Publishing Company" } @STRING{pub-macmillan:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-manchester-univ-press="Manchester University Press" } @STRING{pub-manchester-univ-press:adr="Manchester, UK" } @STRING{pub-mit = "MIT Press" } @STRING{pub-mit:adr="Cambridge, MA, USA" } @STRING{pub-norton="W. W. Norton \& Co." } @STRING{pub-norton:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-open-court="Open Court Publishing Co." } @STRING{pub-open-court:adr="La Salle, IL, USA" } @STRING{pub-oxford="Oxford University Press" } @STRING{pub-oxford:adr="Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK" } @STRING{pub-philosophical-library="Philosophical Library" } @STRING{pub-philosophical-library:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-princeton="Princeton University Press" } @STRING{pub-princeton:adr="Princeton, NJ, USA" } @STRING{pub-project-gutenberg="Project Gutenberg" } @STRING{pub-project-gutenberg:adr="P.O. Box 2782, Champaign, IL 61825-2782, USA" } @STRING{pub-prometheus-books="Prometheus Books" } @STRING{pub-prometheus-books:adr="Amherst, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-reidel="D. Reidel" } @STRING{pub-reidel:adr="Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Boston, MA, USA; Lancaster, UK; Tokyo, Japan" } @STRING{pub-routledge="Routledge \& Kegan Paul" } @STRING{pub-routledge:adr="London, UK and New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-simon-schuster="Simon and Schuster" } @STRING{pub-simon-schuster:adr="New York, NY, USA" } @STRING{pub-springer-netherlands="Springer Netherlands" } @STRING{pub-springer-netherlands:adr="Dordrecht, The Netherlands" } @STRING{pub-stanford="Stanford University Press" } @STRING{pub-stanford:adr="Stanford, CA, USA" } @STRING{pub-sv = "Springer-Verlag" } @STRING{pub-sv:adr="Berlin, Germany~/ Heidelberg, Germany~/ London, UK~/ etc." } @STRING{pub-u-cal="University of California Press" } @STRING{pub-u-cal:adr="Berkeley, CA, USA" } @STRING{pub-u-chicago="University of Chicago Press" } @STRING{pub-u-chicago:adr="Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK" } @STRING{pub-westview="Westview Press" } @STRING{pub-westview:adr="Boulder, CO, USA" } @STRING{pub-world-sci="World Scientific Publishing Co." } @STRING{pub-world-sci:adr="Singapore; Philadelphia, PA, USA; River Edge, NJ, USA" } @STRING{pub-yale= "Yale University Press" } @STRING{pub-yale:adr="New Haven, CT, USA" } @STRING{ser-boston-stud-philos-sci="Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science" } @Book{Adams1975, Title = {The Logic of Conditionals}, Author = {Adams, Ernest W.}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1975}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Article{Adams1965, Title = {{The Logic of Conditionals}}, Author = {Adams, Ernest W.}, Journal = {Inquiry}, Year = {1965}, Pages = {166--197}, Volume = {8}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @InCollection{Akaike1973, Title = {{Information Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle}}, Author = {Akaike, Hirotogu}, Booktitle = {Second International Symposium on Information Theory}, Publisher = {Akademiai Kiado}, Year = {1973}, Address = {Budapest}, Editor = {Petrov, B. N. and Csaki, F.}, Pages = {267--281}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D40{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:MGPUR4WVBMEC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @Article{AGM1985, Title = {{On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions}}, Author = {Alchourr{ó}n, Carlos E. and Gärdenfors, Peter and Makinson, David}, Journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic}, Year = {1985}, Month = {jun}, Number = {2}, Pages = {510--530}, Volume = {50}, Keywords = {Belief Dynamics,Logic} } @Article{AlexanderWeinberg2007, Title = {{Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy}}, Author = {Alexander, Joshua and Weinberg, Jonathan M.}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2007}, Number = {1}, Pages = {56--80}, Volume = {2}, Keywords = {Criticisms of ExPhi,Experimental Philosophy}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Alexander2007, Title = {{The Structural Evolution of Morality}}, Author = {Alexander, Jason McKenzie}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2007}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Allais1953, author = {Allais, Maurice}, title = {Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école Américaine}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1953}, volume = {21}, pages = {503-546}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.20}, } @Book{AllaisHagen1979, Title = {{Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox}}, Author = {Allais, Maurice and Hagen, Ole}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1979}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Aquinas1945, Title = {{Basic Writings of St.~Thomas Aquinas}}, Author = {Aquinas, Thomas}, Publisher = {Random House}, Year = {1945}, Address = {New York} } @Article{VanAssenEtAl2014, Title = {{Why Publishing Everything is More Effective than Selective Publishing of Statistically Significant Results}}, Author = {Assen, Marcel A. L. M. van and Aert, Robbie C. M. van and Nuijten, Mich\`ele B. and Wicherts, Jelte M.}, Journal = {PLoS One}, Year = {2014}, Note = {\doi{10.1371/journal.pone.0084896}}, Volume = {9}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pageswegdamit = {e84896}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Atkinson2012, Title = {{Confirmation and Justification: A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure}}, Author = {Atkinson, David}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {49--61}, Volume = {184}, Keywords = {Confirmation}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Atkinsonetal2009, Title = {{How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses}}, Author = {Atkinson, David and Peijnenburg, Jeanne and Kuipers, Theo}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2009}, Month = jan, Pages = {1--21}, Volume = {76}, Keywords = {Confirmation;Conjunction Fallacy}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{AtkinsonPeijnenburg2017, Title = {{Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem}}, Author = {Atkinson, David, and Peijnenburg, Jeanne}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2017}, Address = {Berlin}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2018.01.02} } @InCollection{Baker2010, Title = {{Simplicity}}, Author = {Baker, Alan}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2016}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/simplicity/}}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/} } @Article{Baker2003, Title = {{Quantitative Parsimony and Explanation}}, Author = {Baker, Alan}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {245-259}, Volume = {54}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.05} } @Article{BakkerEtAl2012, Title = {{The Rules of the Game Called Psychological Science}}, Author = {Bakker, Marjan and Wicherts, Jelte and van Dijk, Annette}, Journal = {{Perspectives on Psychological Science}}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {543--554}, Volume = {7}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.25} } @Article{BandyopadhyayEtAl1996, Title = {{The Curve Fitting Problem: A Bayesian Approach}}, Author = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Boik, Robert J. and Basu, Prasun}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1996}, Pages = {S264-S272}, Volume = {63}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.07.29} } @Book{Barnes2008, Title = {The Paradox of Predictivism}, Author = {Barnes, Eric Christian}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2008}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{bassler2010, Title = {{Stopping Randomized Trials Early for Benefit and Estimation of Treatment Effects}}, Author = {Bassler, D and Briel, M and Montori, V M and Lane, M and Glasziou, P and Zhou, Q and Heels-Ansdell, D and Walter, S D and Guyatt, G H and Flynn, N and Others}, Journal = {JAMA}, Year = {2010}, Number = {12}, Pages = {1180--1187}, Volume = {303}, Publisher = {Am Med Assoc} } @Book{Batterman2002, Title = {{The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence}}, Author = {Batterman, Robert W.}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2002}, Address = {Oxford}, Abstract = {Robert Batterman explores a form of scientific reasoning termed asymptotic reasoning, which he argues is not only underexamined by philosophers but also important for its consequences in our understanding of the scientific process as a whole. Asymptotic reasoning implies that a scientific observer may choose to focus on a handful among many variables, assuming that other variables make little or no contribution to the behavior in a given system. Batterman argues that sometimes this is exactly what is required for scientific understanding. This has important consequences for our conceptions of topics like explanation, reduction, and emergence (core ideas in the philosophy of science). (publisher, edited)}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1093/0195146476.001.0001}}, ISBN = {0195146476}, ISSN = {0031-8248}, Keywords = {Explanation.,Reasoning.,Reductionism.,Science Methodology.,Science Philosophy.}, Pmid = {20225373} } @InCollection{BayarriEtAl1988, Title = {{What Is the Likelihood Function?}}, Author = {Bayarri, M. J. and De Groot, M. H. and Kadane, J. B.}, Booktitle = {{Statistical Decision Theory and Related Topics}}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {1988}, Editor = {Gupta, S. S. and Berger, J. O.}, Pages = {1--27}, Volume = {IV}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{Bayes1763, Title = {{An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances}}, Author = {Bayes, Thomas}, Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society}, Year = {1763}, Pages = {370-418}, Volume = {53}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{BechtelAbrahamsen2005, Title = {{Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative}}, Author = {Bechtel, William and Abrahamsen, Adele}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part~C\@: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {421--441}, Volume = {36}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.10} } @Article{BeckersVennekens2018, author = {Beckers, Sander and Vennekens, Joost}, title = {{A Principled Approach to Defining Actual Causation}}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2018}, volume = {195}, pages = {835--862}, } @Article{Bem2011, author = {Bem, Daryl J.}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, title = {{Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect}}, year = {2011}, issn = {1939-1315}, number = {3}, pages = {407--425}, volume = {100}, abstract = {The term psi denotes anomalous processes of information or energy transfer that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological mechanisms. Two variants of psi are precognition (conscious cognitive awareness) and premonition (affective apprehension) of a future event that could not otherwise be anticipated through any known inferential process. Precognition and premonition are themselves special cases of a more general phenomenon: the anomalous retroactive influence of some future event on an individual's current responses, whether those responses are conscious or nonconscious, cognitive or affective. This article reports 9 experiments, involving more than 1,000 participants, that test for retroactive influence by "time-reversing" well-established psychological effects so that the individual's responses are obtained before the putatively causal stimulus events occur. Data are presented for 4 time-reversed effects: precognitive approach to erotic stimuli and precognitive avoidance of negative stimuli; retroactive priming; retroactive habituation; and retroactive facilitation of recall. The mean effect size (d) in psi performance across all 9 experiments was 0.22, and all but one of the experiments yielded statistically significant results. The individual-difference variable of stimulus seeking, a component of extraversion, was significantly correlated with psi performance in 5 of the experiments, with participants who scored above the midpoint on a scale of stimulus seeking achieving a mean effect size of 0.43. Skepticism about psi, issues of replication, and theories of psi are also discussed.}, doinote = {\doi{10.1037/a0021524}}, keywords = {Psychophysiologic,Affect,Awareness,Boredom,Cognition,Erotica,Escape Reaction,Female,Habituation,Humans,Male,Mental Recall,Parapsychology,Subliminal Stimulation,Time Factors}, pmid = {21280961}, url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21280961}, } @Article{BemUttsJohnson2011, author = {Bem, Daryl J. and Utts, Jessica and Johnson, Wesley O.}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, title = {{Must Psychologists Change the Way they Analyze Their Data?}}, year = {2011}, issn = {1939-1315}, number = {4}, pages = {716--719}, volume = {101}, abstract = {Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas (2011) argued that psychologists should replace the familiar "frequentist" statistical analyses of their data with bayesian analyses. To illustrate their argument, they reanalyzed a set of psi experiments published recently in this journal by Bem (2011), maintaining that, contrary to his conclusion, his data do not yield evidence in favor of the psi hypothesis. We argue that they have incorrectly selected an unrealistic prior distribution for their analysis and that a bayesian analysis using a more reasonable distribution yields strong evidence in favor of the psi hypothesis. More generally, we argue that there are advantages to bayesian analyses that merit their increased use in the future. However, as Wagenmakers et al.'s analysis inadvertently revealed, they contain hidden traps that must be better understood before being more widely substituted for the familiar frequentist analyses currently employed by most research psychologists.}, doinote = {\doi{10.1037/a0024777}}, keywords = {Statistical,Data Interpretation,Humans,Psychology,Psychology: methods}, pmid = {21928916}, url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21928916}, } @Book{Bennett2003, Title = {{A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals}}, Author = {Bennett, Jonathan}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2003}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Article{Berger2003, Title = {{Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have Agreed on Testing?}}, Author = {Berger, James O.}, Journal = {Statistical Science}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {1--32}, Volume = {18}, Abstract = {Ronald Fisher advocated testing using p-values, Harold Jeffreys proposed use of objective posterior probabilities of hypotheses and Jerzy Neyman recommended testing with fixed error probabilities. Each was quite critical of the other approaches. Most troubling for statistics and science is that the three approaches can lead to quite different practical conclusions. This article focuses on discussion of the conditional frequentist approach to testing, which is argued to provide the basis for a methodological unification of the approaches of Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman. The idea is to follow Fisher in using p-values to define the "strength of evidence" in data and to follow his approach of conditioning on strength of evidence; then follow Neyman by computing Type I and Type II error probabilities, but do so conditional on the strength of evidence in the data. The resulting conditional frequentist error probabilities equal the objective posterior probabilities of the hypotheses advocated by Jeffrey}, Booktitle = {Statistical Science}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1214/ss/1056397485}}, ISBN = {0883-4237}, ISSN = {0883-4237} } @InCollection{BergerBerry1988, Title = {{The Relevance of Stopping Rules in Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Berger, James O. and Berry, D. A.}, Booktitle = {Statistical decision theory and related topics: Vol.~IV}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {1988}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Berger, James O and Gupta, S S}, Pages = {29--72} } @Article{BergerBoukaiWang1997, Title = {{Unified Frequentist and Bayesian Testing of a Precise Hypothesis}}, Author = {Berger, James O. and Boukai, B. and Wang, Y.}, Journal = {Statistical Science}, Year = {1997}, Number = {3}, Pages = {133--160}, Volume = {12} } @Article{BergerBrownWolpert1994, Title = {{A Unified Conditional Frequentist and Bayesian Test for Fixed and Sequential Simple Hypothesis Testing}}, Author = {Berger, J O and Brown, L D and Wolpert, R L}, Journal = {Annals of Statistics}, Year = {1994}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1787--1807}, Volume = {22}, Publisher = {Institute of Mathematical Statistics} } @Article{BergerSellke1987, Title = {{Testing a Point Null Hypothesis: The Irreconcilability of $P$ Values and Evidence}}, Author = {Berger, James O. and Sellke, Thomas}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {1987}, Pages = {112-122}, Volume = {82}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:hEXC_dOfxuUC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{BergerWolpert1984, Title = {{The Likelihood Principle}}, Author = {Berger, James O. and Wolpert, Robert L.}, Publisher = {Institute of Mathematical Statistics}, Year = {1984}, Address = {Hayward, Calif.}, Booktitle = {Lecture notes-Monograph {{\ldots}}} } @InCollection{Bernardo1999, Title = {{Nested Hypothesis Testing: The Bayesian Reference Criterion}}, Author = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M.}, Booktitle = {Bayesian Statistics~6: Proceedings of the Sixth Valencia Meeting on Bayesian Statistics}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1999}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M. and Berger, James O. and Dawid, A. P. and Smith, Adrian F. M.}, Pages = {101-130 (with discussion)} } @InCollection{Bernardo2012, Title = {{Integrated Objective Bayesian Estimation and Hypothesis Testing}}, Author = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M.}, Booktitle = {Bayesian Statistics~9: Proceedings of the Ninth Valencia Meeting}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Oxford}, Pages = {1-68 (with discussion)}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:J4E9jCG1tHUC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Bernardo1979, Title = {{Reference Posterior Distributions for Bayesian Inference}}, Author = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M.}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~B}, Year = {1979}, Pages = {113-147}, Volume = {41}, Abstract = {A procedure is proposed to derive reference posterior distributions which approximately describe the inferential content of the data without incorporating any other information. More explicitly, operational priors, derived from information-theoretical considerations, are used to obtain reference posteriors which may be expected to approximate the posteriors which would have been obtained with the use of proper priors describing vague initial states of knowledge. The results obtained unify and generalize some previous work and seem to overcome criticisms to which this has been subject.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.2307/2985028}}, ISBN = {EE000181 00359246 DI993197 99P0383F}, ISSN = {00359246}, Keywords = {fieller-,non-informative,paradox,s paradox,stein}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2985028} } @Article{Bernardo1979a, Title = {{Expected Information as Expected Utility}}, Author = {Bernardo, Jos\'e M.}, Journal = {Annals of Statistics}, Year = {1979}, Pages = {686-690}, Volume = {7}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D40%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:ujxm2eEBZHIC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{Bernardo1994, Title = {{Bayesian Theory}}, Author = {Bernardo, José M. and Smith, Adrian F. M.}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1994}, Address = {New York} } @Article{BerryCarlinConnor2010, Title = {{Bias and Trials Stopped Early for Benefit}}, Author = {Berry, S M and Carlin, B P and Connor, J}, Journal = {Journal of the American Medican Association}, Year = {2010}, Number = {2}, Pages = {156}, Volume = {304}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1001/jama.2010.931}}, Publisher = {Am Med Assoc} } @Book{Bickle1998, Title = {{Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave}}, Author = {Bickle, John}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {1998}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.} } @Book{Billingsley1995, Title = {{Probability and Measure}}, Author = {Billingsley, Patrick}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1995}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Birnbaum1962, Title = {{On the Foundations of Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Birnbaum, Allan}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {1962}, Month = {jun}, Number = {298}, Pages = {269--306}, Volume = {57}, Keywords = {Statistics;Confirmation;Inductive Logic} } @Article{BlackwellDubins1962, Title = {{Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information}}, Author = {Blackwell, David and Dubins, Lester}, Journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, Year = {1962}, Month = {sep}, Number = {3}, Pages = {882--886}, Volume = {33}, ISSN = {2168-8990}, Publisher = {Institute of Mathematical Statistics}, Url = {http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aoms/1177704456} } @Article{BogenWoodward1988, Title = {{Saving the Phenomena}}, Author = {Bogen, James and Woodward, James}, Journal = {Philosophical Review}, Year = {1988}, Month = {jul}, Number = {3}, Pages = {303--352}, Volume = {47}, Keywords = {General Philosophy of Science} } @Article{Boniolo2003, Title = {{Kant's Explication and Carnap's Explication: The \textit{Redde Rationem}}}, Author = {Boniolo, Giovanni}, Journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {289--298}, Volume = {3}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{Bornstein1989, Title = {{Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968--1987}}, Author = {Bornstein, Robert F.}, Journal = {{Psychological Bulletin}}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {265--289}, Volume = {106}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Article{Bovens2010, Title = {{Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty}}, Author = {Bovens, Luc}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {23--26}, Volume = {70}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Book{BovensHartmann2003, Title = {{Bayesian Epistemology}}, Author = {Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2003}, Address = {New York}, Keywords = {Coherence} } @Article{Box1976, Title = {{Science and Statistics}}, Author = {Box, George E. P.}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {1976}, Month = {apr}, Pages = {791--799}, Volume = {71}, Abstract = {Abstract Aspects of scientific method are discussed: In particular, its representation as a motivated iteration in which, in succession, practice confronts theory, and theory, practice. Rapid progress requires sufficient flexibility to profit from such confrontations, and the ability to devise parsimonious but effective models, to worry selectively about model inadequacies and to employ mathematics skillfully but appropriately. The development of statistical methods at Rothamsted Experimental Station by Sir Ronald Fisher is used to illustrate these themes.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1080/01621459.1976.10480949}}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review.}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01621459.1976.10480949} } @InCollection{Boyd1981, Title = {{Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology}}, Author = {Boyd, Richard}, Booktitle = {PSA 1980}, Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association}, Year = {1980}, Address = {East Lansing, Mich.}, Editor = {Asquith, Peter D. and Giere, Ronald N.}, Pages = {613--662}, Volume = {II}, Cnote = {Laut https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.2.192615 ist das in Vol.~1980, no.~2 (1980!) von "PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association", Verlag: Univ. of Chicago Press}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.2.192615}}, Keywords = {Scientific Realism;Explanatory Reasoning}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @InCollection{Boyd1984, Title = {{The Current Status of Scientific Realism}}, Author = {Boyd, Richard}, Booktitle = {Scientific Realism}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1984}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif.}, Editor = {Leplin, Jarrett}, Pages = {41--82}, Keywords = {Scientific Realism;Explanatory Reasoning}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Boyd1983a, Title = {{On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism}}, Author = {Boyd, Richard}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {1983}, Pages = {45--90}, Volume = {19}, Cnote = {Wegen Initialen R.N. kommt der 1983-Artikel NACH dem 1984-Art., obwohl es sich ja um denselben Autor handelt. Was tun?}, File = {:home/jsprenger/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Boyd - 1983 - On the current status of the issue of scientific realism.pdf:pdf}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Broessel2013, Title = {{The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux}}, Author = {Brössel, Peter}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {378--397}, Volume = {80}, Publisher = {JSTOR} } @Book{Broessel2016, Title = {{Rethinking Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Brössel, Peter}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {forthcoming}, Address = {Berlin}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{BroesselHuber2015, Title = {{Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End}}, Author = {Brössel, Peter and Huber, Franz}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {737--749}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. 1 Introduction 2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory 3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief 4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments 5 Conclusion}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axu004}}, ISSN = {0007-0882}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/05/21/bjps.axu004.abstract} } @InCollection{Bradley2014, Title = {{Imprecise Probabilities}}, Author = {Bradley, Seamus}, Booktitle = {{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/imprecise-probabilities/}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{BrahamVanHees2009, Title = {{Degrees of Causation}}, Author = {Braham, Matthew and van Hees, Martin}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {323-344}, Volume = {71}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.10.28} } @Article{Brier1950, Title = {{Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability}}, Author = {Brier, Glenn W.}, Journal = {Monthly Weather Review}, Year = {1950}, Pages = {1-3}, Volume = {78}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Briggs2018, Title = {{Foundations of Probability}}, Author = {Briggs, Rachel A.}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, Year = {forthcoming}, Cnote = {Lieber "forthcoming"?}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Book{Broadbent2013, Title = {{Philosophy of Epidemiology}}, Author = {Broadbent, Alex}, Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, Year = {2013}, Address = {Basingstroke}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @InCollection{Bromberger1965, Title = {{An Approach to Explanation}}, Author = {Bromberger, Sylvain}, Booktitle = {Analytical Philosophy}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1965}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Butler, R J}, Pages = {72--105} } @Article{Brush1989, Title = {{Prediction and Theory Evaluation: The Case of Light Bending}}, Author = {Brush, Stephen G.}, Journal = {Science}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {1124--1129}, Volume = {246} } @Book{Buchak2013, Title = {Risk and Rationality}, Author = {Buchak, Lara}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2013}, Address = {Oxford} } @Article{BurnhamAnderson2004, Title = {{Multimodel Inference Understanding \AIC\ and \BIC\ in Model Selection}}, Author = {Burnham, Kenneth P. and Anderson, David R.}, Journal = {Sociological Methods Research}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {261--304}, Volume = {33}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D100{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:wuD5JclIwkYC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @Book{BurnhamAnderson2002, Title = {{Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A Practical Information-theoretic Approach}}, Author = {Burnham, Kenneth P. and Anderson, David R.}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2002}, Address = {New York}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D20%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:4oJvMfeQlr8C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Buss1998, Title = {{Sexual Strategies Theory: Historical Origins and Current Status}}, Author = {Buss, David M}, Journal = {Journal of Sex Research}, Year = {1998}, Number = {1}, Pages = {19--31}, Volume = {35}, Abstract = {In sexually reproducing organisms, no domain is more closely linked with the engine of the evolutionary process than sexuality. Men and women over human evolutionary history have confronted different adaptive problems in the sexual domain. Sexual Strategies Theory offers an account of these adaptive problems and presents a view of human sexual psychology as a rich repertoire of mechanisms that have evolved as adaptive solutions. A host of specific predictions about human sexuality follows from this analysis, including an account of sex differences in the desire for sexual variety, the qualities preferred in short-term and long-term mates, context-dependent shifts in mate preferences, the nature of sexual jealousy, the tactics that are effective for attracting and retaining a mate, and the causes of sexual conflict between men and women. After reviewing the theory's historical origins, I summarize a portion of the extensive empirical research designed to test its tenets. An evaluation of the theory notes its strengths as well as its weaknesses, with a special focus on the issues of prediction and falsification. It ends with a challenge for other theories of human sexuality to reach an equivalent level of specific predictions, a comparable empirical foundation, an equally parsimonious account of sex differences, a compelling ultimate account of causal origins, and a comparable level of multi-level conceptual integration.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1080/00224499809551914}}, ISBN = {00224499}, ISSN = {0022-4499} } @Article{Buss1993, Title = {{Sexual Strategies Theory: An Evolutionary Perspective on Human Mating}}, Author = {Buss, David M. and Schmitt, David P.}, Journal = {Psychological Review}, Year = {1993}, Number = {2}, Pages = {204--232}, Volume = {100}, Abstract = {This article proposes a contextual-evolutionary theory of human mating strategies. Both men and women are hypothesized to have evolved distinct psychological mechanisms that underlie short-term and long-term strategies. Men and women confront different adaptive problems in short-term as opposed to long-term mating contexts. Consequently, different mate preferences become activated from their strategic repertoires. Nine key hypotheses and 22 predictions from Sexual Strategies Theory are outlined and tested empirically. Adaptive problems sensitive to context include sexual accessibility, fertility assessment, commitment seeking and avoidance, immediate and enduring resource procurement, paternity certainty, assessment of mate value, and parental investment. Discussion summarizes 6 additional sources of behavioral data, outlines adaptive problems common to both sexes, and suggests additional contexts likely to cause shifts in mating strategy.}, Archiveprefix = {arXiv}, Arxivid = {arXiv:0802.3216v2}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1037/0033-295X.100.2.204}}, Eprint = {arXiv:0802.3216v2}, ISBN = {9780521551434}, ISSN = {0033-295X}, Pmid = {8483982} } @Article{Bylander1991, Title = {{The Computational Complexity of Abduction}}, Author = {Bylander, Tom and Allemang, Dean and Tanner, Michael C. and Josephson, John R.}, Journal = {Artificial Intelligence}, Year = {1991}, Number = {1}, Pages = {25--60}, Volume = {49}, Publisher = {Elsevier} } @Article{Callender2001, Title = {{Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously}}, Author = {Callender, Craig}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, Year = {2001}, Pages = {539--553}, Volume = {32}, Abstract = {This paper discusses the mistake of understanding the laws and concepts of thermodynamics too literally in the foundations of statistical mechanics. Arguing that this error is still made in subtle ways, the article explores its occurrence in three examples: the Second Law, the concept of equilibrium and the definition of phase transitions. {\textcopyright} 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1016/S1355-2198(01)00025-9}}, ISSN = {13552198}, Keywords = {Entropy,Equilibrium,Phase Transitions,Statistical Mechanics,Thermodynamics} } @Article{CamererEtAl2016, author = {Camerer, Colin F. and Dreber, Anna and Forsell, Eskil and Ho, Teck-Hua and Huber, Jürgen and Johannesson, Magnus and Kirchler, Michael and Almenberg, Johan and Altmejd, Adam and Chan, Taizan and Heikensten, Emma and Holzmeister, Felix and Imai, Taisuke and Isaksson, Siri and Nave, Gideon and Pfeiffer, Thomas and Razen, Michael and Wu, Hang}, title = {Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics}, journal = {Science}, year = {2016}, volume = {351}, number = {6280}, pages = {1433--1436}, } @Book{Carnap1952, title = {{The Continuum of Inductive Methods}}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1952}, author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, address = {Chicago}, } @Book{Carnap1950, Title = {{Logical Foundations of Probability}}, Author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1950}, Address = {Chicago}, Keywords = {Objective Probability} } @Article{Carnap1947, Title = {{On the Application of Inductive Logic}}, Author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, Year = {1947}, Number = {1}, Pages = {133--148}, Volume = {8}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.30} } @Book{Carnap1935, Title = {{Philosophy and Logical Syntax}}, Author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, Publisher = {Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner \& Co.}, Year = {1935}, Address = {London}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Cartwright1989, Title = {Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement}, Author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, Publisher = {Clarendon Press}, Year = {1989}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.06} } @Article{Cartwright1979, Title = {{Causal Laws and Effective Strategies}}, Author = {Cartwright, Nancy}, Journal = {No{{\^{u}}}s}, Year = {1979}, Month = {nov}, Number = {4}, Pages = {419--437}, Volume = {13}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @Article{CasscellsEtAl1978, Title = {{Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results}}, Author = {Casscells, W. and Schoenberger, A. and Graboys, T. B.}, Journal = {{New England Journal of Medicine}}, Year = {1978}, Pages = {999--1001}, Volume = {299}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.03} } @Article{CevolaniTambolo2013, Title = {{Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach}}, Author = {Cevolani, Gustavo and Tambolo, Luca}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {921--935}, Volume = {78}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @InCollection{Chakravartty2011, Title = {{Scientific Realism}}, Author = {Chakravartty, Anjan}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2017}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/scientific-realism/}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{ChaseBrown2000, Title = {{General Statistics}}, Author = {Chase, Warren and Brown, Fred}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {2000}, Address = {New York} } @Article{Cheng1997, Title = {{From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory}}, Author = {Cheng, Patricia W.}, Journal = {Psychological Review}, Year = {1997}, Pages = {367--405}, Volume = {104}, Keywords = {Causation,Experimental Philosophy,Explication} } @Article{Chihara1987, Title = {{Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Chihara, Charles S.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1987}, Month = {dec}, Number = {4}, Pages = {551--560}, Volume = {38}, Keywords = {Probabilism} } @Article{ChocklerHalpern2004, Title = {{Responsibility and Blame: A Structural-Model Approach}}, Author = {Chockler, Hana and Halpern, Joseph Y.}, Journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {93--115}, Volume = {22} } @Article{Christensen1999, Title = {{Measuring Confirmation}}, Author = {Christensen, David}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1999}, Month = {sep}, Number = {9}, Pages = {437--461}, Volume = {96}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Article{Churchland1985, Title = {{Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States}}, Author = {Churchland, Paul M.}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1985}, Pages = {8--28}, Volume = {82}, Abstract = {Do the phenomenological or qualitative features of our sensations constitute a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of any materialistic neuroscience? I here argue that they do not. Specifically, I wish to address the recent anti-reductionist arguments posed by Thomas NageV Frank Jackson,2 and Howard Robinson. 3 And I wish to explore the possibility of human subjective consciousness within a conceptual environment constituted by a matured and successful neuroscience.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.2307/2026509}}, ISBN = {0022362X}, ISSN = {0022362X} } @Book{Churchland1979, Title = {{Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind}}, Author = {Churchland, Paul M.}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1979}, Address = {Cambridge}, Abstract = {This book is an attempt to argue that experience on all levels is theoretical and to draw some conclusions from this thesis which are relevant to further thought in epistemology and philosophy of science. (staff)}, Booktitle = {Cambridge studies in philosophy}, ISBN = {0521226325}, ISSN = {00318051}, Keywords = {Knowledge,Realism,Science Philosophy,Theory of}, Pages = {x, 157}, Pmid = {3684773} } @Article{Cohen1994, author = {Cohen, Jacob}, title = {{The Earth is Round ($p < .05$)}}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {49}, pages = {997--1003}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.02.24}, } @Book{Cohen1988, Title = {{Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences}}, Author = {Cohen, Jacob}, Publisher = {Lawrence \& Erlbaum}, Year = {1988}, Address = {Newark, N.J.}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.10.28} } @Article{Cohen2016a, Title = {{Explanatory Justice: The Case of Disjunctive Explanations}}, Author = {Cohen, Michael}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2018}, Number = {3}, Pages = {442--454}, Volume = {85} } @Article{Cohen2016, Title = {{On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations}}, Author = {Cohen, Michael P.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {1077--1089}, Volume = {67} } @Article{Cohen2015, Title = {{On Schupbach and Sprenger's Measures of Explanatory Power}}, Author = {Cohen, Michael P.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {97--109}, Volume = {82} } @Article{Colombo2016, Title = {{Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of \emph{Explanation}}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo}, Journal = {Cognitive Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {503--517}, Volume = {41} } @InCollection{ColomboBucherSprenger2017a, Title = {{Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generalizability, and Causal Framing}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo and Bucher, Leandra and Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}}, Publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, Year = {2017}, Address = {Austin, Tex.}, Pages = {1806--1811}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.03.28} } @Article{ColomboBucherSprenger2017b, Title = {{Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo and Bucher, Leandra and Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {{Frontiers in Psychology}}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {1430}, Volume = {8}, Doinote = {\doi{10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01430}}, Timestamp = {4 September 2017} } @Article{ColomboHartmann2016, Title = {{Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification and Explanation}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {451--484}, Volume = {68}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{ColomboPostmaSprenger2016, Title = {{Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Inference}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo and Postma, Marie and Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}}, Publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Austin, Tex.}, Pages = {432--437} } @Article{ColomboWright2016, Title = {{Explanatory Pluralism: An Unrewarding Prediction Error for Free Energy Theorists}}, Author = {Colombo, Matteo and Wright, Cory}, Journal = {Brain and Cognition}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {3-12}, Volume = {112} } @Book{Colyvan2001, Title = {{The Indispensability of Mathematics}}, Author = {Colyvan, Mark}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2001}, Address = {New York} } @Book{Cooke1991, Title = {{Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science}}, Author = {Cooke, Roger}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1991}, Address = {Oxford} } @Book{CoxHinkley1974, Title = {Theoretical Statistics}, Author = {Cox, David and Hinkley, David}, Publisher = {Chapman \& Hall}, Year = {1974}, Address = {London}, Date = {1974}, Location = {London}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @InCollection{CoxMayo2010, Title = {{Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference}}, Author = {Cox, David and Mayo, Deborah G.}, Booktitle = {Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Cambridge}, Chapter = {2}, Editor = {Mayo, Deborah G. and Spanos, Aris}, Pages = {276--304}, Keywords = {Inductive Logic;Statistics} } @Article{Cox1946, Title = {{Probability, Frequency and Reasonable Expectation}}, Author = {Cox, Richard}, Journal = {American Journal of Physics}, Year = {1946}, Pages = {1-10}, Volume = {14}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Craver2007, Title = {{Explaining the Brain}}, Author = {Craver, Carl F.}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2007}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @InCollection{Crupi2013, author = {Crupi, Vincenzo}, title = {{Confirmation}}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2020}, editor = {Zalta, Ed}, note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/confirmation/}}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/}, } @Article{Crupi2012, Title = {{An Argument for Not Equating Confirmation and Explanatory Power}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo}, Journal = {{The Reasoner}}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {39--40}, Volume = {6}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.09.12} } @Article{CrupiChaterTentori2013, Title = {{New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Chater, Nick and Tentori, Katya}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Number = {1}, Pages = {189--204}, Volume = {64}, Keywords = {Confirmation,Explanatory Reasoning,Probabilism} } @Article{CrupiFitelsonTentori2008, Title = {{Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Fitelson, Branden and Tentori, Katya}, Journal = {Thinking \& Reasoning}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {182--199}, Volume = {14}, Abstract = {The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of con- temporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal result is a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy, which is proven robust (i.e., not depending on various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation). The proposed analysis is shown distinct from contentions that the conjunction effect is in fact not a fallacy, and is compared with major competing explanations of the phenomenon, including earlier references to a confirmation-theoretic account.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1080/13546780701643406}}, ISBN = {1354-6783}, ISSN = {1354-6783} } @Article{CrupiTentori2014, Title = {{Measuring Information and Confirmation}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya}, Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {81-90}, Volume = {47}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{CrupiTentori2013, Title = {{Confirmation as Partial Entailment: A Representation Theorem in Inductive Logic}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya}, Journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {364-372}, Volume = {11}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{CrupiTentori2012, Title = {{A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems)}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {365--385}, Volume = {79}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Article{CrupiTentoriGonzalez2007, Title = {{On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya and Gonz\'alez, Michel}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {229--252}, Volume = {74}, Abstract = {Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of logical de- duction and (ii) an empirical comparison of competing measures in an experimental inquiry concerning inductive reasoning in a probabilistic setting.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1086/520779}}, ISSN = {0031-8248} } @Article{CrupiTentoriLombardi2009, Title = {{Pseudodiagnosticity Revisited}}, Author = {Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya and Lombardi, Luigi}, Journal = {Psychological Review}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {971-985}, Volume = {116}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Cumming2014, Title = {{The New Statistics: Why and How}}, Author = {Cumming, Geoff}, Journal = {Psychological Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {7--29}, Volume = {25}, Abstract = {We need to make substantial changes to how we conduct research. First, in response to heightened concern that our published research literature is incomplete and untrustworthy, we need new requirements to ensure research integrity. These include prespecification of studies whenever possible, avoidance of selection and other inappropriate data-analytic practices, complete reporting, and encouragement of replication. Second, in response to renewed recognition of the severe flaws of null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST), we need to shift from reliance on NHST to estimation and other preferred techniques. The new statistics refers to recommended practices, including estimation based on effect sizes, confidence intervals, and meta-analysis. The techniques are not new, but adopting them widely would be new for many researchers, as well as highly beneficial. This article explains why the new statistics are important and offers guidance for their use. It describes an eight-step new-statistics strategy for research with integrity, which starts with formulation of research questions in estimation terms, has no place for NHST, and is aimed at building a cumulative quantitative discipline.}, Doinote = {\doi{10.1177/0956797613504966}}, ISSN = {1467-9280}, Pmid = {24220629}, Url = {http://pss.sagepub.com/content/25/1/7} } @Book{Cumming2012, Title = {{Understanding the New Statistics}}, Author = {Cumming, Geoff}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2012}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Cziszar1975, Title = {{{$I$}-Divergence Geometry of Probability Distributions of Minimization Problems}}, Author = {Cziszár, Imre}, Journal = {{Annals of Probability}}, Year = {1975}, Pages = {146--158}, Volume = {3} } @Article{Cziszar1967, Title = {{Information Type Measures of Difference of Probability Distributions and Indirect Observations}}, Author = {Cziszár, Imre}, Journal = {{Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica}}, Year = {1967}, Pages = {299--318}, Volume = {2} } @Article{Diez2011, Title = {{On Popper's Strong Inductivism (or Strongly Inconsistent Anti-Inductivism)}}, Author = {D{\'\i}ez, José}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {105--116}, Volume = {42} } @Book{DastonGalison2007, Title = {{Objectivity}}, Author = {Daston, Lorraine and Galison, Peter}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2007}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.} } @Article{Davies1998, Title = {{When Can Odds Ratios Mislead?}}, Author = {Davies, H T and Crombie, Iain Kinloch and Tavakoli, Manouche}, Journal = {British Medical Journal}, Year = {1998}, Number = {7136}, Pages = {989--991}, Volume = {316}, Abstract = {Odds ratios are a common measure of the size of an effect and may be reported in case-control studies, cohort studies, or clinical trials. Increasingly, they are also used to report the findings from systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Odds ratios are hard to comprehend directly and are usually interpreted as being equivalent to the relative risk. Unfortunately, there is a recognised problem that odds ratios do not approximate well to the relative risk when the initial risk (that is, the prevalence of the outcome of interest) is high.1,2 Thus there is a danger that if odds ratios are interpreted as though they were relative risks then they may mislead. The advice given in many texts is unusually coy on the matter. For example: ``The odds ratio is approximately the same as the relative risk if the outcome of interest is rare. For common events, however, they can be quite different.''3 How close is ``approximately the same,'' how uncommon does an event have to be to qualify as ``rare,'' and how different is ``quite different''?}, Doi = {10.1136/bmj.317.7166.1155a}, ISBN = {0959-8138, 1468-5833}, ISSN = {0959-8138}, Pmid = {9550961} } @Article{Dawid2009, Title = {{On the Conflicting Assessments of the Current Status of String Theory}}, Author = {Dawid, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2009}, Month = {dec}, Pages = {984--996}, Volume = {76}, Keywords = {Philosophy of Physics;Confirmation} } @Article{Dawid2006, Title = {{Underdetermination and Theory Succession from the Perspective of String Theory}}, Author = {Dawid, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2006}, Month = {jul}, Pages = {298--322}, Volume = {73}, Keywords = {Confirmation;Philosophy of Physics} } @Article{DawidHartmann2018, Title = {{The No Miracles Argument Without the Base Rate Fallacy}}, Author = {Dawid, Richard and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {forthcoming}, Note = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axt045}}, Abstract = {Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light ofnewevidence? These aresomeof the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument') is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjps/axt045} } @Article{DawidHartmannSprenger2015, Title = {{The No Alternatives Argument}}, Author = {Dawid, Richard and Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {213--234}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light ofnewevidence? These aresomeof the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument') is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt045}, ISSN = {0007-0882}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjps/axt045} } @Article{DeBonaStaffel2018, Title = {{Why Be (Approximately) Coherent?}}, Author = {De Bona, Glauber and Staffel, Julia}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2018}, Pages = {405--415}, Volume = {78} } @InCollection{DeLangheRubbens2015, Title = {{From Theory Choice to Theory Search: The Essential Tension between Exploration and Exploitation in Science}}, Author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Rubbens, Peter}, Booktitle = {{Kuhn's \emph{Structure of Scientific Revolutions}---50~Years On}}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2015}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Devlin, William J. and Bokulich, Alisa}, Pages = {105-114}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Deeks1998, Title = {{When Can Odds Ratios Mislead?}}, Author = {Deeks, Jon}, Journal = {British Medical Journal}, Year = {1998}, Pages = {1155}, Volume = {317} } @Article{DiaconisZabell1982, Title = {{Updating Subjective Probability}}, Author = {Diaconis, Persi and Zabell, Sandy L.}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {1982}, Month = {dec}, Number = {380}, Pages = {822--830}, Volume = {77}, Keywords = {Jeffrey Conditioning} } @InCollection{DietrichList2016, Title = {{Probabilistic Opinion Pooling}}, Author = {Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian}, Booktitle = {{Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy}}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Hájek, Alan and Hitchcock, Christopher}, Pages = {179--207}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.01} } @Article{DietrichMoretti2005, Title = {{On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation}}, Author = {Dietrich, Franz and Moretti, Luca}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {403--424}, Volume = {72} } @Article{DFH2011, Title = {{Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account}}, Author = {Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad and Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {321--338}, Volume = {179}, Keywords = {Confirmation,Probabilism} } @Article{DFH2010, Title = {{Who's Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?}}, Author = {Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad and Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {393-412}, Volume = {73}, Url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-010-9239-x} } @Article{Douglas2013, Title = {{The Value of Cognitive Values}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Number = {5}, Pages = {796--806}, Volume = {80}, Abstract = {Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while reducing the tensions among them.}, Doi = {10.1086/673716}, ISSN = {0031-8248}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673716\nhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1086/673716.pdf?acceptTC=true} } @Article{Douglas2011, Title = {{Facts, Values, and Objectivity}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Journal = {Ian Jarvie and Jes{ú}s Zamora}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {283--306}, Abstract = {Is Economics an ‘objective’ or ‘positive’ science, independent of ethical and political positions? The financial crisis that began in 2007 gave rise to renewed doubts regarding the ‘objectivity’...}, ISBN = {9780415667128}, Url = {http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Facts,+Values+and+Objectivity#7} } @Article{Douglas2009b, author = {Douglas, Heather}, title = {{Reintroducing Prediction to Explanation}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2009}, volume = {76}, pages = {444--463}, month = {oct}, keywords = {Nature of Explanation; Explanatory Reasoning}, } @Book{Douglas2009a, Title = {{Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Pittsburgh}, Url = {/citations?view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}op=view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}citation{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\&}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}continue=/scholar{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Fhl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Dnl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}}}} } @Article{Douglas2008, Title = {{The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {1--18}, Volume = {22} } @Article{Douglas2004, Title = {{The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2004}, Number = {3}, Pages = {453--473}, Volume = {138}, Abstract = {The terms “objectivity” and “objective” are among the most used yet illdefined terms in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Common to all the various usages is the rhetorical force of “I endorse this and you should too”, or to put it more mildly, that one should trust the outcome of the objectivity-producing process. The persuasive endorsement and call to trust provide some conceptual coherence to objectivity, but the reference to objectivity is hopefully not merely an attempt at persuasive endorsement. What, in addition to epistemological endorsement, does objectivity carry with it? Drawing on recent historical and philosophical work, I articulate eight operationally accessible and distinct senses of objectivity.While there are links among these senses, providing cohesion to the concept, I argue that none of the eight senses is strictly reducible to the others, giving objectivity its irreducible complexity.}, Doi = {10.1023/B:SYNT.0000016451.18182.91}, ISBN = {0039-7857}, ISSN = {00397857} } @Article{Douglas2000, Title = {{Inductive Risk and Values in Science}}, Author = {Douglas, Heather}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2000}, Pages = {559--579}, Volume = {67}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.26} } @InCollection{Douven2011, Title = {{Abduction}}, Author = {Douven, Igor}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2017}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/abduction/}}, Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning}, Url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/} } @Book{Douven2016, Title = {{The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals}}, Author = {Douven, Igor}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Douven2012, Title = {{Learning Conditional Information}}, Author = {Douven, Igor}, Journal = {Mind \& Language}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {239--263}, Volume = {27} } @Article{DouvenDietz2011, Title = {{A Puzzle about Stalnaker's Hypothesis}}, Author = {Douven, Igor and Dietz, Richard}, Journal = {Topoi}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {31--37}, Volume = {30} } @Article{DouvenRomeijn2011, Title = {{A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem}}, Author = {Douven, Igor and Romeijn, Jan-Willem}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {2011}, Number = {479}, Pages = {637--670}, Volume = {120}, Abstract = {Van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin problem has generally been taken to show that not all rational changes of belief can be modelled in a probabilistic framework if the available update rules are restricted to Bayes's rule and Jeffrey's generalization thereof. But alternative rules based on distance functions between probability assignments that allegedly can handle the problem seem to have counterintuitive consequences. Taking our cue from a recent proposal by Bradley, we argue that Jeffrey's rule can solve the Judy Benjamin problem after all. Moreover, we show that the specific instance of Jeffrey's rule that solves the Judy Benjamin problem can be underpinned by a particular distance function. Finally, we extend the set of distance functions to ones that take into account the varying degrees to which propositions may be epistemically entrenched.}, Booktitle = {Mind}, Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzr051}, ISBN = {0026-4423}, ISSN = {00264423} } @Article{DouvenSchupbach2015a, Title = {{The Role of Explanatory Considerations in Updating}}, Author = {Douven, Igor and Schupbach, Jonah N.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {299--311}, Volume = {142}, Abstract = {There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper investigates experimentally the descriptive question of whether judgments of the explanatory goodness of hypotheses do play a role when people revise their degrees of belief in those hypotheses upon the receipt of new evidence. We present the results of three experiments that together strongly support the predictive superiority of the explanationist position.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.017}, ISBN = {1873-7838}, ISSN = {18737838}, Keywords = {Bayesianism,Explanation,Inference,Probability,Updating}, Pmid = {26069937} } @Article{DouvenSchupbach2015b, Title = {{Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism}}, Author = {Douven, Igor and Schupbach, Jonah N.}, Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, Year = {2015}, Note = {\doi{10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00459}}, Volume = {6}, Abstract = {There has been a probabilistic turn in contemporary cognitive science. Far and away, most of the work in this vein is Bayesian, at least in name. Coinciding with this development, philosophers have increasingly promoted Bayesianism as the best normative account of how humans ought to reason. In this paper, we make a push for exploring the probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism. Non-Bayesian, but still probabilistic, theories provide plausible competitors both to descriptive and normative Bayesian accounts. We argue for this general idea via recent work on explanationist models of updating, which are fundamentally probabilistic but assign a substantial, non-Bayesian role to explanatory considerations.}, ISSN = {16641078}, Keywords = {Bayesianism,Explanation,Inference,Probability,Updating}, Pmid = {25964769} } @Article{DouvenVerbrugge2010, Title = {{The Adams Family}}, Author = {Douven, Igor and Verbrugge, Sara}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2010}, Number = {3}, Pages = {302--318}, Volume = {117}, Abstract = {According to Adams{{\^{a}}}€{\texttrademark}s Thesis, the acceptability of an indicative conditional sentence goes by the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. We test, for the first time, whether this thesis is descriptively correct and show that it is not; in particular, we show that it yields the wrong predictions for people{{\^{a}}}€{\texttrademark}s judgments of the acceptability of important subclasses of the class of inferential conditionals. Experimental results are presented that reveal an interaction effect between, on the one hand, the type of inferential connection between a conditional{{\^{a}}}€{\texttrademark}s antecedent and its consequent and, on the other, the judged acceptability of the conditional in relation to the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. Specifically, these results suggest a family of theses, each pertaining to a different type of conditional, about how conditionals relate to the relevant conditional probabilities.}, Keywords = {Conditional Probability; Experimental Philosophy}, Url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027710001952} } @InCollection{Dowe2011, Title = {{\MML, Hybrid Bayesian Network Graphical Models, Statistical Consistency, Invariance and Uniqueness}}, Author = {Dowe, David L.}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Statistics}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Editor = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Forster, Malcolm}, Pages = {901--982}, Series = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume~VII}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{DoweEtAl2007, Title = {{Bayes not Bust! Why Simplicity is no Problem for Bayesians}}, Author = {Dowe, David L. and Gardner, Steve and Oppy, Graham}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {709--754}, Volume = {58}, Keywords = {Formal Philosophy of Science} } @Book{Dowe2000, Title = {{Physical Causation}}, Author = {Dowe, Phil}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Cambridge} } @Book{Duhem1914, Title = {\frz{La théorie physique}: \frz{Son objet, sa structure}}, Author = {Duhem, Pierre}, Publisher = {Vrin}, Year = {1914}, Address = {Paris}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Dupre1984, Title = {{Probabilistic Causality Emancipated}}, Author = {Dupr{é}, John}, Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy}, Year = {1984}, Pages = {169--175}, Volume = {9}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00058.x}, ISSN = {0363-6550}, Url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00058.x} } @Article{Eagle2004, Title = {{Twenty-one Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability}}, Author = {Eagle, Antony}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {371--416}, Volume = {60}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Book{Earman1992, Title = {{Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Earman, John}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {1992}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Keywords = {Confirmation; Formal Philosophy of Science} } @InCollection{Easwaran2011, Title = {{The Varieties of Conditional Probability}}, Author = {Easwaran, Kenny}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Statistics}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Forster, Malcolm}, Pages = {137--148}, Series = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume~VII}, Keywords = {Conditional Probability}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Easwaran2016, Title = {{Dr.~Truthlove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities}}, Author = {Easwaran, Kenny}, Journal = {No\^us}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {816--853}, Volume = {50}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.03} } @Article{Easwaran2011a, Title = {{Bayesianism~I\@: Introduction and Arguments in Favor}}, Author = {Easwaran, Kenny}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {312--320}, Volume = {6}, Journaltitle = {Philosophy Compass}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @Article{Easwaran2011b, Title = {{Bayesianism~II\@: Applications and Criticisms}}, Author = {Easwaran, Kenny}, Journal = {Philosophy}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {321--332}, Volume = {6}, Date = {2011}, Journaltitle = {Philosophy Compass}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @InCollection{EaswaranFitelson2016, Title = {{Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence}}, Author = {Easwaran, Kenny and Fitelson, Branden}, Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Epistemology}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Szab\'o Gendler, Tamar and Hawthorne, John}, Pages = {61--96}, Volume = {5}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.20} } @InCollection{Edgington2014, Title = {{Indicative Conditionals}}, Author = {Edgington, Dorothy}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/conditionals/}}, Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conditionals/} } @Article{Edgington1995, Title = {{On Conditionals}}, Author = {Edgington, Dorothy}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {1995}, Pages = {235--329}, Volume = {104} } @Book{Edwards1972, Title = {{Likelihood}}, Author = {Edwards, A. W. F.}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1972}, Address = {Cambridge}, Url = {/citations?view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}op=view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}citation{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\&}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}continue=/scholar{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Fhl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Dnl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}}}} } @Article{EdwardsLindmanSavage1963, Title = {{Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research}}, Author = {Edwards, Ward and Lindman, Harold and Savage, Leonard J}, Journal = {Psychological Review}, Year = {1963}, Pages = {193--242}, Volume = {70}, Abstract = {Bayesian statistics, a currently controversial viewpoint concerning statistical inference, is based on a definition of probability as a particular measure of the opinions of ideally consistent people. Statistical inference is modification of these opinions in the light of evidence, and Bayes' theorem specifies how such modifications should be made. The tools of Bayesian statistics include the theory of specific distributions and the principle of stable estimation, which specifies when actual prior opinions may be satisfactorily approximated by a uniform distribution. A common feature of many classical significance tests is that a sharp null hypothesis is compared with a diffuse alternative hypothesis. Often evidence which, for a Bayesian statistician, strikingly supports the null hypothesis leads to rejection of that hypothesis by standard classical procedures. The likelihood principle emphasized in Bayesian statistics implies, among other things, that the rules governing when data collection stops are irrelevant to data interpretation. It is entirely appropriate to collect data until a point has been proven or disproven, or until the data collector runs out of time, money, or patience.}, Doi = {10.1037/h0044139}, ISSN = {0033-295X} } @InCollection{Eells1990, Title = {{Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence}}, Author = {Eells, Ellery}, Booktitle = {Scientific Theories}, Publisher = {University of Minnesota Press}, Year = {1990}, Address = {Minneapolis}, Editor = {Savage, C. W.}, Pages = {205--223} } @Book{Eells1991, Title = {{Probabilistic Causality}}, Author = {Eells, Ellery}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1991}, Address = {Cambridge}, Url = {https://books.google.nl/books?hl=de&lr=&id=W8F52vNGU5QC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=eells+1991+causality&ots=HUalEZIHHZ&sig=OtdH8gG7jiH_g4eWkBGKvTWNwNM} } @Article{Eells1985, Title = {{Problems of Old Evidence}}, Author = {Eells, Ellery}, Journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, Year = {1985}, Pages = {283}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {According to bayesian epistemology, A proposition e is evidence in favor of a hypothesis h for a given person if and only if (roughly) e raises the person's subjective probability of h: pr (h/e)(gpr(h). But if e is already known, If pr(e) = 1, Then, For any h, Pr(h/e) = pr(h). Thus it seems that bayesian epistemology cannot accommodate the fact that already known evidence can confirm a hypothesis or theory. This is clark glymour's "problem of old evidence." I clarify several versions of the problem and offer bayesian solutions and "dissolution" to them.}, ISBN = {0279-0750}, ISSN = {0279-0750}, Keywords = {Bayesianism; Confirmability; Epistemology} } @Article{EellsFitelson2002, Title = {{Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support}}, Author = {Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Philosophical Studies}, Year = {2002}, Number = {2}, Pages = {129--142}, Volume = {107}, Abstract = {Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support are considered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree of evidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1014712013453}, ISBN = {0031-8116}, ISSN = {0031-8116}, Keywords = {Epistemology,Evidence,Support,Symmetry}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{EellsFitelson2000, Title = {{Measuring Confirmation and Evidence}}, Author = {Eells, Ellery and Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {2000}, Month = {dec}, Number = {12}, Pages = {663--672}, Volume = {97}, Keywords = {Confirmation,Formal Philosophy of Science,Formal meets Mainstream} } @Article{Efron1986, Title = {{Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?}}, Author = {Efron, Bradley}, Journal = {American Statistician}, Year = {1986}, Pages = {1--11 (with discussion)}, Volume = {40}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.10.29} } @Article{Eiter1995, Title = {{The Complexity of Logic-based Abduction}}, Author = {Eiter, Thomas and Gottlob, Georg}, Journal = {Journal of the ACM}, Year = {1995}, Number = {1}, Pages = {3--42}, Volume = {42}, Publisher = {ACM} } @Article{Elga2010, Title = {{Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp}}, Author = {Elga, Adam}, Journal = {Philosophical Imprints}, Year = {2010}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0010.005}}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1--11}, Volume = {10}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Book{Ellsberg2001, Title = {Risk, Ambiguity and Decision}, Author = {Ellsberg, Daniel}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2001}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Ellsberg1961, Title = {{Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms}}, Author = {Ellsberg, Daniel}, Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, Year = {1961}, Pages = {643-669}, Volume = {75}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{ErikssonHajek2007, Title = {{What Are Degrees of Belief?}}, Author = {Eriksson, Lina and Hájek, Alan}, Journal = {Studia Logica}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {185--215}, Volume = {86}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Article{EvaHartmann2018b, Title = {{Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity}}, Author = {Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {{Psychological Review}}, Year = {forthcoming}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Article{EvaHartmann2018a, Title = {{When No Reason For Is a Reason Against}}, Author = {Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2018}, Pages = {426--431}, Volume = {78}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Article{EvaHartmannRafieeRad2018, Title = {{Updating on Conditionals}}, Author = {Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan and {Rafiee Rad}, Soroush}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {forthcoming} } @Article{EvaStern2018, Title = {{Causal Explanatory Power}}, Author = {Eva, Benjamin and Stern, Reuben}, Journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {forthcoming}, Note = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axx033}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @InCollection{Fahrbach2009, Title = {{Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science}}, Author = {Fahrbach, Ludwig}, Booktitle = {Reduction--Abstraction--Analysis}, Publisher = {Ontos}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Heusenstamm}, Editor = {Hieke, Alexander and Leitgeb, Hannes}, Pages = {95--111}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Fahrbach2011a, Title = {{How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change}}, Author = {Fahrbach, Ludwig}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {139--155}, Volume = {108}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-009-9602-0} } @Article{Fanelli2016, Title = {{Set Up a `Self-Retraction' System for Honest Errors}}, Author = {Fanelli, Daniele}, Journal = {Nature}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {415}, Volume = {531}, Doi = {10.1038/531415a}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Festa2012, Title = {{``\emph{For Unto Every One that Hath Shall be Given}'': Matthew Properties for Incremental Confirmation}}, Author = {Festa, Roberto}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {89--100}, Volume = {184} } @Article{FestaCevolani2017, Title = {{Unfolding the grammar of Bayesian confirmation: likelihood and anti-likelihood principles}}, Author = {Festa, Roberto, and Cevolani, Gustavo}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {56--81}, Volume = {84} } @InCollection{Feyerabend1962, Title = {{Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism}}, Author = {Feyerabend, Paul}, Booktitle = {Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism}, Publisher = {University of Minnesota Press}, Year = {1962}, Address = {Minneapolis}, Editor = {Feigl, Herbert and Maxwell, Grover}, Pages = {28--97} } @Book{Feyerabend1975, Title = {{Against Method}}, Author = {Feyerabend, Paul}, Publisher = {Verso}, Year = {1975}, Address = {London} } @Book{Fidler2007, Title = {{From Statistical Significance to Effect Estimation: Statistical Reform in Psychology, Medicine and Ecology}}, Author = {Fidler, Fiona}, Year = {2007}, Note = {\doi{10.1080/13545700701881096}}, Abstract = {Compelling criticisms of statistical significance testing (or Null Hypothesis Significance Testing, NHST) can be found in virtually all areas of the social and life sciences— including economics, sociology, ecology, biology, education and psychology. Because it is the overwhelmingly dominant statistical method in these sciences, criticisms need to be taken seriously. Yet, after half a century of cogent arguments against NHST and calls to adopt alternative practices some disciplines, such as psychology, show little sign of change. One obvious question is ‘why?' Why are psychological researchers so unwilling to abandon this flawed practice? In this thesis I attempt to answer this question, and compare their practice with other disciplines.}, Booktitle = {PhD Thesis}, Pages = {1--275} } @Article{FidlerCumming2014, Title = {{Yes, but Don't Underestimate Estimation: Reply to Morey, Rouder, Verhagen, and Wagenmakers (2014)}}, Author = {Fidler, Fiona and Cumming, Geoff}, Journal = {Psychological Science}, Year = {2014}, Month = {jun}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1291--1292}, Volume = {25}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797614532658}, ISSN = {1467-9280}, Keywords = {Biomedical Research,Biomedical Research: standards,Data Interpretation, Statistical,Humans,Psychology,Psychology: standards,Statistics as Topic,Statistics as Topic: standards}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pmid = {24789841}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24789841} } @Article{Fine1998, Title = {{The Viewpoint of No-One in Particular}}, Author = {Fine, Arthur}, Journal = {Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association}, Year = {1998}, Number = {2}, Pages = {7--20}, Volume = {72}, Abstract = {This is an essay on objectivity. Using Arthur Eddington's conception of a "point of view of no-one in particular" it begins by examining contemporary writings that single out the natural sciences as especially privileged with respect to objectivity, but also as needing to be restrained and limited in their claims. It continues by looking at feminist and other recent critiques of objectivity. The essay concludes with a positive proposal that links objectivity with trust.}, Doi = {10.2307/3130879}, ISBN = {079146069X}, ISSN = {0065-972X} } @Book{deFinetti2008, Title = {{Philosophical Lectures on Probability}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Editor = {Mura, Alberto}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2008}, Address = {Berlin}, Keywords = {Subjective Probability;Scoring Rules}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{deFinetti1974, Title = {{Theory of Probability}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons}, Year = {1974}, Address = {New York} } @Book{deFinetti1972, Title = {{Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons}, Year = {1972}, Address = {New York}, Keywords = {Subjective Probability} } @InCollection{deFinetti1937, Title = {\frz{La prévision}: \frz{Ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Booktitle = {\frz{Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré}}, Year = {1937}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.09.29} } @InCollection{deFinetti1936, Title = {\frz{La logique de la probabilité}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Booktitle = {\frz{Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique}}, Publisher = {Hermann \& Cie.}, Year = {1936}, Address = {Paris}, Volume = {IV: \frz{Induction et Probabilité}} } @Article{deFinetti1931, Title = {\ital{Sul significato soggettivo della probabilità}}, Author = {de Finetti, Bruno}, Journal = {Fundamenta Mathematicae}, Year = {1931}, Pages = {298--329}, Volume = {17}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Book{Fisher1956, Title = {{Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference}}, Author = {Fisher, R. A.}, Publisher = {Hafner}, Year = {1956}, Address = {New York}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:2Q0AJrNhS-QC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Fisher1935b, Title = {{The Fiducial Argument in Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Fisher, R. A.}, Journal = {Annals of Human Genetics}, Year = {1935}, Pages = {391--398}, Volume = {6}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Unpublished{Fitelson2018, Title = {Coherence}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Note = {Unpublished manuscript, retrieved from \url{http://fitelson.org/coherence/coherence_duke.pdf} on August 10, 2018}, Year = {2018}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Fitelson2008, Title = {{A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Review of Symbolic Logic}, Year = {2008}, Month = {jun}, Number = {1}, Pages = {111--125}, Volume = {1}, Keywords = {Probability} } @Article{Fitelson2008a, author = {Fitelson, Branden}, title = {Goodman's ``New Riddle''}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, year = {2008}, volume = {37}, pages = {613--643}, issn = {00223611}, abstract = {First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous “grue” paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's “grue” argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the “New Riddle” is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman's problem, and the “problem of old evidence”. Several other novel aspects of Goodman's argument are also discussed (mainly, from a Bayesian perspective).}, doi = {10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5}, isbn = {0022-3611}, keywords = {Bayesian,Carnap,Confirmation,Goodman,Grue,Hempel}, } @InCollection{Fitelson2007, Title = {{Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Booktitle = {Synthese}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {473--489}, Volume = {156}, Abstract = {Abstract Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a “middle way” between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the “Monty Hall” problem.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9}, ISSN = {00397857}, Keywords = {Bayesian,Confirmation,Favoring,Likelihood,Monty Hall,Support} } @Article{Fitelson2006, Title = {{Logical Foundations of Evidential Support}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2006}, Month = {dec}, Pages = {500--512}, Volume = {73}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Article{Fitelson2006a, Title = {{The Paradox of Confirmation}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {95--113}, Volume = {1} } @Unpublished{Fitelson2015, Title = {{Earman on Old Evidence and Measures of Confirmation}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Note = {Unpublished manuscript, retrieved from \url{http://fitelson.org/oe_old.pdf} on August 10, 2018}, Year = {2004} } @Article{Fitelson2003, Title = {{A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2003}, Month = {jul}, Number = {3}, Pages = {194--199}, Volume = {63}, Keywords = {Coherence} } @Misc{Fitelson2002a, Title = {{Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Year = {2002}, Abstract = {Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunctionH&X, for any X—even ifX is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation—E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms H (again, in the case of deductive evidence). I argue that existing Bayesian “resolutions” of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. In the end, I suggest a new-and-improved Bayesian account (and understanding) of the problem of irrelevant conjunction.}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Science}, Doi = {10.1086/344624}, ISSN = {00318248}, Pages = {611--622}, Volume = {69} } @PhdThesis{Fitelson2001, Title = {{Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, School = {University of Wisconsin--Madison}, Year = {2001}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Article{Fitelson2001b, Title = {{A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2001}, Pages = {S123-S140}, Volume = {68}, Abstract = {A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closing, another application of my account to the problem of evidential diversity is also discussed.}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Science}, Doi = {10.1086/392903}, ISSN = {0031-8248} } @Article{Fitelson1999, author = {Fitelson, Branden}, title = {{The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {S362-S378}, url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D80%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:1EqfMoDn7-AC&hl=nl&oi=p}, } @Article{FitelsonHajek2018, Title = {{Declarations of Independence}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden and H{á}jek, Alan}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2017}, Number = {10}, Pages = {3979--3995}, Volume = {194}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0559-2}, ISSN = {0039-7857}, Url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-014-0559-2} } @Article{FitelsonHartmann2016, Title = {{A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Month = {October}, Number = {4}, Pages = {712--717}, Volume = {82} } @InCollection{FitelsonHawthorne2011, Title = {{How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden and Hawthorne, James}, Booktitle = {The Place of Probability in Science}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2011}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Fetzer, James H. and Eells, Ellery}, Pages = {247--275} } @InCollection{FitelsonHitchcock2011, Title = {{Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength}}, Author = {Fitelson, Branden and Hitchcock, Christopher}, Booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Illari, Phyllis McKay and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon}, Pages = {600--627} } @Article{Forber2011, Title = {{Reconceiving Eliminative Inference}}, Author = {Forber, Patrick}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {185-208}, Volume = {78}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Forster2002, Title = {{Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2002}, Pages = {S124-S134}, Volume = {69}, Abstract = {Abstract What has science actually achieved? A theory of achievement should (1) define what has been achieved, (2) describe the means or methods used in science, and (3) explain how such methods lead to such achievements. Predictive accuracy is one truth‐related achievement of science, and there is an explanation of why common scientific practices (of trading off simplicity and fit) tend to increase predictive accuracy. Akaike{\{}$\backslash$rq{\}}s explanation for the success of AIC is limited to interpolative predictive accuracy. But therein lies the strength of the general framework, for it also provides a clear formulation of many open problems of research.}, ISSN = {00318248, 1539767X}, Publisher = {[University of Chicago Press, Philosophy of Science Association]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/341840} } @Article{Forster2000, Title = {{Key Concepts in Model Selection: Performance and Generalizability}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm}, Journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, Year = {2000}, Number = {1}, Pages = {205--231}, Volume = {44}, Abstract = {What is model selection? What are the goals of model selection? What are the methods of model selection and how do they work? Which methods perform better than others and in what circumstances? These questions rest on a number of key concepts in a relatively underdeveloped field. The aim of this paper is to explain some background concepts, to highlight some of the results in this special issue, and to add my own. The standard methods of model selection include classical hypothesis testing, maximum likelihood, Bayes method, minimum description length, cross-validation, and Akaike's information criterion. They all provide an implementation of Occam's razor, in which parsimony or simplicity is balanced against goodness-of-fit. These methods primarily take account of the sampling errors in parameter estimation, although their relative success at this task depends on the circumstances. However, the aim of model selection should also include the ability of a model to generalize to predictions in a different domain. Errors of extrapolation, or generalization, are different from errors of parameter estimation. So, it seems that simplicity and parsimony may be an additional factor in managing these errors, in which case the standard methods of model selection are incomplete implementations of Occam's razor. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.}, Doi = {10.1006/jmps.1999.1284}, ISBN = {0022-2496 (Electronic)$\backslash$n0022-2496 (Linking)}, ISSN = {0022-2496}, Pmid = {10733865}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10733865} } @Article{Forster1999, Title = {{Model Selection in Science: The Problem of Language Variance}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {83--102}, Volume = {50}, Abstract = {Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1994]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses ate described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable parameters' is actually a loose way of referring to a quantity that is not language dependent. The quantity arises out of Akaike's theorem in a way that ensures its language invariance.}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/50.1.83}, ISBN = {00070882 (ISSN)}, ISSN = {0007-0882}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/50/1/83} } @Article{Forster1995, Title = {{Bayes or Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to Confirmation}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1995}, Pages = {399--424}, Volume = {46}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.07.29} } @Article{ForsterEtAl2018, author = {Forster, Malcolm and Raskutti, Garvesh and Stern, Reuben and Weinberger, Naftali}, title = {{The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations}}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2018}, volume = {69}, pages = {821--848}, owner = {jsprenger}, timestamp = {2017.08.02}, } @InCollection{ForsterSober2010, Title = {{\AIC\ Scores as Evidence: A Bayesian Interpretation}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm and Sober, Elliott}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Statistics}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Editor = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Forster, Malcolm}, Pages = {535--549}, Series = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume~VII} } @Article{ForsterSober1994, Title = {{How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less \emph{Ad Hoc} Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions}}, Author = {Forster, Malcolm and Sober, Elliott}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1994}, Pages = {1-35}, Volume = {45}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D40%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:BPS1z4jHU5cC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{vanFraassen1989, Title = {{Laws and Symmetry}}, Author = {van Fraassen, Bas}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1989}, Address = {New York}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning; General Philosophy of Scien} } @Article{vanFraassen1981, Title = {{A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics}}, Author = {van Fraassen, Bas}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1981}, Month = {dec}, Number = {4}, Pages = {375--379}, Volume = {32}, Keywords = {Probabilism;Jeffrey Conditioning} } @Book{vanFraassen1980, Title = {{The Scientific Image}}, Author = {van Fraassen, Bas}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1980}, Address = {New York}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning,General Philosophy of Scien} } @Article{Francis2014, Title = {{The Frequency of Excess Success for Articles in Psychological Science}}, Author = {Francis, Gregory}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2014}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1180--1187}, Volume = {21}, Abstract = {Recent controversies have questioned the quality of scientific practice in the field of psychology, but these concerns are often based on anecdotes and seemingly isolated cases. To gain a broader perspective, this article applies an objective test for excess success to a large set of articles published in the journal Psychological Science between 2009 and 2012. When empirical studies succeed at a rate much higher than is appropriate for the estimated effects and sample sizes, readers should suspect that unsuccessful findings have been suppressed, the experiments or analyses were improper, or the theory does not properly account for the data. In total, problems appeared for 82 % (36 out of 44) of the articles in Psychological Science that had four or more experiments and could be analyzed.}, Doi = {10.3758/s13423-014-0601-x}, ISSN = {1069-9384}, Keywords = {Bias (Epidemiology),Data Interpretation,Experimental,Experimental: methods,Experimental: standards,Experimental: statistics & numerical d,Humans,Models,Periodicals as Topic,Periodicals as Topic: statistics & numerical data,Psychology,Sample Size,Statistical,Statistics as Topic,Statistics as Topic: standards}, Pmid = {24638826}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24638826} } @Article{Francis2012, Title = {{Publication Bias and the Failure of Replication in Experimental Psychology}}, Author = {Francis, Greg}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {975--991}, Volume = {19}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.24} } @Article{FrancisTanzmanMatthews2014, Title = {{Excess Success for Psychology Articles in the Journal \emph{Science}}}, Author = {Francis, Gregory and Tanzman, Jay and Matthews, William J.}, Journal = {PLoS One}, Year = {2014}, Note = {\doi{10.1371/journal.pone.0114255}}, Volume = {9}, Abstract = {This article describes a systematic analysis of the relationship between empirical data and theoretical conclusions for a set of experimental psychology articles published in the journal Science between 2005-2012. When the success rate of a set of empirical studies is much higher than would be expected relative to the experiments' reported effects and sample sizes, it suggests that null findings have been suppressed, that the experiments or analyses were inappropriate, or that the theory does not properly follow from the data. The analyses herein indicate such excess success for 83{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (15 out of 18) of the articles in Science that report four or more studies and contain sufficient information for the analysis. This result suggests a systematic pattern of excess success among psychology articles in the journal Science.}, ISSN = {1932-6203}, Pageswegdamit = {e114255}, Pmid = {25474317}, Url = {http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=4256411{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\&}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}tool=pmcentrez{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\&}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}rendertype=abstract} } @Article{Friedman1974, Title = {{Explanation and Scientific Understanding}}, Author = {Friedman, Michael}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1974}, Number = {1}, Pages = {5--19}, Volume = {71}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation; Understanding; Unification} } @InCollection{Frigg2008, Title = {{A Field Guide to Recent Work on the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics}}, Author = {Frigg, Roman}, Booktitle = {The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics}, Publisher = {Ashgate}, Year = {2008}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Rickles, Dean}, Pages = {99--196} } @InCollection{FriggHartmann2012, Title = {{Models in Science}}, Author = {Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2012}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/models-science/}} } @Article{FriggHoefer2015, Title = {{The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics}}, Author = {Frigg, Roman and Hoefer, Carl}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {551--574}, Volume = {80}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.11} } @Article{FriggHoefer2007, Title = {{Probability in GRW theory}}, Author = {Frigg, Roman and Hoefer, Carl}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {371--389}, Volume = {38}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.11} } @Article{GaifmanSnir1982, Title = {{Probabilities over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness}}, Author = {Gaifman, Haim and Snir, Marc}, Journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic}, Year = {1982}, Month = {sep}, Number = {3}, Pages = {495--548}, Volume = {47}, Keywords = {Probabilism,Randomization} } @Article{GalakEtAl2012, Title = {{Correcting the Past: Failures to Replicate Psi}}, Author = {Galak, Jeff and LeBoeuf, Robyn A. and Nelson, Leif D. and Simmons, Joseph P.}, Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {933--948}, Volume = {103}, Abstract = {Across seven experiments (N = 3,289) we replicate the procedure of Experiments 8 and 9 from Bem (2011), which had originally demonstrated retroactive facilitation of recall. We failed to replicate that finding. We further conduct a meta-analysis of all replication attempts of these experiments and find that the average effect size (d = .04) is no different from zero. We discuss some reasons for differences between the results in this paper and those presented in Bem (2011).}, Doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2001721}, ISSN = {1556-5068}, Keywords = {esp,failure to replicate,precognition,psi}, Url = {http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2001721} } @Article{Galavotti1989, Title = {{Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de~Finetti's Subjectivism}}, Author = {Galavotti, Maria Carla}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {239--261}, Volume = {31}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{Gallistel2009, author = {Gallistel, C. R.}, journal = {Psychological Review}, title = {{The Importance of Proving the Null}}, year = {2009}, issn = {0033-295X}, pages = {439--453}, volume = {116}, abstract = {Null hypotheses are simple, precise, and theoretically important. Conventional statistical analysis cannot support them; Bayesian analysis can. The challenge in a Bayesian analysis is to formulate a suitably vague alternative, because the vaguer the alternative is (the more it spreads out the unit mass of prior probability), the more the null is favored. A general solution is a sensitivity analysis: Compute the odds for or against the null as a function of the limit(s) on the vagueness of the alternative. If the odds on the null approach 1 from above as the hypothesized maximum size of the possible effect approaches 0, then the data favor the null over any vaguer alternative to it. The simple computations and the intuitive graphic representation of the analysis are illustrated by the analysis of diverse examples from the current literature. They pose 3 common experimental questions: (a) Are 2 means the same? (b) Is performance at chance? (c) Are factors additive?}, doi = {10.1037/a0015251}, file = {:home/jsprenger/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Gallistel - 2009 - The importance of proving the null(9).pdf:pdf}, keywords = {Classical,Attention,Bayes Theorem,Behavioral Research,Behavioral Research: statistics & numerical data,Conditioning,Humans,Learning,Likelihood Functions,Psychomotor Performance}, pmid = {19348549}, url = {http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2859953&tool=pmcentrez&rendertype=abstract}, } @Article{Gandenberger2015, Title = {{A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle}}, Author = {Gandenberger, Greg}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {475--503}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {I present a new proof of the likelihood principle that avoids two responses to a well-known proof due to Birnbaum ([1962]). I also respond to arguments that Birnbaum's proof is fallacious, which if correct could be adapted to this new proof. On the other hand, I urge caution in interpreting proofs of the likelihood principle as arguments against the use of frequentist statistical methods. 1 Introduction 2 The New Proof 3 How the New Proof Addresses Proposals to Restrict Birnbaum's Premises 4 A Response to Arguments that the Proofs Are Fallacious 5 Conclusion}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt039}, ISSN = {14643537} } @InCollection{Garber1983, Title = {{Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Garber, Daniel}, Booktitle = {Testing Scientific Theories}, Publisher = {University of Minnesota Press}, Year = {1983}, Address = {Minneapolis}, Editor = {Earman, John}, Pages = {99--132} } @Article{GelmanHennig2017, Title = {{Beyond Objective and Subjective in Statistics}}, Author = {Gelman, Andrew and Hennig, Christian}, Journal = {{Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~A}}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {967--1033 (with discussion)}, Volume = {180}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.03.15} } @InCollection{GelmanShalizi2012, Title = {{Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics in the Social Sciences}}, Author = {Gelman, Andrew and Shalizi, Cosma}, Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Kincaid, Harold}, Pages = {259--273}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D140%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:cNe27ouKFcQC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{GelmanShalizi2013, Title = {{Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics}}, Author = {Gelman, Andrew and Shalizi, Cosma}, Journal = {British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {8--38}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.}, Archiveprefix = {arXiv}, Arxivid = {1006.3868}, Doi = {10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x}, Eprint = {1006.3868}, ISBN = {2044-8317 (Electronic) 0007-1102 (Linking)}, ISSN = {00071102}, Pmid = {22364575} } @Article{Gemes1998, Title = {{Hypothetico-Deductivism: The Current State of Play; the Criterion of Empirical Significance: Endgame}}, Author = {Gemes, Ken}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {1998}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1--20}, Volume = {49}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D20%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:vD2iS2Kej30C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Gemes1993, Title = {{Hypothetico-Deductivism, Content and the Natural Axiomatisation of Theories}}, Author = {Gemes, Ken}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1993}, Pages = {477--487}, Volume = {60}, Keywords = {Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation} } @Article{GenestZidek1986, Title = {{Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography}}, Author = {Genest, Christian and Zidek, James V.}, Journal = {Statistical Science}, Year = {1986}, Pages = {114--135}, Volume = {1}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Gigerenzer2004, Title = {{Mindless Statistics}}, Author = {Gigerenzer, Gerd}, Journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {587--606}, Volume = {33}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @InCollection{Gigerenzer1987, Title = {{Probabilistic Thinking and the Fight against Subjectivity}}, Author = {Gigerenzer, Gerd}, Booktitle = {The Probabilistic Revolution, Vol.~2: Ideas in the Sciences}, Year = {1987}, Pages = {11--33}, Abstract = {role of probabilistic thinking in experimental psychology / determinism / objectivity / the ideals of science / probabilistic models (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved) (from the chapter)}, ISBN = {0-262-11118-7}, Keywords = {Experimental Psychology,History,Human,MODEL,MODELS,STATISTICS,Sciences,classification,constance,probability,psychology}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25}, Url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&db=psyh\&AN=1987-98328-004\&$\backslash$nlang=fr\&site=ehost-live} } @Article{GigerenzerMarewski2015, Title = {{Surrogate Science: The Idol of a Universal Method for Scientific Inference}}, Author = {Gigerenzer, Gerd and Marewski, Julian N.}, Journal = {{Journal of Management}}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {421--440}, Volume = {41}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Article{GilbertEtAl2016, Title = {Comment on {\textquotedblleft}Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science{\textquotedblright}}, Author = {Gilbert, Daniel T. and King, Gary and Pettigrew, Stephen and Wilson, Timothy D.}, Journal = {Science}, Year = {2016}, Number = {6277}, Pages = {1037--1037}, Volume = {351}, Abstract = {A paper from the Open Science Collaboration (Research Articles, 28 August 2015, aac4716) attempting to replicate 100 published studies suggests that the reproducibility of psychological science is surprisingly low. We show that this article contains three statistical errors and provides no support for such a conclusion. Indeed, the data are consistent with the opposite conclusion, namely, that the reproducibility of psychological science is quite high.}, Doi = {10.1126/science.aad7243}, Eprint = {http://science.sciencemag.org/content/351/6277/1037.2.full.pdf}, ISSN = {0036-8075}, Publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science}, Url = {http://science.sciencemag.org/content/351/6277/1037.2} } @Article{Gillies1971a, Title = {{A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements}}, Author = {Gillies, Donald A.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1971}, Pages = {231--261}, Volume = {22}, Abstract = {Probability statements are used in science, But are not falsifiable. The article discusses the problem thereby created. The solution offered runs counter to the neyman-Pearson theory which is therefore criticized.}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/22.3.231}, ISBN = {0007-0882}, ISSN = {00070882} } @Article{Glymour2015, Title = {{Probability and the Explanatory Virtues}}, Author = {Glymour, Clark}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {591--604}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {Recent literature in philosophy of science has addressed purported notions of explanatory virtues-- explanatory power', unification', and coherence'. In each case, a probabilistic relation between a theory and data is said to measure the power of an explanation, or degree of unification, or degree of coherence. This essay argues that the measures do not capture cases that are paradigms of scientific explanation, that the available psychological evidence indicates that the measures do not capture judgements of explanatory power, and, finally, that the measures do not provide useful methods for selecting hypotheses. 1. Introduction 2. Some Proposed Measures of Explanatory Virtues 3. Descriptive Inadequacy 3.1 Excellent but false explanations 3.2 Causal explanation 4. Psychological Inadequacy 5. Finding the Truth 6. Conclusion}, Booktitle = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt051}, ISSN = {14643537} } @Article{Glymour1980, Title = {{Hypothetico-Deductivism Is Hopeless}}, Author = {Glymour, Clark}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1980}, Number = {2}, Pages = {322--325}, Volume = {47}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D60%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:GiYFt9mpioMC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{Glymour1980a, Title = {{Theory and Evidence}}, Author = {Glymour, Clark}, Publisher = {Princeton University Press}, Year = {1980}, Address = {Princeton, N.J.}, Keywords = {Formal Philosophy of Science} } @Book{Good2009, Title = {{Good Thinking}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Publisher = {Dover}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Mineola, N.Y.}, Note = {Originally published by University of Minnesota Press in 1983} } @Article{Good1975, Title = {{Explicativity, Corroboration, and the Relative Odds of Hypotheses}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1975}, Pages = {39--73}, Volume = {30} } @Article{Good1971, Title = {{46656 Varieties of Bayesianism}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {American Statistician}, Year = {1971}, Pages = {62--63}, Volume = {25} } @Article{Good1968a, Title = {{Corroboration, Explanation, Evolving Probability, Simplicity and a Sharpened Razor}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1968}, Month = {aug}, Number = {2}, Pages = {123--143}, Volume = {19}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Article{Good1968b, Title = {{Corrigendum: Weight of Evidence, Corroboration, Explanatory Power, Information and the Utility of Experiments}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~B}, Year = {1968}, Number = {1}, Pages = {203}, Volume = {30}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning;Confirmation} } @Article{Good1966, author = {Good, I. J.}, title = {{The White Shoe is a Red Herring}}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1966}, volume = {17}, number = {4}, pages = {322}, publisher = {Br Soc Philosophy Sci}, } @Article{Good1961a, Title = {{A Causal Calculus (I)}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1961}, Pages = {305--318}, Volume = {11}, Keywords = {Actual Causation;Causation} } @Article{Good1961b, Title = {{A Causal Calculus (II)}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1961}, Pages = {43--51}, Volume = {12}, Keywords = {Causation;Actual Causation}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Good1960a, Title = {{Weight of Evidence, Corroboration, Explanatory Power, Information and the Utility of Experiments}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~B}, Year = {1960}, Pages = {319-331}, Volume = {22}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D40%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:GJVTs2krol4C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Good1952, Title = {{Rational Decisions}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, Year = {1952}, Pages = {107--114}, Volume = {14}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D10%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:cF7EPgIk0B4C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{Good1950, Title = {{Probability and the Weighting of Evidence}}, Author = {Good, I. J.}, Publisher = {Griffin}, Year = {1950}, Address = {London}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Book{Goodman1955, title = {{Fact, Fiction and Forecast}}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1955/83}, author = {Goodman, Nelson}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, edition = {4th}, note = {Originally published in 1955}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.13}, } @Article{GoodmanBerryWittes2010, Title = {{Bias and Trials Stopped Early for Benefit}}, Author = {Goodman, S and Berry, D and Wittes, J}, Journal = {Journal of the American Medical Association}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {157}, Volume = {304}, Publisher = {Am Med Assoc} } @Article{Goodman2007, Title = {{Stopping at Nothing? Some Dilemmas of Data Monitoring in Clinical Trials}}, Author = {Goodman, Stephen N.}, Journal = {Annals of Internal Medicine}, Year = {2007}, Number = {12}, Pages = {882}, Volume = {146}, Publisher = {Am Coll Physicians} } @Article{Goodman1999a, Title = {{Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics~1: The $P$~value Fallacy}}, Author = {Goodman, Stephen N.}, Journal = {Annals of Internal Medicine}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {995-1004}, Volume = {130}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {/citations?view\_op=view\_citation\&continue=/scholar\%3Fhl\%3Dnl\%26start\%3D40\%26as\_sdt\%3D0,5\%26scilib\%3D1\&citilm=1\&citation\_for\_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:u0Mu\_IsstPMC\&hl=nl\&oi=p} } @Article{Goodman1999b, Title = {{Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics~2: The Bayes Factor}}, Author = {Goodman, Stephen N.}, Journal = {Annals of Internal Medicine}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {1005-1013}, Volume = {130}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {/citations?view\_op=view\_citation\&continue=/scholar\%3Fhl\%3Dnl\%26start\%3D60\%26as\_sdt\%3D0,5\%26scilib\%3D1\&citilm=1\&citation\_for\_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:5LPo\_wSKItgC\&hl=nl\&oi=p} } @Article{Gould1979, Title = {{The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme}}, Author = {Gould, Stephen J. and Lewontin, Richard C.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series~B (Biological Sciences)}, Year = {1979}, Pages = {581--598}, Volume = {205}, Abstract = {An adaptationist programme has dominated evolutionary thought in England and the United States during the past 40 years. It is based on faith in the power of natural selection as an optimizing agent. It proceeds by breaking an organism into unitary 'traits' and proposing an adaptive story for each considered separately. Trade-offs among competing selective demands exert the only brake upon perfection; non-optimality is thereby rendered as a result of adaptation as well. We criticize this approach and attempt to reassert a competing notion (long popular in continental Europe) that organisms must be analysed as integrated wholes, with Bauplane so constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development and general architecture that the constraints themselves become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change than the selective force that may mediate change when it occurs. We fault the adaptationist programme for its failure to distinguish current utility from reasons for origin (male tyrannosaurs may have used their diminutive front legs to titillate female partners, but this will not explain why they got so small); for its unwillingness to consider alternatives to adaptive stories; for its reliance upon plausibility alone as a criterion for accepting speculative tales; and for its failure to consider adequately such competing themes as random fixation of alleles, production of non-adaptive structures by developmental correlation with selected features (allometry, pleiotropy, material compensation, mechanically forced correlation), the separability of adaptation and selection, multiple adaptive peaks, and current utility as an epiphenomenon of non-adaptive structures. We support Darwin's own pluralistic approach to identifying the agents of evolutionary change.}, Archiveprefix = {arXiv}, Arxivid = {9.23}, Doi = {10.1098/rspb.1979.0086}, Eprint = {9.23}, ISBN = {00804649}, ISSN = {0962-8452}, Pmid = {42062}, Url = {http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/205/1161/581.abstract} } @InCollection{Gruenwald2005, Title = {{A Tutorial Introduction to the Minimum Description Length Principle}}, Author = {Grünwald, Peter}, Booktitle = {Advances in Minimum Description Length: Theory and Applications}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {2005}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Editor = {Grünwald, P. and Myung, I. J. and Pitt, M.}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{GreavesWallace2006, Title = {{Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility}}, Author = {Greaves, Hilary and Wallace, David}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {607--632}, Volume = {115}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Article{GriffithsEtAl2015, Title = {{Measuring Causal Specificity}}, Author = {Griffiths, Paul and Pocheville, Arnaud and Calcott, Brett and Stotz, Karola and Kim, Hyunju and Knight, Rob}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {529--555}, Volume = {82}, Abstract = {Several authors have argued that causes differ in the degree to which they are ‘specific' to their effects. Woodward has used this idea to enrich his influential interventionist theory of causal explanation. Here we propose a way to measure causal specificity using tools from information theory. We show that the specificity of a causal variable is not well defined without a probability distribution over the states of that variable. We demonstrate the tractability and interest of our proposed measure by measuring the specificity of coding DNA and other factors in a simple model of the production of mRNA.}, ISSN = {00318248, 1539767X}, Publisher = {[University of Chicago Press, Philosophy of Science Association]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/682914} } @Article{GyenisHofer-SzaboRedei2017, author = {Gyenis, Zal{á}n and Hofer-Szab{ó}, G{á}bor and R{é}dei, Mikl{ó}s}, title = {{Conditioning Using Conditional Expectations: The Borel--Kolmogorov Paradox}}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2017}, volume = {194}, pages = {2595-2630}, abstract = {The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is typically taken to highlight a tension between our intuition that certain conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero conditioning events are well defined and the mathematical definition of conditional probability by Bayes' formula, which looses its meaning when the conditioning event has probability zero. We argue in this paper that the theory of conditional expectations is the proper mathematical device to conditionalize, and this theory allows conditionalization with respect to probability zero events. The conditional probabilities on probability zero events in the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox also can be calculated using conditional expectations. The alleged clash arising from the fact that one obtains different values for the conditional probabilities on probability zero events depending on what conditional expectation one uses to calculate them is resolved by showing that the different conditional probabilities obtained using different conditional expectations cannot be interpreted as calculating in different parametrizations of the conditional probabilities of the same event with respect to the same conditioning conditions. We conclude that there is no clash between the correct intuition about what the conditional probabilities with respect to probability zero events are and the technically proper concept of conditionalization via conditional expectations -- the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox is just a pseudo-paradox.}, howpublished = {Manuscript under review}, keywords = {Probability/Statistics}, owner = {grenache}, publisher = {Manuscript under review.}, timestamp = {2016.07.13}, url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11377/1/hofer{\%}2Dredei{\%}2Dcondex{\_}for{\%}2Darchives.pdf}, } @InCollection{Hajek2011, Title = {{Interpretations of Probability}}, Author = {H{á}jek, Alan}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2011}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/probability-interpret/}}, HowPublished = {\url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/}}, Keywords = {Interpretations of Probability}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/} } @Article{Hajek2003, Title = {{What Conditional Probability Could Not Be}}, Author = {H{á}jek, Alan}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {273--323}, Volume = {137}, Keywords = {Conditional Probability,Probability}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Hajek2008, Title = {{Arguments For---or Against---Probabilism?}}, Author = {Hájek, Alan}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {793--819}, Volume = {59}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{HajekHartmann2010, Title = {{Bayesian Epistemology}}, Author = {Hájek, Alan and Hartmann, Stephan}, Booktitle = {{A Companion to Epistemology}}, Publisher = {Blackwell}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Chichester}, Edition = {2nd}, Editor = {Dancy, Jonathan and Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup}, Pages = {93--106}, Journal = {A Companion to Epistemology, Wiley}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21}, Url = {/citations?view\_op=view\_citation\&continue=/scholar\%3Fhl\%3Dnl\%26start\%3D120\%26as\_sdt\%3D0,5\%26scilib\%3D1\&citilm=1\&citation\_for\_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:q1zXlPLtbUIC\&hl=nl\&oi=p} } @Book{Hacking1983, Title = {{Representing and Intervening}}, Author = {Hacking, Ian}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1983}, Address = {Cambridge}, Keywords = {Experimentation,Robustness,Scientific Realism}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Hacking1965, Title = {{Logic of Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Hacking, Ian}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1965}, Address = {Cambridge}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D20%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:v_xunPV0uK0C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{Haenni2011, Title = {{Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks}}, Author = {Haenni, Rolf and Romeijn, Jan-Willem and Wheeler, Gregory and Williamson, Jon}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Berlin} } @Article{HahnOaksford2007, Title = {{The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies}}, Author = {Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike}, Journal = {Psychological Review}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {704--732}, Volume = {114}, Keywords = {Psychology of Human Reasoning} } @Book{Hailperin1996, Title = {{Sentential Probability Logic: Origins, Development, Current Status, and Technical Applications}}, Author = {Hailperin, Theodore}, Publisher = {Lehigh University Press}, Year = {1996}, Address = {Bethlehem, Pa.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Hailperin1984, Title = {{Probability Logic}}, Author = {Hailperin, Theodore}, Journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic}, Year = {1984}, Pages = {198-212}, Volume = {25}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{Hall2004, Title = {{The Intrinsic Character of Causation}}, Author = {Hall, Ned}, Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2004}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Collins, John and Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie}, Pages = {225--276} } @Article{Halpern2016, Title = {{Sufficient Conditions for Causality to Be Transitive}}, Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {213--226}, Volume = {83}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.11.16} } @Article{HalpernHitchcock2015, Title = {{Graded Causation and Defaults}}, Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Hitchcock, Christopher}, Journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {413--457}, Volume = {66}, Publisher = {Br Soc Philosophy Sci} } @Article{HalpernPearl2005a, Title = {{Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part~I\@: Causes}}, Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {843--887}, Volume = {56}, Keywords = {Actual Causation,Causation,Explanation,Structural Equations}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{HalpernPearl2005b, Title = {{Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part~II\@: Explanations}}, Author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {889--911}, Volume = {56}, Keywords = {Actual Causation,Causation,Explanation,Structural Equations}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{HanCarlin2001, Title = {{Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods for Computing Bayes Factors}}, Author = {Han, C and Carlin, B P}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {2001}, Pages = {1122--1132}, Volume = {96}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D100{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:rFyVMFCKTwsC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @Book{Harding1991, Title = {{Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives}}, Author = {Harding, Sandra}, Publisher = {Cornell University Press}, Year = {1991}, Address = {Ithaca, N.Y.} } @Article{Harman1965, Title = {{The Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Author = {Harman, Gilbert}, Journal = {Philosophical Review}, Year = {1965}, Pages = {88--95}, Volume = {74}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Book{HartHonore1985, Title = {{Causation in the Law}}, Author = {Hart, H. L. A. and Honoré, Tony}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1985}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.10.28} } @InCollection{Hartmann1999, Title = {{Models and Stories in Hadron Physics}}, Author = {Hartmann, Stephan}, Booktitle = {Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1999}, Address = {Cambridge}, Editor = {Morgan, Mary and Morrison, Margaret}, Pages = {326--346}, Abstract = {Fundamental theories are hard to come by. But even if we had them, they would be too complicated to apply. Quantum chromodynamics (QCD) is a case in point. This theory is supposed to govern all strong interactions, but it is extremely hard to apply and test at energies where protons, neutrons and pions are the effective degrees of freedom. Instead, scientists typically use highly idealized models such as the MIT Bag Model or the Nambu Jona-Lasinio Model to account for phenomena in this domain, to explain them and to gain understanding. Based on these models, which typically isolate a single feature of QCD (confinement and chiral symmetry breaking respectively) and disregard many others, scientists attempt to get a better understanding of the physics of strong interactions. But does this practice make sense? Is it justified to use these models for the purposes at hand? Interestingly, these models do not even provide an accurate description of the mass spectrum of protons, neutrons and pions and their lowest lying excitations well - despite several adjustable parameters. And yet, the models are heavily used. I'll argue that a qualitative story, which establishes an explanatory link between the fundamental theory and a model, plays an important role in model acceptance in these cases.}, ISBN = {9780511660108}, Keywords = {Intertheory relations,Models,Philosophy of Science}, Url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10065/1085} } @InCollection{HartmannSprenger2010a, Title = {{Bayesian Epistemology}}, Author = {Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Epistemology}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2010}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Pritchard, Duncan}, Pages = {609--620}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{HartmannSprenger2012a, Title = {{The Future of Philosophy of Science: Introduction}}, Author = {Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2012}, Number = {2}, Pages = {157--159}, Volume = {2}, Abstract = {There is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy, but philosophical problems tend to have three special features. First, they tend to concern large frameworks rather than specific questions within the framework. Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of solution. And third they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these reasons a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scientific problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific resolution. Philosophy in the 20th century was characterized by a concern with logic and language, which is markedly different from the concerns of earlier centuries of philosophy. However, it shared with the European philosophical tradition since the 17th century an excessive concern with issues in the theory of knowledge and with scepticism. As the century ends, we can see that scepticism no longer occupies centre stage, and this enables us to have a more constructive approach to philosophical problems than was possible for earlier generations. This situation is somewhat analogous to the shift from the sceptical concerns of Socrates and Plato to the constructive philosophical enterprise of Aristotle. With that in mind, we can discuss the prospects for the following six philosophical areas: (1) the traditional mind-body problem; (ii) the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; (iii) the philosophy of language; (iv) the philosophy of society; (v) ethics and practical reasons; (vi) the philosophy of science. The general theme of these investigations, I believe, is that the appraisal of the true significance of issues in the philosophy of knowledge enables us to have a more constructive account of various other philosophical problems than has typically been possible for the past three centuries.} } @Article{Hawthorne2005, Title = {{Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions}}, Author = {Hawthorne, James}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {277-320}, Volume = {114}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{HawthorneFitelson2004, Title = {{Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence}}, Author = {Hawthorne, James and Fitelson, Branden}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2004}, Month = {oct}, Pages = {505--514}, Volume = {71}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @InCollection{Heckerman1988, Title = {{An Axiomatic Framework for Belief Updates}}, Author = {Heckerman, David}, Booktitle = {Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2}, Publisher = {North-Holland}, Year = {1988}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Lemmer, J. F. and Kanal, L. N.}, Pages = {11--22} } @Article{Heesen2016b, Title = {{When Journal Editors Play Favorites}}, Author = {Heesen, Remco}, Journal = {Philosophical Studies}, Year = {2018}, Pages = {831--858}, Volume = {175}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Heesen2016a, Title = {{Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science}}, Author = {Heesen, Remco}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {698--716}, Volume = {84}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Hempel1965, Title = {{Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Publisher = {Free Press}, Year = {1965}, Address = {New York}, Booktitle = {Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @InCollection{Hempel1965b, Title = {{Science and Human Values}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Booktitle = {Aspects of Scientific Explanation}, Publisher = {Free Press}, Year = {1965}, Address = {New York}, Pages = {81--96}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Article{Hempel1960, Title = {{Inductive Inconsistencies}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1960}, Number = {4}, Pages = {439--469}, Volume = {12}, Publisher = {Springer} } @Article{Hempel1945a, Title = {{Studies in the Logic of Confirmation~I}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {1945}, Pages = {1--26}, Volume = {54}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Article{Hempel1945b, Title = {{Studies in the Logic of Confirmation~II}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {1945}, Pages = {97--121}, Volume = {54}, Keywords = {Confirmation}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.30} } @Article{Hempel1943, Title = {{A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, Journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic}, Year = {1943}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D60%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:adHtZc2wMuEC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{HempelOppenheim1948, Title = {{Studies in the Logic of Explanation}}, Author = {Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, Paul}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1948}, Month = {apr}, Number = {2}, Pages = {135--175}, Volume = {15}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation; Explanatory Reasoning; Symm} } @Article{HendersonEtAl2010, Title = {{The Structure and Dynamics of Scientific Theories: A Hierarchical Bayesian Perspective}}, Author = {Henderson, Leah and Goodman, Noah D. and Tenenbaum, Joshua B. and Woodward, James F.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {172--200}, Volume = {77}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{HerfeldDoehne2018, Title = {{The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology}}, Author = {Herfeld, Catherine and Doehne, Malte}, Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part~A}, Year = {2018}, Note = {\doi{10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.12.001}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{HindriksDouvenSingmann2016, Title = {{A New Angle on the Knobe Effect: Intentionality Correlates with Blame, Not with Praise}}, Author = {Hindriks, Frank and Douven, Igor and Singmann, Henrik}, Journal = {Mind \& Language}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {204--220}, Volume = {31}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @InCollection{Hitchcock2016, Title = {{Probabilistic Causation}}, Author = {Hitchcock, Christopher}, Booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Probability}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Hajek, Alan and Hitchcock, Christopher} } @Article{HitchcockKnobe2009, Title = {{Cause and Norm}}, Author = {Hitchcock, Christopher and Knobe, Joshua}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {587--612}, Volume = {106} } @Article{HitchcockSober2004, Title = {{Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting}}, Author = {Hitchcock, Christopher and Sober, Elliott}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2004}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1--34}, Volume = {55}, Abstract = {When a scientist uses an observation to formulate a theory, it is no surprise that the resulting theory accurately captures that observation. However, when the theory makes a novel prediction-when it predicts an observation that was not used in its formulation-this seems to provide more substantial confirmation of the theory. This paper presents a new approach to the vexed problem of understanding the epistemic difference between prediction and accommodation. In fact, there are several problems that need to be disentangled; in all of them, the key is the concept of overfitting. We float the hypothesis that accommodation is a defective methodology only when the methods used to accommodate the data fail to guard against the risk of overfitting. We connect our analysis with the proposals that other philosophers have made. We also discuss its bearing on the conflict between instrumentalism and scientific realism.}, ISSN = {00070882, 14643537}, Publisher = {[Oxford University Press, British Society for the Philosophy of Science]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541832} } @Article{HitchcockWoodward2003b, Title = {{Explanatory Generalizations, Part~II\@: Plumbing Explanatory Depth}}, Author = {Hitchcock, Christopher and Woodward, James}, Journal = {No\^us}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {181--199}, Volume = {37}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.13} } @InCollection{Hobbs1988, Title = {{Interpretation as Abduction}}, Author = {Hobbs, Jerry R. and Stickel, Mark and Martin, Paul and Edwards, Douglas}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics}, Year = {1988}, Address = {Buffalo, N.Y.}, Pages = {95--103}, Organization = {Association for Computational Linguistics} } @Article{Hoefer2007, Title = {{The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance}}, Author = {Hoefer, Carl}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {549--596}, Volume = {116}, Abstract = {The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or 'theory' of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is 'Humean' in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal Principle (PP) to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance.}, Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm549}, ISSN = {0026-4423}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/463/549.abstract} } @Article{Holland1986, Title = {{Statistics and Causal Inference}}, Author = {Holland, Paul W.}, Journal = {{Journal of the American Statistical Association}}, Year = {1986}, Pages = {945-960}, Volume = {81}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.11.17} } @Article{Howson2017, Title = {{Putting on the Garber Style? Better Not}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {659--676}, Volume = {84}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.06} } @Article{Howson2013, Title = {{Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {205--211}, Volume = {73}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/2/205.short} } @Article{Howson2008, Title = {{De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {1--23}, Volume = {59}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Howson2000, Title = {{Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://books.google.com/books?hl=de\&lr=\&id=HX8xZRgDGx4C\&oi=fnd\&pg=PA1\&dq=howson+2000\&ots=tNnuwO\_aqu\&sig=K6\_5hE8CsceJVgytsqPv7dxkm3M} } @Article{Howson1991, Title = {{The `Old Evidence' Problem}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1991}, Pages = {547--555}, Volume = {42} } @Article{Howson1985, Title = {{Some Recent Objections to the Bayesian Theory of Support}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1985}, Pages = {305--309}, Volume = {36} } @Article{Howson1984, Title = {{Bayesianism and Support by Novel Facts}}, Author = {Howson, Colin}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1984}, Pages = {245--251}, Volume = {35} } @Book{HowsonUrbach1993, title = {{Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach}}, publisher = {Open Court}, year = {1993}, author = {Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter}, address = {La Salle, Ill.}, edition = {2nd}, keywords = {Formal Philosophy of Science}, } @InCollection{Hrdy1986, Title = {Empathy, polyandry, and the myth of the coy female}, Author = {Hrdy, Sarah}, Booktitle = {Feminist approaches to scienceFeminist approaches to science}, Publisher = {Teachers College Press}, Year = {1986}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Bleier, Ruth}, Pages = {119--146} } @Article{Huber2006, Title = {{Ranking Functions and Rankings on Languages}}, Author = {Huber, Franz}, Journal = {Artificial Intelligence}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {462--471}, Volume = {170}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @Article{Huber2005, Title = {{What Is the Point of Confirmation?}}, Author = {Huber, Franz}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2005}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1146--1159}, Volume = {72}, Publisher = {JSTOR} } @Article{Huber2005b, Title = {{Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning}}, Author = {Huber, Franz}, Journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {101--116}, Volume = {56}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.04.18} } @Book{Huber2009, Title = {{Robust Statistics}}, Author = {Huber, Peter J.}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {2009}, Address = {New York}, Edition = {2nd}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Book{HumeDNR, Title = {{Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion}}, Author = {Hume, David}, Editor = {Gaskin, J C A}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1779}, Address = {Oxford} } @Book{Hume1739, title = {{A Treatise of Human Nature}}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1739/2011}, author = {Hume, David}, editor = {Selby-Bigge, L A and Nidditch, P H}, address = {Oxford}, annote = {First edition by Selby-Bigge published in 1888}, } @Book{Hume1748, Title = {{Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}}, Author = {Hume, David}, Publisher = {Clarendon Press}, Year = {1748}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Hume1748}, Mendeley-tags = {Hume1748} } @Article{Humphreys1985, Title = {{Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities}}, Author = {Humphreys, Paul}, Journal = {Philosophical Review}, Year = {1985}, Pages = {557--570}, Volume = {94}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @Article{HymanHonorton1986, Title = {{A Joint Communiqué: The Psi Ganzfeld Controversy}}, Author = {Hyman, Ray and Honorton, Charles}, Journal = {{Journal of Parapsychology}}, Year = {1986}, Pages = {351--364}, Volume = {50}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Article{IcardKominskyKnobe2017, Title = {{Normality and Actual Causal Strength}}, Author = {Icard, Thomas F. and Kominsky, Jonathan F. and Knobe, Joshua}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {80-93}, Volume = {161}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.12} } @Article{Ioannidis2005, author = {Ioannidis, John P. A.}, title = {{Why Most Published Research Findings Are False}}, journal = {PLoS Medicine}, year = {2005}, volume = {2}, issn = {1549-1277}, abstract = {Summary\n There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false. The probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field are smaller; when effect sizes are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical modes; when there is greater financial and other interest and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific field in chase of statistical significance. Simulations show that for most study designs and settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true. Moreover, for many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias. In this essay, I discuss the implications of these problems for the conduct and interpretation of research.}, archiveprefix = {arXiv}, arxivid = {gr-qc/0208024}, eprint = {0208024}, isbn = {3540239081}, keywords = {Communication in Health Care,Editorial policies (including conflicts of interes,Essay,Genetics and Genomics,Mathematics/Statistics,Medical journals,Public Health and Epidemiology,Science Policy}, pageswegdamit = {e124}, pmid = {16060722}, primaryclass = {gr-qc}, url = {http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124}, } @Article{Ioannidis2005b, Title = {{Contradicted and Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited Clinical Research}}, Author = {Ioannidis, John P. A.}, Journal = {Journal of the Americal Medical Association}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {218--228}, Volume = {294}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Ioannidis2007, Title = {{An Exploratory Test for an Excess of Significant Findings}}, Author = {Ioannidis, John P. A. and Trikalinos, Thomas A.}, Journal = {Clinical Trials}, Year = {2007}, Number = {3}, Pages = {245--253}, Volume = {4}, Abstract = {BACKGROUND: The published clinical research literature may be distorted by the pursuit of statistically significant results. PURPOSE: We aimed to develop a test to explore biases stemming from the pursuit of nominal statistical significance. METHODS: The exploratory test evaluates whether there is a relative excess of formally significant findings in the published literature due to any reason (e.g., publication bias, selective analyses and outcome reporting, or fabricated data). The number of expected studies with statistically significant results is estimated and compared against the number of observed significant studies. The main application uses alpha = 0.05, but a range of alpha thresholds is also examined. Different values or prior distributions of the effect size are assumed. Given the typically low power (few studies per research question), the test may be best applied across domains of many meta-analyses that share common characteristics (interventions, outcomes, study populations, research environment). RESULTS: We evaluated illustratively eight meta-analyses of clinical trials with >50 studies each and 10 meta-analyses of clinical efficacy for neuroleptic agents in schizophrenia; the 10 meta-analyses were also examined as a composite domain. Different results were obtained against commonly used tests of publication bias. We demonstrated a clear or possible excess of significant studies in 6 of 8 large meta-analyses and in the wide domain of neuroleptic treatments. LIMITATIONS: The proposed test is exploratory, may depend on prior assumptions, and should be applied cautiously. CONCLUSIONS: An excess of significant findings may be documented in some clinical research fields.}, Doi = {10.1177/1740774507079441}, ISBN = {1740774507}, ISSN = {1740-7745}, Pmid = {17715249} } @Book{Jackson1991, Title = {{Conditionals}}, Author = {Jackson, Frank}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1991}, Address = {Oxford}, Booktitle = {Conditionals}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Jackson1975, Title = {Grue}, Author = {Jackson, Frank}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1975}, Pages = {113--131}, Volume = {72}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.30} } @Book{Jaynes2003, Title = {{Probability Theory: The Logic of Science}}, Author = {Jaynes, Edwin T.}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2003}, Address = {Cambridge}, Keywords = {Probabilism}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{Jaynes1968, Title = {{Prior Probabilities}}, Author = {Jaynes, Edwin T.}, Booktitle = {IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics (SSC-4)}, Year = {1968}, Pages = {227--241} } @InCollection{Jeffrey1983, Title = {{Bayesianism with a Human Face}}, Author = {Jeffrey, Richard C.}, Booktitle = {{Testing Scientific Theories}}, Publisher = {University of Minnesota Press}, Year = {1983}, Address = {Minneapolis}, Editor = {Earman, John}, Pages = {133--156} } @Book{Jeffrey1971, Title = {The Logic of Decision}, Author = {Jeffrey, Richard C.}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1965}, Address = {Chicago and London}, Note = {Second edition 1983}, Date = {1971}, Location = {Chicago}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @Article{Jeffrey1956, Title = {{Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses}}, Author = {Jeffrey, Richard C.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1956}, Pages = {237--246}, Volume = {23} } @Book{Jeffreys1961, Title = {{Theory of Probability}}, Author = {Jeffreys, Harold}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1961}, Address = {Oxford}, Edition = {3rd}, Abstract = {This paper argues that probability is not an objective phenomenon that can be identified with either the configurational properties of sequences, or the dynamic properties of sources that generate sequences. Instead, it is proposed that probability is a function of subjective as well as objective conditions. This is explained by formulating a notion of probability that is a modification of Laplace's classical enunciation. This definition is then used to explain why probability is strongly associated with disordered sequences, and is also used to throw light on a number of problems in probability theory.}, Booktitle = {Theory of Probability}, ISSN = {00070882} } @Misc{Jensma2014, Title = {{Marokkaanse afkomst heeft met criminaliteit niets van doen}}, Author = {Jensma, Folkert}, HowPublished = {NRC Handelsblad}, Month = {7 June}, Year = {2014}, Booktitle = {NRC Handelsblad}, Url = {http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2014/06/07/marokkaanse-afkomst-heeft-met-criminaliteit-niet-1385404} } @InCollection{Joyce2009, Title = {{Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief}}, Author = {Joyce, James}, Booktitle = {Degrees of Belief}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Berlin}, Editor = {Huber, Franz and Schmidt-Petri, Christoph}, Pages = {263--297}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{Joyce2008, Title = {{Bayes' Theorem}}, Author = {Joyce, James}, Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2003}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/bayes-theorem/}} } @Article{Joyce1998, Title = {{A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism}}, Author = {Joyce, James}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1998}, Month = {dec}, Pages = {575--603}, Volume = {65}, Keywords = {Probabilism} } @Book{KSS1999, Title = {{Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics}}, Author = {Kadane, Joseph B. and Schervish, Mark J. and Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1999}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.09.29} } @InCollection{KSS1996a, Title = {{When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion}}, Author = {Kadane, Joseph B. and Schervish, Mark J. and Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part~I\@: Contributed Papers}, Year = {1996}, Pages = {S281-S289}, Volume = {63}, Abstract = {When can a Bayesian investigator select an hypothesis H and design an experiment (or a sequence of experiments) to make certain that, given the experimental outcome(s), the posterior probability of H will be lower than its prior probability? We report an elementary result which establishes sufficient conditions under which this reasoning to a foregone conclusion cannot occur. Through an example, we discuss how this result extends to the perspective of an onlooker who agrees with the investigator about the statistical model for the data but who holds a different prior probability for the statistical parameters of that model. We consider, specifically, one-sided and two-sided statistical hypotheses involving i.i.d. Normal data with conjugate priors. In a concluding section, using an "improper" prior, we illustrate how the preceding results depend upon the assumption that probability is countably additive.}, Doi = {10.1086/289962}, ISSN = {0031-8248} } @Article{KahnemanTversky1973, Title = {{On the Psychology of Prediction}}, Author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos}, Journal = {{Psychological Review}}, Year = {1973}, Pages = {237--251}, Volume = {80}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @Article{Kaiserman2017, Title = {{Partial Liability}}, Author = {Kaiserman, Alexander}, Journal = {Legal Theory}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {1--26}, Volume = {23}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.08.19} } @Article{Kaiserman2016, Title = {{Causal Contribution}}, Author = {Kaiserman, Alexander}, Journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {387--394}, Volume = {116}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.08.19} } @Article{Karni2005, Title = {{Subjective Expected Utility Theory without States of the World}}, Author = {Karni, Edi}, Journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, Year = {2006}, Number = {3}, Pages = {325--342}, Volume = {42} } @Article{KassRaftery1995, Title = {{Bayes Factors}}, Author = {Kass, Robert E. and Raftery, Adrian E.}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {1995}, Pages = {773--795}, Volume = {90}, Abstract = {In a 1935 paper and in his book Theory of probability, Jeffresy developed a methodology for quantifying the evidence in favor of a scientific theory. The centerpiece was a number, now called the Bayes factor, which is the posterior odds of the null hypothesis when the prior probability on the null is one-half. Although there has been much discussion of Bayesian hypothesis testing in the context of criticism of P-values, less attention has been given to the Bayes as a practical tool of applied statistics. In this article we review and discuss the uses of Bayes factors in the context of five scientific applications in genetics, sports, ecology, sociology, and psychology. We emphasize the following points: From Jeffrey's Bayesian viewpoint, the purpose of hypothesis testing is to evaluate the evidence in favor of a scientific theory. Bayes factors offer a way of evaluating evidence in favor of a null hypothesis. Bayes factors provide a way of incorporating external information into the evaluation of evidence about a hypothesis. Bayes factors are very general and do not require alternative models to be nested. Several techniques are available for computing Bayes factors, including asymptotic approximations that are easy to compute using the output from standard packages that maximize likelihoods. In "non-Bayesian significance tests. The Schwarz criterion (or BIC) gives a rough approximation to the logarithm of the Bayes factor, which is easy to use and does not require evaluation of prior distributions. When one is interested in estimation or prediction, Bayes factors may be converted to weights to be attached to various models so that a composite estimate or prediction may be obtained that takes account of structural or model uncertainty. Algorithms have been proposed that allow model uncertainty to be taken into account when the class of models initially considered is very large. Bayes factors are useful for guiding an evolutionary model-building process. It is important, and feasible, to assess the sensitivity of conclusions to the prior distributions used. CR - Copyright © 1995 American Statistical Association}, Doi = {10.2307/2291091}, ISBN = {9213227418}, ISSN = {01621459}, Pmid = {20179745}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2291091} } @Book{Kelly1996, Title = {The Logic of Reliable Inquiry}, Author = {Kelly, Kevin}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1996}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Kemeny1955, Title = {{Fair Bets and Inductive Probability}}, Author = {Kemeny, John G.}, Journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic}, Year = {1955}, Pages = {263-273}, Volume = {20}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{KemenyOppenheim1952, Title = {{Degree of Factual Support}}, Author = {Kemeny, John G. and Oppenheim, Paul}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1952}, Pages = {307--324}, Volume = {19}, Keywords = {Confirmation} } @Book{Kern-Isberner2001, Title = {{Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision}}, Author = {Kern-Isberner, Gabriele}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2001}, Address = {Berlin} } @Article{Kieseppae2001, Title = {{Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination}}, Author = {Kieseppä, Ilkka A.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2001}, Number = {4}, Pages = {761--794}, Volume = {52}, Abstract = {I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has analogies in all legitimate applications of the model selection criteria, and that an analogy of Goodman's new riddle of induction can be formulated in only some of their applications.}, ISSN = {00070882, 14643537}, Publisher = {[Oxford University Press, British Society for the Philosophy of Science]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541918} } @Article{Kieseppae1997, Title = {{Akaike Information Criterion, Curve-Fitting, and the Philosophical Problem of Simplicity}}, Author = {Kieseppä, Ilkka A.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1997}, Number = {1}, Pages = {21--48}, Volume = {48}, Abstract = {The philosophical significance of the procedure of applying Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to curve-fitting problems is evaluated. The theoretical justification for using AIC (the so-called Akaike's theorem) is presented in a rigorous way, and its range of validity is assessed by presenting both instances in which it is valid and counter-examples in which it is invalid. The philosophical relevance of the justification that this result gives for making one particular choice between simple and complicated hypotheses is emphasized. In addition, recent claims that the methods based on Akaike's theorem are relevant to other philosophical problems associated with the notion of simplicity are presented and evaluated.}, ISSN = {00070882, 14643537}, Publisher = {[Oxford University Press, British Society for the Philosophy of Science]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/687715} } @Article{King2012, Title = {{Use of Relative and Absolute Effect Measures in Reporting Health Inequalities: Structured Review}}, Author = {King, N B and Harper, S and Young, M E}, Journal = {British Medical Journal}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {5774}, Volume = {345}, Abstract = {OBJECTIVE: To examine the frequency of reporting of absolute and relative effect measures in health inequalities research.{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}n{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}nDESIGN: Structured review of selected general medical and public health journals.{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}n{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}nDATA SOURCES: 344 articles published during 2009 in American Journal of Epidemiology, American Journal of Public Health, BMJ, Epidemiology, International Journal of Epidemiology, JAMA, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, The Lancet, The New England Journal of Medicine, and Social Science and Medicine.{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}n{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}nMAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Frequency and proportion of studies reporting absolute effect measures, relative effect measures, or both in abstract and full text; availability of absolute risks in studies reporting only relative effect measures.{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}n{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}nRESULTS: 40{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (138/344) of articles reported a measure of effect in the abstract; among these, 88{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (122/138) reported only a relative measure, 9{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (13/138) reported only an absolute measure, and 2{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (3/138) reported both. 75{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (258/344) of all articles reported only relative measures in the full text; among these, 46{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (119/258) contained no information on absolute baseline risks that would facilitate calculation of absolute effect measures. 18{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (61/344) of all articles reported only absolute measures in the full text, and 7{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} (25/344) reported both absolute and relative measures. These results were consistent across journals, exposures, and outcomes.{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}n{\{}{\$}{\}}\backslashbackslash{\{}\backslash{\$}{\}}nCONCLUSIONS: Health inequalities are most commonly reported using only relative measures of effect, which may influence readers' judgments of the magnitude, direction, significance, and implications of reported health inequalities.}, Doi = {10.1136/bmj.e5774}, ISBN = {1756-1833}, ISSN = {1756-1833}, Pmid = {22945952} } @Article{Kitcher1981, Title = {{Explanatory Unification}}, Author = {Kitcher, Philip}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1981}, Number = {4}, Pages = {507--531}, Volume = {48}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation; Unification} } @Article{Knobe2003, Title = {{Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language}}, Author = {Knobe, Joshua}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {190--194}, Volume = {63}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Article{KnobeFraser2008, Title = {{Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments}}, Author = {Knobe, Joshua and Fraser, Ben}, Journal = {{Moral Psychology}}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {441--448}, Volume = {2} } @InCollection{KnobeNichols2007, Title = {{An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto}}, Author = {Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun}, Booktitle = {{Experimental Philosophy}}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2007}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun}, Pages = {3--14}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Article{Knutti2010, Title = {{The End of Model Democracy?}}, Author = {Knutti, Reto}, Journal = {Climatic Change}, Year = {2010}, Number = {3}, Pages = {395--404}, Volume = {102}, Abstract = {1 The trillion dollar garden party---an analogy Imagine you are hosting a garden party tomorrow and you are trying to decide whether or not to put up a tent against the rain. You read the weather forecast in the newspaper and you ask the farmer next door, and you look at the sky (knowing that persistence is often not a bad weather forecast). So you get three predictions, but how would you aggregate them? Would you average them with equal weight? You might trust the forecast model more (or less) than the farmer, not because you understand how either of them generates their prediction, but because of your past experience in similar situations. But why seek advice from more than one source in the first place? We intuitively assume that the combined information from multiple sources improves our understanding and therefore our ability to decide. Now having read one newspaper forecast already, would a second and a third one increase your confidence? That seems unlikely, because you know that all newspaper forecasts are based on one of only a few numerical weather prediction models. Now once you have decided on a set of forecasts, and irrespective of whether they agree or not, you will have to synthesize the different pieces of information and decide about the tent for the party. The optimal decision probably involves more than just the most likely prediction. If the damage without the tent is likely to be large, and if putting up the tent is easy, then you might go for the tent in a case of large prediction uncertainty even if the most likely outcome is no rain. Although it may seem far-fetched at first, the problem of climate projection is in fact similar in many respects to the garden party situation discussed above. So far, projections from multiple climate models were often aggregated into simple averages, standard deviations and ranges. One example is the recent Fourth Assess-ment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 396 Climatic Change (2010) 102:395--404 which was based largely on multi-model averages of the models participating in the World Climate Research Project (WCRP) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 3 (CMIP3) (Meehl et al. 2007). But is this the best use of the information? Or are we finally ready to move beyond the 'one-model-one-vote' approach? Some recent publications suggest that 'the end of model democracy' (a quote first used by Vladimir Kattsov at an IPCC meeting in 2006) may be near, but the problem is far from trivial. In this issue, Smith and Chandler (2010) propose that for rainfall over the Murray Darling basin in south east Australia, present-day precipitation mean and variability are useful indicators for the evaluation of models, and they find that models performing well today show a more similar trend in the future. At least in their case, eliminating poor models therefore decreases the spread of the ensemble. Although this is not always the case, similar findings for Alaska and Greenland are reported by Walsh et al. (2008). Ideas of down-weighting or eliminating models have been around for a while (Giorgi and Mearns 2002, 2003) but the widespread availability of perturbed physics and multi-model ensembles has sparked more interest in the community for methods to evaluate, combine and possibly weight models, and constrain projections using observations (Annan et al. 2005; Eyring et al. 2007; Forest et al. 2002; Furrer et al. 2007a, b; Greene et al. 2006; Hall and Qu 2006; Hargreaves et al. 2004; Jun et al. 2008a, b; Knutti 2008a; Knutti et al. 2009; Lopez et al. 2006; Murphy et al. 2004; Piani et al. 2005; Räis\"anen 2005, 2007; Sanderson et al. 2008; Schmittner et al. 2005; Shukla et al. 2006; Tebaldi and Knutti 2007; Tebaldi et al. 2004, 2005; Tebaldi and Sanso 2009; van Oldenborgh et al. 2005; Weigel et al. 2008). In the following section, I try to summarize some of the pertinent questions that in my view remain unresolved in combining multiple models. There are of course several aspects where the analogy with the garden party above will fail. First, we are working with a forecast system that strictly speaking has never been proven to have skill, nor to be wrong, at least on the time scales of centuries. Second, we are dealing with a rather expensive garden party that involves billions of people and trillions of dollars. The decisions based on our forecasts might shape the world of the future, so a prediction that is overconfident might be an expensive failure. And finally, it is not just about deciding yes or no as in the case of the tent, but about deciding on one of many possible strategies based on an admittedly incomplete understanding of an extremely complex system. Accordingly, providing a clear recommendation for a way forward is far from trivial. 2 Making sense of multiple models}, Doi = {10.1007/s10584-010-9800-2}, ISBN = {1058401098002}, ISSN = {01650009} } @Book{Kolmogorov1933, Title = {{Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung}}, Author = {Kolmogorov, Andrey}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {1933}, Address = {Berlin}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{KominskyEtAl2015, Title = {{Causal Superseding}}, Author = {Kominsky, Jonathan F. and Phillips, Jonathan and Gerstenberg, Tobias and Lagnado, David and Knobe, Joshua}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {196--209}, Volume = {137}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.19} } @Article{KooleLakens2012, Title = {{Rewarding Replications}}, Author = {Koole, Sander L. and Lakens, Daniel}, Journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {608--614}, Volume = {7}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Koopman1940, Title = {{The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability}}, Author = {Koopman, Bernard O.}, Journal = {Annals of Mathematics}, Year = {1940}, Pages = {269--292}, Volume = {41}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @InCollection{KorbHopeNyberg2009, Title = {{Information-Theoretic Causal Power}}, Author = {Korb, Kevin B. and Hope, Lucas and Nyberg, Erik P.}, Booktitle = {{Information Theory and Statistical Learning}}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Berlin}, Editor = {Emmert-Streib, F. and Dehmer, M.}, Pages = {231-265}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @InCollection{KorbNybergHope2011, Title = {{A New Causal Power Theory}}, Author = {Korb, Kevin B. and Nyberg, Erik P. and Hope, Lucas}, Booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Illari, Phyllis and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon}, Pages = {628--652}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @InCollection{Kuhn1977, Title = {{Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice}}, Author = {Kuhn, Thomas S.}, Booktitle = {The Essential Tension}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1977}, Address = {Chicago}, Pages = {320--339}, Keywords = {General Philosophy of Science} } @Book{Kuhn1977a, Title = {{The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change}}, Author = {Kuhn, Thomas S.}, Publisher = {Chicago University Press}, Year = {1977}, Address = {Chicago} } @Book{Kuhn1962, Title = {{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}, Author = {Kuhn, Thomas S.}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1962}, Address = {Chicago} } @Book{Kuipers2000, Title = {{From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism}}, Author = {Kuipers, Theo A. F.}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Berlin}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{KullbackLeibler1951, Title = {{On Information and Sufficiency}}, Author = {Kullback, Solomon and Leibler, Richard A.}, Journal = {{Annals of Mathematical Statistics}}, Year = {1951}, Pages = {79--86}, Volume = {22} } @Book{Kyburg1974, Title = {{The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Kyburg, Henry E.}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1974}, Address = {Dordrecht} } @Book{Kyburg1961, Title = {{Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief}}, Author = {Kyburg, Henry E.}, Publisher = {Wesleyan University Press}, Year = {1961}, Address = {Middletown, Conn.} } @Book{KyburgTeng2001, Title = {{Uncertain Inference}}, Author = {Kyburg, Henry E. and Teng, Choh Man}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2001}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Book{Lacey1999, Title = {{Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding}}, Author = {Lacey, Hugh}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {1999}, Address = {London}, Abstract = {Introduction: the idea that science is value free 1 2 Values 23 3 Cognitive values 45 4 Science as value free: provisional theses 67 5 Scientific understanding 89 6 The control of nature 111 7 Kuhn: scientific activity in different worlds 147 8 A grassroots empowerment approach 177 9 A feminist approach 197 10 Science as value free: revised theses 219 11 Conclusion}, Doi = {10.1093/mind/110.438.495}, ISBN = {0415208203}, ISSN = {0007-0882}, Journal = {Philosophy}, Pages = {xiv, 285 p.}, Url = {http://mind.oxfordjournals.org} } @Book{LadymanRoss2009, Title = {{Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized}}, Author = {Ladyman, James and Ross, Don}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Laplace1814, Title = {{A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities}}, Author = {de Laplace, Pierre Simon}, Publisher = {Dover}, Year = {1814}, Address = {Mineola, N.Y.}, Keywords = {History of Science,Probability} } @Article{Laudan1981, Title = {{A Confutation of Convergent Realism}}, Author = {Laudan, Larry}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1981}, Pages = {19-48}, Volume = {48}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/187066} } @Book{LeeWagenmakers2013, Title = {{Bayesian Cognitive Modeling: A Practical Course}}, Author = {Lee, Michael D. and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2013}, Address = {Cambridge} } @Book{LehrerWagner1981, Title = {Rational Consensus in Science and Society}, Author = {Lehrer, Keith and Wagner, Carl}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1981}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.03.24} } @Book{Leitgeb2017, Title = {{The Stability of Belief}}, Author = {Leitgeb, Hannes}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2017}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{Leitgeb2014, Title = {{The Stability Theory of Belief}}, Author = {Leitgeb, Hannes}, Journal = {Philosophical Review}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {131--171}, Volume = {123}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {http://philreview.dukejournals.org/content/123/2/131.short} } @Article{Leitgeb2013, Title = {{Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All That}}, Author = {Leitgeb, Hannes}, Journal = {Metaphilosophy}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {267-275}, Volume = {44}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{LeitgebPettigrew2010a, Title = {{An Objective Justification of Bayesianism~I\@: Measuring Inaccuracy}}, Author = {Leitgeb, Hannes and Pettigrew, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2010}, Month = apr, Pages = {201--235}, Volume = {77}, Keywords = {Probabilism}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{LeitgebPettigrew2010b, Title = {{An Objective Justification of Bayesianism~II\@: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy}}, Author = {Leitgeb, Hannes and Pettigrew, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2010}, Month = apr, Pages = {236--272}, Volume = {77}, Keywords = {Probabilism}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Levi1996, Title = {For the Sake of the Argument}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1996}, Address = {Cambridge} } @Book{Levi1980, Title = {{The Enterprise of Knowledge}}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {1980}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.07} } @Article{Levi1977, Title = {{Direct Inference}}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1977}, Pages = {5--29}, Volume = {74}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Levi1974, Title = {{On Indeterminate Probabilities}}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1974}, Pages = {391---418}, Volume = {71}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @Article{Levi1963, Title = {{Corroboration and Rules of Acceptance}}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1963}, Pages = {307--313}, Volume = {13} } @Article{Levi1960, Title = {{Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?}}, Author = {Levi, Isaac}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1960}, Pages = {345--357}, Volume = {11}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.26} } @InCollection{Lewis1980, Title = {{A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Booktitle = {Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1980}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif.}, Editor = {Jeffrey, Richard C.}, Pages = {263--293}, Keywords = {Diachronic Dutch Books; Subjective Probability}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{Lewis1999, Title = {{Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1999}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Lewis1994, Title = {{Humean Supervenience Debugged}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {1994}, Pages = {473--490}, Volume = {103}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review.}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{Lewis1986, Title = {{Philosophical Papers, Volume~2}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1986}, Address = {Oxford}, Booktitle = {Philosophical Papers, Volume 2} } @InCollection{Lewis1986a, Title = {{Postscript to ``Causation''}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Booktitle = {{Philosophical Papers}}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1986}, Address = {Cambridge}, Pages = {172--213}, Volume = {2}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @Article{Lewis1979, Title = {{Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Journal = {No{\^{u}}s}, Year = {1979}, Pages = {455--476}, Volume = {13} } @Article{Lewis1976, Title = {{Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Journal = {Philosophical Review}, Year = {1976}, Pages = {297--315}, Volume = {85}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184279} } @Article{Lewis1973, Title = {{Causation}}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {1973}, Pages = {556--567}, Volume = {70} } @Book{Lewis1973a, Title = {Counterfactuals}, Author = {Lewis, David}, Publisher = {Blackwell}, Year = {1973}, Address = {London}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.18} } @Article{Lindley1983, Title = {{Reconciliation of Probability Distributions}}, Author = {Lindley, Dennis}, Journal = {Operations Research}, Year = {1983}, Pages = {866--880}, Volume = {31}, Doi = {10.1287/opre.31.5.866}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{Lindley1957, Title = {{A Statistical Paradox}}, Author = {Lindley, Dennis V.}, Journal = {Biometrika}, Year = {1957}, Pages = {187--192}, Volume = {44}, Abstract = {A series of 3-aryloxindole derivatives were synthesized and evaluated as activators of the cloned maxi-K channel mSlo expressed in Xenopus laevis oocytes using electrophysiological methods. The most promising maxi-K openers to emerge from this study were (+/-)-3-(5-chloro-2-hydroxyphenyl)-1,3-dihydro-3-hydroxy-6-(trifluoromethy l)-2H-indol-2-one ((+/-)-8c) and its 3-des-hydroxy analogue (+/-)-11b. The individual enantiomers of (+/-)-8c were synthesized, and the maxi-K channel-opening properties were shown to depend on the absolute configuration of the single stereogenic center with the efficacy of (-)-8c superior to that of both (+)-8c and the racemic mixture when evaluated at a concentration of 20 microM. Racemic 11b exhibited greater efficacy than either the racemic 8c or the more active enantiomer in the electrophysiological evaluation. In vitro metabolic stability studies conducted with (+/-)-8c and (+/-)-11b in rat liver S9 microsomal fractions revealed significant oxidative degradation with two hydroxylated metabolites observed by liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry for each compound in addition to the production of 8c from 11b. The pharmacokinetic properties of (+/-)-8c and (+/-)-11b were determined in rats as a prelude to evaluation in a rat model of stroke that involved permanent occlusion of the middle cerebral artery (MCAO model). In the MCAO model, conducted in the spontaneously hypertensive rat, the more polar 3-hydroxy derivative (+/-)-8c did not demonstrate a significant reduction in cortical infarct volume when administered intravenously at doses ranging from 0.1 to 10 mg/kg as a single bolus 2 h after middle cerebral artery occlusion when compared to vehicle-treated controls. In contrast, intravenous administration of (+/-)-11b at a dose of 0.03 mg/kg was found to reduce the measured cortical infarct volume by approximately 18\% when compared to vehicle-treated control animals. Intraperitoneal administration of (+/-)-11b at a dose of 10 mg/kg 2 h following artery occlusion was shown to reduce infarct volume by 26\% when compared to vehicle-treated controls. To further probe the effects of compounds (+/-)-8c and (+/-)-11b on neurotransmitter release in vitro, both compounds were examined for their ability to reduce electrically stimulated 3H-glutamate release from rat hippocampal slices that had been preloaded with 3H-glutamate. Only (+/-)-11b was able to demonstrate a significant inhibition 3H-glutamate release in this assay at a concentration of 20 microM, providing concordance with the profile of these compounds in the MCAO model. Although (+/-)-11b showed some promise as a potential developmental candidate for the treatment of the sequelae of stroke based on its efficacy in the rat MCAO model, the pharmacokinetic profile of this compound was considered to be less than optimal and was not pursued in favor of derivatives with enhanced metabolic stability.}, Doi = {10.2307/2333251}, ISSN = {00063444}, Pmid = {11906290}, Url = {http://biomet.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/44/1-2/187.pdf} } @InCollection{Lipton2001b, Title = {{Is Explanation a Guide to Inference? A Reply to Wesley~C. Salmon}}, Author = {Lipton, Peter}, Booktitle = {Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, Year = {2001}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Editor = {Hon, Giora and Rakover, Sam S.}, Pages = {93--120}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @InCollection{Lipton2000, Title = {{Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Author = {Lipton, Peter}, Booktitle = {{A Companion to the Philosophy of Science}}, Publisher = {Blackwell}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Newton-Smith, W. H.}, Pages = {184--193}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Book{Lipton2004, Title = {{Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Author = {Lipton, Peter}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2004}, Address = {New York}, Edition = {2nd}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Book{Lloyd2005, Title = {{The Case of the Female Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution}}, Author = {Lloyd, Elisabeth A}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {2005}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.} } @InCollection{Lombrozo2012, Title = {{Explanation and Abductive Inference}}, Author = {Lombrozo, Tania}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {K. J. Holyoak and R. G. Morrison}, Pages = {260--276}, Abstract = {Everyday cognition reveals a sophisticated capacity to seek, generate, and evaluate explanations for the social and physical worlds around us. Why are we so driven to explain, and what accounts for our systematic explanatory preferences? This chapter reviews evidence from cognitive psychology and cognitive development concerning the structure and function of explanations, with a focus on the role of explanations in learning and inference. The findings highlight the value of understanding explanation and abductive inference both as phenomena in their own right and for the insights they provide concerning foundational aspects of human cognition, such as representation, learning, and inference.}, Archiveprefix = {arXiv}, Arxivid = {arXiv:1011.1669v3}, Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0014}, Eprint = {arXiv:1011.1669v3}, ISBN = {9780199968718}, ISSN = {1098-6596}, Keywords = {Abduction,Abductive inference,Explanation,Inference to the best explanation,Self-explanation,Understanding}, Pmid = {25246403} } @Article{Lombrozo2011, Title = {{The Instrumental Value of Explanations}}, Author = {Lombrozo, Tania}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2011}, Number = {8}, Pages = {539--551}, Volume = {6}, Abstract = {Scientific and ‘intuitive' or ‘folk' theories are typically characterized as serving three critical functions: prediction, explanation, and control. While prediction and control have clear instrumental value, the value of explanation is less transparent. This paper reviews an emerging body of research from the cognitive sciences suggesting that the process of seeking, generating, and evaluating explanations in fact contributes to future prediction and control, albeit indirectly by facilitating the discovery and confirmation of instrumentally valuable theories. Theoretical and empirical considerations also suggest why explanations may nonetheless feel intrinsically valuable. The paper concludes by considering some implications of the psychology of explanation for a naturalized philosophy of explanation.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00413.x}, ISBN = {1747-9991}, ISSN = {17479991} } @Article{Lombrozo2009, Title = {{Explanation and Categorization: How `Why?'\ Informs `What?'}}, Author = {Lombrozo, Tania}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {248--253}, Volume = {110}, Keywords = {Understanding;Psychology of Explanation} } @Article{Lombrozo2007, Title = {{Simplicity and Probability in Causal Explanation}}, Author = {Lombrozo, Tania}, Journal = {Cognitive Psychology}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {232--257}, Volume = {55}, Keywords = {Understanding; Psychology of Explanation} } @Article{Lombrozo2006, Title = {{The Structure and Function of Explanations}}, Author = {Lombrozo, Tania}, Journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, Year = {2006}, Number = {10}, Pages = {464--470}, Volume = {10}, Keywords = {Psychology of Explanation;Understanding} } @Book{Longino1990, Title = {{Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry}}, Author = {Longino, Helen}, Publisher = {Princeton University Press}, Year = {1990}, Address = {Princeton, N.J.} } @Article{MachamerDardenCraver2000, Title = {{Thinking about Mechanisms}}, Author = {Machamer, Peter and Darden, Lindley and Craver, Carl F.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2000}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1--25}, Volume = {67}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @Article{Machery2012, Title = {{Power and Negative Results}}, Author = {Machery, \'Edouard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {808--820}, Volume = {79}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.03.15} } @Article{MacheryEtAl2004, Title = {{Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style}}, Author = {Machery, \'Edouard and Mallon, Ron and Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {1--12}, Volume = {92}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Book{Mackie1974, Title = {{The Cement of the Universe: A Study in Causation}}, Author = {Mackie, John L.}, Publisher = {Clarendon Press}, Year = {1974}, Address = {Oxford} } @Book{Maddy2009, Title = {{Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method}}, Author = {Maddy, Penelope}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Magnani2001, Title = {{Abduction, Reason and Science}}, Author = {Magnani, Lorenzo}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2001}, Address = {New York} } @Article{MagnusCallender2004, Title = {{Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy}}, Author = {Magnus, P. D. and Callender, Craig}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {320--338}, Volume = {71}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/421536} } @InCollection{Maher2004, Title = {{Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Booktitle = {Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Blackwell}, Year = {2004}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Hitchcock, Christopher}, Pages = {69--93}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Unpublished{Maher2010, Title = {{What Is Probability?}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Note = {Unfinished book manuscript, retrieved from \url{http://patrick.maher1.net/preprints/pop.pdf}}, Year = {2010}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {http://patrick.maher1.net/preprints/pop.pdf} } @Article{Maher2007, Title = {{Explication Defended}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Journal = {Studia Logica}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {331--341}, Volume = {86}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{Maher2002, Title = {{Joyce's Argument for Probabilism}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2002}, Pages = {73-81}, Volume = {69}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Maher1999, Title = {{Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {50--70}, Volume = {66}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Book{Maher1993, Title = {{Betting on Theories}}, Author = {Maher, Patrick}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1993}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Article{Mahoney1977, Title = {{Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in the Peer Review System}}, Author = {Mahoney, M. J.}, Journal = {{Cognitive Therapy and Research}}, Year = {1977}, Pages = {161--175}, Volume = {1}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.25} } @Article{MakelEtAl2012, Title = {{Replications in Psychology Research: How Often Do They Really Occur?}}, Author = {Makel, Matthew C. and Plucker, Jonathan A. and Hegarty, Boyd}, Journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, Year = {2012}, Month = {nov}, Number = {6}, Pages = {537--542}, Volume = {7}, Abstract = {Recent controversies in psychology have spurred conversations about the nature and quality of psychological research. One topic receiving substantial attention is the role of replication in psychological science. Using the complete publication history of the 100 psychology journals with the highest 5-year impact factors, the current article provides an overview of replications in psychological research since 1900. This investigation revealed that roughly 1.6{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} of all psychology publications used the term replication in text. A more thorough analysis of 500 randomly selected articles revealed that only 68{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}} of articles using the term replication were actual replications, resulting in an overall replication rate of 1.07{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}. Contrary to previous findings in other fields, this study found that the majority of replications in psychology journals reported similar findings to their original studies (i.e., they were successful replications). However, replications were significantly less likely to be successful when there was no overlap in authorship between the original and replicating articles. Moreover, despite numerous systemic biases, the rate at which replications are being published has increased in recent decades.}, Doi = {10.1177/1745691612460688}, ISSN = {1745-6916}, Pmid = {26168110}, Url = {http://pps.sagepub.com/content/7/6/537.abstract} } @Article{Makinson1985, Title = {{How to Give It Up: A Survey of Some Formal Aspects of the Logic of Theory Change}}, Author = {Makinson, David}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1985}, Number = {3}, Pages = {347--363}, Volume = {62}, Abstract = {The paper surveys some recent work on formal aspects of the logic of theory change. It begins with a general discussion of the intuitive processes of contraction and revision of a theory, and of differing strategies for their formal study. Specific work is then described, notably Gärdenfors' postulates for contraction and revision, maxichoice contraction and revision functions and the condition of orderliness, partial meet contraction and revision functions and the condition of relationality, and finally the operations of safe contraction and revision. Verifications and proofs are omitted, with references given to the literature but definitions and principal results are presented with rigour along with discussion of their significance.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00869410}, ISSN = {00397857} } @Article{Makinson1965, Title = {{The Paradox of the Preface}}, Author = {Makinson, David}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {1965}, Pages = {205--207}, Volume = {25} } @InCollection{MartiniSprenger2016, Title = {{Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise}}, Author = {Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2017}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Boyer-Kassem, Thomas and Mayo-Wilson, Conor and Weisberg, Michael}, Pages = {180--201} } @Book{Mayo2018, Title = {Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Science Wars}, Author = {Mayo, Deborah}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2018}, Address = {Cambridge} } @InCollection{Mayo2010b, Title = {{An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle}}, Author = {Mayo, Deborah G.}, Booktitle = {Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Cambridge}, Chapter = {3}, Editor = {Mayo, Deborah G. and Spanos, Aris}, Pages = {305--314}, Keywords = {Inductive Logic;Statistics} } @Book{Mayo1996, Title = {{Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge}}, Author = {Mayo, Deborah G.}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1996}, Address = {Chicago} } @InCollection{MayoKruse2001, Title = {{Principles of Inference and their Consequences}}, Author = {Mayo, Deborah G. and Kruse, M.}, Booktitle = {Foundations of Bayesianism}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands}, Year = {2001} } @Article{MayoSpanos2006, Title = {{Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman--Pearson Philosophy of Induction}}, Author = {Mayo, Deborah G. and Spanos, Aris}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {323--357}, Volume = {57}, Keywords = {Inductive Logic;Statistics}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.26} } @Article{McCullagh2002, Title = {{What Is a Statistical Model?}}, Author = {McCullagh, Peter}, Journal = {Annals of Statistics}, Year = {2002}, Pages = {1225--1310}, Volume = {30}, Date = {2002}, Journaltitle = {Annals of Statistics}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.12} } @Article{McGrew2003, Title = {{Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning}}, Author = {McGrew, Timothy}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {553--567}, Volume = {54}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @InCollection{McMullin2008, Title = {{The Virtues of a Good Theory}}, Author = {McMullin, Ernan}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2008}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Curd, Martin and Psillos, Stathis}, Pages = {498--508} } @InCollection{McMullin1982, Title = {{Values in Science}}, Author = {McMullin, Ernan}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, Year = {1982}, Pages = {3-28} } @Book{Meadows1974, Title = {{Communication in Science}}, Author = {Meadows, A. J.}, Publisher = {Butterworths}, Year = {1974}, Address = {London}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://cds.cern.ch/record/103910} } @Article{MeekGlymour1994, Title = {{Conditioning and Intervening}}, Author = {Meek, Christopher and Glymour, Clark}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1994}, Pages = {1001-1021}, Volume = {45}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.11.16} } @PhdThesis{Meijs2005, Title = {{Probabilistic Measures of Coherence}}, Author = {Meijs, Wouter}, School = {Erasmus University Rotterdam}, Year = {2005}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.10.25} } @InCollection{Menzies2014, Title = {{Counterfactual Theories of Causation}}, Author = {Menzies, Peter}, Booktitle = {{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/causation-counterfactual/}}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/} } @Article{Mikkelson2006, Title = {{Realism vs. Instrumentalism in a New Statistical Framework}}, Author = {Mikkelson, Gregory M.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {440--447}, Volume = {73}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.07.29} } @Article{Miller1974, Title = {{Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude}}, Author = {Miller, David}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1974}, Pages = {166--177}, Volume = {25}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.20} } @Book{Miller2000, Title = {{The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature}}, Author = {Miller, G F}, Publisher = {Anchor Books}, Year = {2000}, Address = {New York}, Abstract = {'The mating mind' revives and extends Darwin's suggestion that sexual selection through mate choice was important in human mental evolution - especially the more 'self-expressive' aspects of human behavior, such as art, morality, language, and creativity. Their 'survival value' has proven elusive, but their adaptive design features suggest they evolved through mutual mate choice, in both sexes, to advertise intelligence, creativity, moral character, and heritable fitness. The supporting evidence includes human mate preferences, courtship behavior, behavior genetics, psychometrics, and life history patterns. The theory makes many testable predictions, and sheds new light on human cognition, motivation, communication, sexuality, and culture.}, Booktitle = {Anchor Books}, Doi = {10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.1196}, ISBN = {038549517X}, ISSN = {00027294}, Keywords = {Selection,art,creativity,human evolution,language,morality,sexual selection}, Pmid = {578}, Url = {://000172571300001} } @Article{Miller1998, Title = {{A Review of Sexual Selection and Human Evolution: How Mate Choice Shaped Human Nature}}, Author = {Miller, G F}, Journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior: Ideas, Issues, and Applications}, Year = {1998}, Pages = {87--129}, Abstract = {(from the chapter) Reviews the current state of sexual-selection theory, and outlines some applications to understanding human behavior. One goal of this chapter is to dispel some myths regarding sexual-selection theory, and to bring evolutionary psychology up to date with respect to the biological literature on sexual selection. It reviews the history and basic theory on sexual selection; contextualizes human mate choice by covering sexual selection in primates and hominids; surveys some possible roles of mate choice in shaping the human body, the human mind, and human culture; and concludes with some academic and existential implications of applying sexual-selection theory to understand human nature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2000 APA, all rights reserved)}, Url = {ftp://wuecon195.wustl.edu/RePEc/els/esrcls/sex.pdf} } @Article{Milne1996, Title = {{$\log\bigl[P(h\numk12/eb)\bigslash P(h\nmk1/b)\bigr]$ Is the One True Measure of Confirmation}}, Author = {Milne, Peter}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1996}, Pages = {21--26}, Volume = {63}, Keywords = {Confirmation}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{MontonMohler2012, Title = {{Constructive Empiricism}}, Author = {Monton, Bradley and Mohler, Chad}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2017}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/constructive-empiricism/}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/} } @Article{montori2005, Title = {{Randomized Trials Stopped Early for Benefit: A Systematic Review}}, Author = {Montori, V M and Devereaux, P J and Adhikari, N K J and Burns, K E A and Eggert, C H and Briel, M and Lacchetti, C and Leung, T W and Darling, E and Bryant, D M and Others}, Journal = {JAMA}, Year = {2005}, Number = {17}, Pages = {2203}, Volume = {294}, Publisher = {AMA AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION} } @Article{Moretti2007, Title = {{Ways in Which Coherence Is Confirmation Conducive}}, Author = {Moretti, Luca}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {309--319}, Volume = {157}, Abstract = {Abstract Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti (2005) and define two evidence-gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11229-006-9057-5}, ISSN = {00397857}, Keywords = {Coherence,Coherence measures,Coherentism,Confirmation,Confirmation transmission,Dietrich,Fitelson,Moretti,Olsson,Total evidence} } @Article{MoreyEtAl2016, Title = {{The Fallacy of Placing Confidence in Confidence Intervals}}, Author = {Morey, Richard D. and Hoekstra, Rink and Rouder, Jeffrey N. and Lee, Michael D. and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {103-123}, Volume = {23}, Abstract = {Interval estimates - estimates of parameters that include an allowance for sampling uncertainty - have long been touted as a key component of statistical analyses. There are several kinds of interval estimates, but the most popular are confidence intervals (CIs): intervals that contain the true parameter value in some known proportion of repeated samples, on average. The width of confidence intervals is thought to index the precision of an estimate; CIs are thought to be a guide to which parameter values are plausible or reasonable; and the confidence coefficient of the interval (e.g., 95 {\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}) is thought to index the plausibility that the true parameter is included in the interval. We show in a number of examples that CIs do not necessarily have any of these properties, and can lead to unjustified or arbitrary inferences. For this reason, we caution against relying upon confidence interval theory to justify interval estimates, and suggest that other theories of interval estimation should be used instead.}, Doi = {10.3758/s13423-015-0947-8}, ISSN = {1069-9384}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pmid = {26450628}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26450628} } @Article{MoreyRomeijnRouder2013, Title = {{The Humble Bayesian: Model Checking from a Fully Bayesian Perspective}}, Author = {Morey, Richard D. and Romeijn, J. W. and Rouder, J. N.}, Journal = {{British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology}}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {68--75}, Volume = {66}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.20} } @Article{MoreyEtAl2014, Title = {{Why Hypothesis Tests are Essential for Psychological Science: A Comment on Cumming (2014)}}, Author = {Morey, Richard D. and Rouder, Jeffrey N. and Verhagen, Josine and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, Journal = {Psychological Science}, Year = {2014}, Month = {jun}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1289--1290}, Volume = {25}, Doi = {10.1177/0956797614525969}, ISSN = {1467-9280}, Keywords = {Biomedical Research,Biomedical Research: standards,Data Interpretation,Humans,Psychology,Psychology: standards,Statistical,Statistics as Topic,Statistics as Topic: standards}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pmid = {24604147}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24604147} } @Book{Moss2018, Title = {Probabilistic Knowledge}, Author = {Moss, Sarah}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2018}, Address = {Oxford} } @Article{moye2008, Title = {{Bayesians in Clinical Trials: Asleep at the Switch}}, Author = {Moy{é}, Lemuel A.}, Journal = {Statistics in Medicine}, Year = {2008}, Pages = {469--482}, Volume = {27} } @Article{MuldoonEtAl2014, Title = {{On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms}}, Author = {Muldoon, Ryan and Lisciandra, Chiara and Bicchieri, Cristina and Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {3-22}, Volume = {13}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{Myrvold2016, Title = {{On the Evidential Import of Unification}}, Author = {Myrvold, Wayne C.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {92--114}, Volume = {84}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Myrvold2015, Title = {{You Can't Always Get What You Want: Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities}}, Author = {Myrvold, Wayne C.}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {573--603}, Volume = {80}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Myrvold2003, Title = {{A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification}}, Author = {Myrvold, Wayne C.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2003}, Month = {apr}, Pages = {399--423}, Volume = {70}, Keywords = {Unification}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Nagel1979, Title = {{Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science}}, Author = {Nagel, Ernest}, Publisher = {Columbia University Press}, Year = {1979}, Address = {New York} } @Book{Nagel1961, Title = {{The Structure of Science}}, Author = {Nagel, Ernest}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {1961}, Address = {London} } @Article{NagelSanJuanMar2013, Title = {{Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs}}, Author = {Nagel, Jennifer and San Juan, Valerie and Mar, Raymond A.}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {652--661}, Volume = {129}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Book{Nagel1986, Title = {{The View from Nowhere}}, Author = {Nagel, Thomas}, Year = {1986}, Abstract = {Much philosophical debate has attempted to reconcile the human capacity to view the world both objectively and subjectively. Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and scepticism, thought and reality, free will, and ethics. From reviews of the hardback: `Remarkable ... all of his discussions are clear and insightful, but some reach a level of originality and illumination that opens genuinely new avenues of philosophical thought ... a rare combination of profundity and clarity, along with simplicity of expression. It should be recommended to all those who are bored with or despair about philosophy.' Times Literary Supplement}, Booktitle = {Oxford OUP}, ISBN = {0195036689}, Pages = {256}, Url = {http://www.lavoisier.fr/notice/frIWOKKXAAOAW6RO.html} } @Article{NahmiasEtAl2005, Title = {{Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility}}, Author = {Nahmias, Eddy and Morris, Stephen and Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Turner, Jason}, Journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {561--584}, Volume = {18}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Article{Nardini2013, Title = {{Bias and Conditioning in Sequential Medical Trials}}, Author = {Nardini, Cecilia and Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {1053--1064}, Volume = {80}, Abstract = {Randomized controlled trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based medicine. Usually they are monitored for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from trials stopped early is often charged with bias toward implausibly large effects. To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that conditional hypothesis tests give a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and significantly improve the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]}, ISSN = {00318248}, Keywords = {CLINICAL trials,EVIDENCE-based medicine,FREQUENTIST statistics,RANDOMIZED controlled trials,RESEARCH bias}, Url = {http://offcampus.lib.washington.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=93642180&site=ehost-live} } @Book{NeymanPearson1967, Title = {{Joint Statistical Papers}}, Author = {Neyman, Jerzy and Pearson, Egon S.}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1967}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif.}, Abstract = {Professor E.S. Pearson retired from the Managing Editorship of Biometrika at the end of 1965, and the Trustees decided to celebrate his long and distinguished editorship by reissuing some of his written contributions to statistics in collected form. Some of the most important of these were made jointly with Professor Jerzy Neyman and so it was decided to issue two volumes : one of papers largely by Professor Pearson alone, which has been published, and the other of the joint Neyman-Pearson papers, which is the present volume. The Trusteens salute both authors, and are glad to make their important work available to statisticians and students in convenient form. The University Presses of Cambridge and California will shortly publish a volume of collected papers by Professor Neyman alone.}, Booktitle = {The testing of statistical hypotheses in relation to probabilities a priori}, ISBN = {{\isbn{0520009916}} {\andname} {\isbn{0852647069}}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pages = {186--202}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{NeymanPearson1933, Title = {{On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses}}, Author = {Neyman, Jerzy and Pearson, Egon S.}, Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A}, Year = {1933}, Pages = {289--337}, Volume = {231}, Abstract = {The likelihood principle of Bayesian statistics implies that information about the stopping rule used to collect evidence does not enter into the statistical analysis. This consequence confers an apparent advantage on Bayesian statistics over frequentist ...}, Booktitle = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society~A\@: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences}, Doi = {10.1098/rsta.1933.0009}, ISBN = {02643952}, ISSN = {1364-503X} } @Book{Nicod1961, title = {Le problème logique de l'induction}, publisher = {Presses Universitaires de France}, year = {1925/61}, author = {Nicod, Jean}, editor = {Russell, Bertrand}, address = {Paris}, note = {Originally published in 1925 (Paris: Alcan)}, } @Article{Niiniluoto2011, Title = {{Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth}}, Author = {Niiniluoto, Ilkka}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {165--181}, Volume = {75}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.20} } @Book{Niiniluoto1999, Title = {{Critical Scientific Realism}}, Author = {Niiniluoto, Ilkka}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1999}, Address = {Oxford} } @Article{Niiniluoto1983, Title = {{Novel Facts and Bayesianism}}, Author = {Niiniluoto, Ilkka}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1983}, Number = {4}, Pages = {375--379}, Volume = {34}, Publisher = {Taylor \& Francis} } @Article{Nolan1997, Title = {{Quantitative Parsimony}}, Author = {Nolan, Daniel}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1997}, Pages = {329-343}, Volume = {48}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.05} } @InCollection{Norton2011, Title = {{Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory}}, Author = {Norton, John D.}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Statistics}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Forster, Malcolm}, Pages = {391--439}, Series = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume~VII}, Abstract = {Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that governs its inductive bearing in science. The core ideas shared by all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are, at a good first approximation, that a scientist's beliefs are or should conform to a probability measure; and that the incorporation of new evidence is through conditionalization using Bayes' theorem. The theory reduces the often-nebulous notion of logic of induction to a single, unambiguous calculus, the probability calculus. Second, the theory has proven to be spacious, with a remarkable ability to absorb, systematize and vindicate what elsewhere appear as independent evidential truisms. Third is its most important virtue, an assurance of consistency. The challenge to a Bayesian analysis is to find a way of capturing these last informal thoughts in a more precise analysis. ?? 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-444-51862-0.50011-3}, ISBN = {9780444518620} } @Article{Norton2016, Title = {{A Demonstration of the Incompleteness of Calculi of Inductive Inference}}, Author = {Norton, John D.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2018}, Note = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axx004}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Norton2003, Title = {{A Material Theory of Induction}}, Author = {Norton, John D.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {647--670}, Volume = {70}, Abstract = {Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume's problem of the justification of induction.}, Doi = {10.1086/378858}, ISSN = {00318248} } @Article{NosekErrington2017, author = {Nosek, Brian A. and Errington, Timothy M.}, title = {Reproducibility in Cancer Biology: Making sense of replications}, journal = {eLife}, year = {2017}, volume = {6}, pages = {e23383}, month = {jan}, issn = {2050-084X}, abstract = {The first results from the Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology suggest that there is scope for improving reproducibility in pre-clinical cancer research.}, article_type = {journal}, citation = {eLife 2017;6:e23383}, doi = {10.7554/eLife.23383}, keywords = {Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology, replication, metascience, reproducibility, methodology, open science}, pub_date = {2017-01-19}, publisher = {eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd}, url = {https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.23383}, } @Article{Nuijten2016, Title = {The prevalence of statistical reporting errors in psychology (1985--2013)}, Author = {Nuijten, Michèle B. and Hartgerink, Chris H. J. and van Assen, Marcel A. L. M. and Epskamp, Sacha and Wicherts, Jelte M.}, Journal = {Behavior Research Methods}, Year = {2016}, Month = {Dec}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1205--1226}, Volume = {48}, Abstract = {This study documents reporting errors in a sample of over 250,000 p-values reported in eight major psychology journals from 1985 until 2013, using the new R package ``statcheck.'' statcheck retrieved null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) results from over half of the articles from this period. In line with earlier research, we found that half of all published psychology papers that use NHST contained at least one p-value that was inconsistent with its test statistic and degrees of freedom. One in eight papers contained a grossly inconsistent p-value that may have affected the statistical conclusion. In contrast to earlier findings, we found that the average prevalence of inconsistent p-values has been stable over the years or has declined. The prevalence of gross inconsistencies was higher in p-values reported as significant than in p-values reported as nonsignificant. This could indicate a systematic bias in favor of significant results. Possible solutions for the high prevalence of reporting inconsistencies could be to encourage sharing data, to let co-authors check results in a so-called ``co-pilot model,'' and to use statcheck to flag possible inconsistencies in one's own manuscript or during the review process.}, Day = {01}, Doi = {10.3758/s13428-015-0664-2}, ISSN = {1554-3528}, Url = {https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-015-0664-2} } @Misc{OHagan2012, Title = {{Posting on the Statistical Methods Used in the Discovery of the Higgs Boson}}, Author = {O'Hagan, Tony}, HowPublished = {Email list of the International Society for Bayesian Analysis (\textsc{isba}). Retrieved from \url{www.isba.org} on July~27, 2017}, Year = {2012}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Book{Oakes1986, Title = {{Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Oakes, M W}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1986}, Address = {New York}, Url = {/citations?view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}op=view{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\_}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}citation{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\&}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}continue=/scholar{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Fhl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}{\}}{\{}{\}}{\}}3Dnl{\{}{\{}{\}}{\{}{\%}}}} } @Book{OaksfordChater2000, Title = {{Bayesian Rationality}}, Author = {Oaksford, Mike and Chater, Nick}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Oxford} } @InCollection{Oddie2014, Title = {Truthlikeness}, Author = {Oddie, Graham}, Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/truthlikeness}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16}, Url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthlikeness} } @Book{Oddie1986, Title = {{Likeness to Truth}}, Author = {Oddie, Graham}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1986}, Address = {Dordrecht} } @Article{Okasha2007, Title = {{What Does Goodman's `Grue' Problem Really Show?}}, Author = {Okasha, Samir}, Journal = {{Philosophical Papers}}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {483--502}, Volume = {36}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.30} } @Article{Okasha2000, Title = {{Van Fraassen's Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Author = {Okasha, Samir}, Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2000}, Number = {4}, Pages = {691--710}, Volume = {31}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Article{Okruhlik2005, Title = {{Gender Bias in the Biological and Social Sciences}}, Author = {Okruhlik, Kathleen}, Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {21--42}, Volume = {20} } @Article{Olsson2011, Title = {{A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology}}, Author = {Olsson, Erik J.}, Journal = {Episteme}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {127--143}, Volume = {8}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @Article{OSC2015, Title = {{Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science}}, Author = {{Open Science Collaboration}}, Journal = {Science}, Year = {2015}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://science.sciencemag.org/content/349/6251/aac4716.full.pdf}}, Volume = {349} } @InCollection{Over2016, Title = {{Causation and the Probability of Causal Conditionals}}, Author = {Over, David}, Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Waldmann, Michael}, Pages = {307--325}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.07} } @Article{OverEtAl2007, Title = {{Causal Conditionals}}, Author = {Over, David and Hadjichristidis, C}, Year = {2007}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.02} } @TechReport{OxburghEtAl2010, Title = {{Report of the International Panel Set Up by the University of East Anglia to Examine the Research of the Climatic Research Unit}}, Author = {Oxburgh, Ron and Davies, Huw and Emanuel, Kerry and Graumlich, Lisa and Hand, David and Huppert, Herbert and Kelly, Michael}, Institution = {University of East Anglia}, Year = {2010}, Note = {Downloaded on July 28, 2017, at \url{http://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/3154295/7847337/SAP.pdf/a6f591fc-fc6e-4a70-9648-8b943d84782b}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28} } @Article{ParisVencovska1989, Title = {{On the Applicability of Maximum Entropy to Inexact Reasoning}}, Author = {Paris, Jeff B. and Vencovská, Alina}, Journal = {International Journal of Approximate Reasoning}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {1--34}, Volume = {3}, Booktitle = {{Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods}}, Editor = {Skilling, J.}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Kluwer}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Article{ParisVencovskaWilmers1994, Title = {{A Natural Prior Probability Distribution Derived from the Propositional Calculus}}, Author = {Paris, Jeff B. and Vencovská, Alina and Wilmers, G. M.}, Journal = {Annals of Pure and Applied Logic}, Year = {1994}, Pages = {243--285}, Volume = {70}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @InCollection{Pearl2001, Title = {{Direct and Indirect Effects}}, Author = {Pearl, Judea}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence}, Year = {2001}, Editor = {Breese, Jack and Koller, Daphne}, Pages = {411--420}, Abstract = {The direct effect of one event on another can be defined and measured by holding constant all intermediate variables between the two. Indirect effects present conceptual and practical difficulties (in nonlinear models), because they cannot be isolated by holding certain variables constant? This paper presents a new way of defining the effect transmitted through a restricted set of paths, without controlling variables on the remaining paths. This permits the assessment of a more natural type of direct and indirect effects, one that is applicable in both linear and nonlinear models and that has broader policy-related interpretations. The paper establishes conditions under which such assessments can be estimated consistently from experimental and nonexperimental data, and thus extends path-analytic tec hniques to nonlinear and nonparametric models.}, ISBN = {1558608001} } @InCollection{Pearl2011, Title = {{The Structural Theory of Causation}}, Author = {Pearl, Judea}, Booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2011}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Illari, Phyllis McKay and Russo, Frederic and Williamson, Jon}, Pages = {697--727}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.10.28} } @Book{Pearl2009, title = {{Causality}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2009}, author = {Pearl, Judea}, address = {Cambridge}, edition = {2nd}, } @Book{Peirce1931, Title = {{The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce}}, Author = {Peirce, Charles Sanders}, Editor = {Hartshorne, Charles and Weiss, Paul}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {1931--1935}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Volume = {I--VI\@}, Keywords = {History of Science,Statistics}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @InCollection{Pettigrew2015a, Title = {{Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism}}, Author = {Pettigrew, Richard}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2015}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epistemic-utility/}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-utility/} } @Book{Pettigrew2016, Title = {Accuracy and the Laws of Credence}, Author = {Pettigrew, Richard}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Pettigrew2015b, Title = {{Accuracy and the Credence--Belief Connection}}, Author = {Pettigrew, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophical Imprints}, Year = {2015}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16}, Url = {www.philosophersimprint.org/015016} } @Article{Pincock2015, Title = {{Abstract Explanations in Science}}, Author = {Pincock, Christopher}, Journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {857--882}, Volume = {66}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.06} } @Article{Poole2010, Title = {{On the Origin of Risk Relativism}}, Author = {Poole, Charles}, Journal = {Epidemiology}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {3-9}, Volume = {21}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.06.06} } @Book{Popper2002, Title = {{The Logic of Scientific Discovery}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {1959/2002}, Address = {London}, Note = {Reprint of the revised English 1959 edition. Originally published in German in 1934 as ``Logik der Forschung''}, Keywords = {General Philosophy of Science} } @Book{Popper1983b, Title = {{Realism and the Aim of Science}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, Year = {1983}, Address = {Totowa, N.J.} } @Book{Popper1979, Title = {{Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Publisher = {Clarendon Press}, Year = {1979}, Address = {Oxford} } @Book{Popper1963, Title = {{Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {1963}, Address = {London}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D60%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:M0j1y4EgrScC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Popper1958, Title = {{A Third Note on Degree of Corroboration or Confirmation}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1958}, Number = {32}, Pages = {294--302}, Volume = {8}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D140%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:V_vSwabWVtYC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{Popper1957, Title = {{A Second Note on Degree of Confirmation}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1957}, Number = {28}, Pages = {350--353}, Volume = {7}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/VII.28.350}, ISSN = {0007-0882}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/bjps/VII.28.350} } @Article{Popper1954, Title = {{Degree of Confirmation}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1954}, Pages = {143--149}, Volume = {5} } @Article{Popper1938, Title = {{A Set of Independent Axioms for Probability}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R.}, Journal = {Mind}, Year = {1938}, Month = {apr}, Number = {186}, Pages = {275--277}, Volume = {47}, Keywords = {Conditional Probability,Probability} } @Article{PopperMiller1983, Title = {{A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability}}, Author = {Popper, Karl R. and Miller, David}, Journal = {Nature}, Year = {1983}, Number = {5910}, Pages = {687--688}, Volume = {302}, Abstract = {Proofs of the impossibility of induction have been fallingdead-born from the Press' ever since the first of them (in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature) appeared in 1739. One of us (K.P.) has been producing them for more than 50 years. The present proof strikes us both as pretty.}, Doi = {10.1038/302687a0}, ISBN = {0028-0836}, ISSN = {0028-0836}, Keywords = {Q Science}, Url = {http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/27233/} } @Book{Porter1996, Title = {{Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life}}, Author = {Porter, Theodore}, Publisher = {Princeton University Press}, Year = {1996}, Address = {Princeton, N.J.} } @InCollection{PreddEtAl2009, Title = {{Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules}}, Author = {Predd, Joel B. and Seiringer, Robert and Lieb, Elliott H. and Osherson, Daniel N. and Poor, Vincent H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev R.}, Booktitle = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory}, Year = {2009}, Number = {10}, Pages = {4786--4792}, Volume = {55}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Book{Psillos2009a, Title = {{Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation}}, Author = {Psillos, Stathis}, Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, Year = {2009}, Address = {London}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=psillos+2009+knowing\&btnG=\&hl=de\&as\_sdt=0\%2C5\#0} } @Book{Psillos1999, Title = {{Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth}}, Author = {Psillos, Stathis}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {1999}, Address = {London}, Keywords = {General Philosophy of Science; Scientific Realism;}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{Putnam1975, Title = {{Mathematics, Matter, and Method}}, Author = {Putnam, Hilary}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1975}, Address = {Cambridge}, Series = {Philosophical Papers}, Volume = {I}, Keywords = {Scientific Realism}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Book{Quine1992, Title = {{Pursuit of Truth}}, Author = {Quine, W. V. O.}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {1992}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.} } @InCollection{Quine1969, Title = {{Epistemology Naturalized}}, Author = {Quine, W. V. O.}, Booktitle = {{Ontological Relativity and Other Essays}}, Publisher = {Columbia University Press}, Year = {1969}, Address = {New York}, Pages = {69--90}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Quine1951, Title = {{Two Dogmas of Empiricism}}, Author = {Quine, W. V. O.}, Journal = {{Philosophical Review}}, Year = {1951}, Pages = {20-43}, Volume = {60} } @Article{RedeiGyenis2016, author = {Rédei, Miklós and Gyenis, Zalán}, title = {{Measure-theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2016}, volume = {83}, pages = {972--987}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.20}, } @Book{Renyi1970, Title = {{Foundations of Probability}}, Author = {Rényi, Alfred}, Publisher = {Holden-Day}, Year = {1970}, Address = {San Francisco}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Raftery1995, Title = {{Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research}}, Author = {Raftery, Adrian E.}, Journal = {Sociological Methodology}, Year = {1995}, Pages = {111--163}, Volume = {25} } @InCollection{Ramsey1926, author = {Ramsey, Frank P.}, booktitle = {Philosophical Papers}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, title = {{Truth and Probability}}, year = {1926/1990}, address = {Cambridge}, editor = {Mellor, D. H.}, note = {Originally published in 1926.}, pages = {52--94}, annote = {Edited collection published in 1990}, keywords = {Subjective Probability;Ramsey}, } @Book{Rawls1971, Title = {{A Theory of Justice}}, Author = {Rawls, John}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {1971}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D80%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:WIXB4To3Tx4C&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Article{deRegtDieks2005, Title = {{A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding}}, Author = {de Regt, Henk and Dieks, Dennis}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {137-170}, Volume = {144}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Reichenbach1956, Title = {{The Direction of Time}}, Author = {Reichenbach, Hans}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1956}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif., and Los Angeles}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.01} } @Book{Reichenbach1951, Title = {{The Rise of Scientific Philosophy}}, Author = {Reichenbach, Hans}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1951}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif.}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Reichenbach1949, Title = {{The Theory of Probability}}, Author = {Reichenbach, Hans}, Publisher = {University of California Press}, Year = {1949}, Address = {Berkeley, Calif.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @InCollection{ReissSprenger2014, author = {Reiss, Julian and Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Scientific Objectivity}}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2014/20}, editor = {Zalta, Ed}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/}, } @Article{Reutlinger2017, Title = {{Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation}}, Author = {Reutlinger, Alexander}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2017}, Note = {\doi{10.1111/phc3.12395}}, Volume = {12}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Pageswegdamit = {e12395}, Timestamp = {2017.07.06} } @Article{Reutlinger2016, Title = {{Is There a Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation}}, Author = {Reutlinger, Alexander}, Journal = {{Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {733--745}, Volume = {83}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.09.12} } @Article{Reutlinger2014, Title = {{Why Is There Universal Macro-Behavior? Renormalization Group Explanation as Non-causal Explanation}}, Author = {Reutlinger, Alexander}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {1157--1170}, Volume = {81}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.06} } @Article{RichardEtAl2003, Title = {{One Hundred Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively Described}}, Author = {Richard, F. D. and Bond, Jr., Charles F. and Stokes-Zoota, Juli J.}, Journal = {Review of General Psychology}, Year = {2003}, Pages = {331--363}, Volume = {7}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.26} } @InCollection{RielGulick2014, Title = {{Scientific Reduction}}, Author = {van Riel, Raphael and {V}an Gulick, Robert}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/scientific-reduction/}}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/} } @InCollection{Rips1989, Title = {{Similarity, Typicality, and Categorization}}, Author = {Rips, Lance J.}, Booktitle = {Similarity and Analogical Reasoning}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1989}, Address = {Cambridge}, Editor = {S. Vosniadou and A. Ortony}, Pages = {21--59}, Abstract = {(From the chapter ) what I [author] would like to argue is this: even if we grant that people have a stable sense of resemblance or similarity and even if we can give this sense a correct psychological description, similarity still will not be either necessary or sufficient for dealing with all object categories / as long as we stick to the ordinary meaning of similiarity--the meaning that it has for nonexperts--then similarity will not be enough to explain human concepts and categories / present evidence from a set of experiments in which subjects were asked either to categorize an instance or to judge its similarity with respect to two potential categories / claim that there are factors that affect categorization but not similarity and other factors that affect similarity but not categorization (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2004 APA )}, Doi = {10.1029/2003JD004173.Aires}, ISBN = {9780521389358}, Keywords = {*Classification (Cognitive Process) *Stimulus Simi} } @Article{RizzoArnold1980, Title = {{Causal Apportionment in Tort Law: An Economic Theory}}, Author = {Rizzo, Mario J. and Arnold, Frank S.}, Journal = {Columbia Law Review}, Year = {1980}, Pages = {1399-1429}, Volume = {85}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.10.28} } @Article{Robert2014, Title = {{On the Jeffreys--Lindley Paradox}}, Author = {Robert, Christian}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {216--232}, Volume = {81} } @Article{Roche2014, Title = {{A Note on Confirmation and Matthew Properties}}, Author = {Roche, William}, Journal = {Logic and Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {91--101}, Volume = {12} } @InCollection{Romeijn2014, Title = {{Philosophy of Statistics}}, Author = {Romeijn, Jan-Willem}, Booktitle = {{The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, E.}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/statistics/}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.28}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/statistics/} } @Article{Romeijn2017, Title = {{Inherent Complexity: A Problem for Statistical Model Evaluation}}, Author = {Romeijn, Jan-Willem}, Journal = {{Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {797--809}, Volume = {84}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.13} } @InCollection{Romeijn2012, Title = {{One Size does Not Fit All: Derivation of a Prior-Adapted \BIC}}, Author = {Romeijn, Jan-Willem and van de Schoot, Rens and Hoijtink, Herbert}, Booktitle = {Probabilities, Laws, and Structures}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Berlin}, Editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzáles, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Michael Stöltzner and Weber, Marcel}, Pages = {87--106} } @Article{Romero2017, Title = {{Novelty vs. Replicability: Virtues and Vices in the Reward System of Science}}, Author = {Romero, Felipe}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {1031--1043}, Volume = {84} } @Article{Romero2016, Title = {{Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Socio-Epistemic Assessment}}, Author = {Romero, Felipe}, Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {55--69}, Volume = {60}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.06} } @Article{RosenbaumRubin1983, Title = {{The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects}}, Author = {Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin}, Journal = {Biometrika}, Year = {1983}, Pages = {41--55}, Volume = {70}, Abstract = {SUMMARY The propensity score is the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates. Both large and small sample theory show that adjustment for the scalar propensity score is sufficient to remove bias due to all observed covariates. Applications include: (i) matched sampling on the univariate propensity score, which is a generalization of discriminant matching, (ii) multivariate adjustment by subclassification on the propensity score where the same subclasses are used to estimate treatment effects for all outcome variables and in all subpopulations, and (iii) visual representation of multivariate covariance adjustment by a two- dimensional plot.}, ISBN = {0006-3444}, ISSN = {0006-3444}, Keywords = {Propensity scores}, Pmid = {179} } @Book{Rosenkrantz1981, Title = {{Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability}}, Author = {Rosenkrantz, Roger}, Publisher = {Ridgeview Press}, Year = {1981}, Address = {Atascadero, Calif.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Book{Rosenthal2004, Title = {{Wahrscheinlichkeiten als Tendenzen}}, Author = {Rosenthal, Jacob}, Publisher = {Mentis}, Year = {2004}, Address = {Paderborn}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Rosenthal1979, Title = {{The File Drawer Problem and Tolerance for Null Results}}, Author = {Rosenthal, Robert}, Journal = {Psychological Bulletin}, Year = {1979}, Number = {3}, Pages = {638--641}, Volume = {86}, Abstract = {For any gien research area, one cannot tell how many studies have been conducted but never reported. The extreme view of the "file drawer problem" is that journals are filled with the 5% of the studies that show Type 1 errors, while the file drawers are filled with the 95% of the studies that show non-significant resluts. Quantitative procedures for computing the tolerance for filed and future results are reported and illustrated, and the implications are discussed.}, Doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638}, ISBN = {0033-2909\r1939-1455}, ISSN = {0033-2909}, Pmid = {53} } @Article{RouderMorey2011, Title = {{A Bayes Factor Meta-Analysis of Bem's \textsc{esp} Claim}}, Author = {Rouder, Jeffrey N. and Morey, Richard D.}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {682--689}, Volume = {18}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.24} } @Article{RouderEtAl2009, Title = {{Bayesian $t$~Tests for Accepting and Rejecting the Null Hypothesis}}, Author = {Rouder, Jeffrey N. and Speckman, Paul L. and Sun, Dongchu and Morey, Richard D. and Iverson, Geoffrey}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2009}, Number = {2}, Pages = {225--237}, Volume = {16}, Abstract = {Progress in science often comes from discovering invariances in relationships among variables; these invariances often correspond to null hypotheses. As is commonly known, it is not possible to state evidence for the null hypothesis in conventional significance testing. Here we highlight a Bayes factor alternative to the conventional t test that will allow researchers to express preference for either the null hypothesis or the alternative. The Bayes factor has a natural and straightforward interpretation, is based on reasonable assumptions, and has better properties than other methods of inference that have been advocated in the psychological literature. To facilitate use of the Bayes factor, we provide an easy-to-use, Web-based program that performs the necessary calculations.}, Institution = {University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. rouderj@missouri.edu}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Rowbottom2012a, Title = {{Popper's Measure of Corroboration and $P(h\gvn b)$}}, Author = {Rowbottom, Darrell P.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {739--745}, Volume = {64}, Keywords = {Formal Philosophy of Science} } @Book{Rowbottom2011, Title = {{Popper's Critical Rationalism: A Philosophical Investigation}}, Author = {Rowbottom, Darrell P.}, Publisher = {Routledge}, Year = {2011}, Address = {London} } @Article{Rowbottom2008, Title = {{The Big Test of Corroboration}}, Author = {Rowbottom, Darrell P.}, Journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2008}, Number = {3}, Pages = {293--302}, Volume = {22}, Doi = {10.1080/02698590802567357}, ISSN = {0269-8595}, Url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02698590802567357} } @Article{Royall2000, Title = {On the Probability of Observing Misleading Statistical Evidence}, Author = {Royall, Richard}, Journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, Year = {2000}, Number = {451}, Pages = {760--768}, Abstract = {The law of likelihood explains how to interpret statistical data as evidence. Specifically, it gives to the discipline of statistics a precise and objective measure of the strength of statistical evidence supporting one probability distribution vis-a-vis another. That measure is the likelihood ratio. But evidence, even when properly interpreted, can be misleading-observations can truly constitute strong evidence supporting one distribution when the other is true. What makes statistical evidence valuable to science is that this cannot occur very often. Here we examine two bounds on the probability of observing strong misleading evidence. One is a universal bound, applicable to every pair of probability distributions. The other bound, much smaller, applies to all pairs of distributions within fixed-dimensional parametric models in large samples. The second bound comes from examining how the probability of strong misleading evidence varies as a function of the alternative value of the parameter. We show that in large samples one curve describes how this probability first rises and then falls as the alternative moves away from the true parameter value for a very wide class of models. We also show that this large-sample curve, and the bound that its maximum value represents, applies to profile likelihood ratios for one-dimensional parameters in fixed-dimensional parametric models, but does not apply to the estimated likelihood ratios that result from replacing the nuisance parameters by their global maximum likelihood estimates.}, Publisher = {[American Statistical Association, Taylor \& Francis, Ltd.]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669456} } @Book{Royall1997, Title = {{Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm}}, Author = {Royall, Richard}, Publisher = {Chapman \& Hall}, Year = {1997}, Address = {London} } @Article{Rubin1974, Title = {{Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies}}, Author = {Rubin, Donald B.}, Journal = {Journal of Educational Psychology}, Year = {1974}, Pages = {688--701}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {Presents a discussion of matching, randomization, random sampling, and other methods of controlling extraneous variation. The objective was to specify the benefits of randomization in estimating causal effects of treatments. It is concluded that randomization should be employed whenever possible but that the use of carefully controlled nonrandomized data to estimate causal effects is a reasonable and necessary procedure in many cases.}, ISBN = {1939-2176(Electronic);0022-0663(Print)}, ISSN = {0022-0663} } @Article{Rudner1953, Title = {{The Scientist \emph{qua} Scientist Makes Value Judgments}}, Author = {Rudner, Richard}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1953}, Pages = {1-6}, Volume = {20}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/185617} } @Book{Sakamoto1986, Title = {{Akaike Information Criterion Statistics}}, Author = {Sakamoto, Y. and Ishiguro, M. and Kitagawa, G.}, Publisher = {Reidel}, Year = {1986}, Address = {Dordrecht} } @InCollection{Salmon1971a, Title = {{Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance}}, Author = {Salmon, Wesley C.}, Booktitle = {The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories}, Publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, Year = {1971}, Address = {Pittsburgh}, Editor = {Colodny, R. G.}, Pages = {173--231} } @InCollection{Salmon2001a, Title = {{Explanation and Confirmation: A Bayesian Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Author = {Salmon, Wesley C.}, Booktitle = {Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, Year = {2001}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Editor = {Hon, Giora and Rakover, Sam S.}, Pages = {61--91}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Salmon1984, Title = {{Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World}}, Author = {Salmon, Wesley C.}, Publisher = {Princeton University Press}, Year = {1984}, Address = {Princeton, N.J.}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @Book{Savage1954, title = {{The Foundations of Statistics}}, publisher = {Wiley}, year = {1954/1972}, author = {Savage, Leonard J.}, address = {New York}, edition = {2nd}, note = {Originally published in 1954}, keywords = {Subjective Probability}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.13}, } @InCollection{Schaffner1977, Title = {{Reduction, Reductionism, Values, and Progress in the Biomedical Sciences}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Booktitle = {Logic, Laws and Life}, Publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, Year = {1977}, Address = {Pittsburgh}, Editor = {Colodny, R. G.}, Pages = {143--171} } @Article{Schaffner2006, Title = {{Reduction: The {C}heshire Cat Problem and a Return to Roots}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {377--402}, Volume = {151} } @Book{Schaffner1993, Title = {{Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Publisher = {Chicago University Press}, Year = {1993}, Address = {Chicago} } @InCollection{Schaffner1976, Title = {{Reductionism in Biology: Prospects and Problems}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Booktitle = {PSA 1974 Special Edition---Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {1976}, Address = {New York}, Pages = {613--632}, Volume = {32}, Abstract = {Explications of what it means for one science to be reduced to another have been the focus of considerable interest in recent years, and when the reducing science is physics (and chemistry) and the reduced science is biology, additional concerns seem to arise. In this paper I wish to represent a model for theory reduction which has occupied my attention for some years now, and consider its applicability in the area of the biological sciences.1}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-010-1449-6{\_}35}, ISSN = {02708647}, Keywords = {biology,reductionism}, Url = {citeulike-article-id:12722217$\backslash$nhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1449-6{\_}35} } @Article{Schaffner1969, Title = {{The Watson--Crick Model and Reductionism}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1969}, Pages = {325--348}, Volume = {20}, Abstract = {The reduction of biology to physics and chemistry is analyzed in the context of the reduction of genetics to molecular biology. Reductions are shown to be on-Going historical processes involving identifications of entities and predicates between theories which often require modifications of both reduced and reducing theories. A brief historical account of molecular genetics from the publication of the watson-Crick dna model to the present outlines how the reduction is being achieved in concrete terms. The important role of organization at the molecular level is also discussed.}, Doi = {10.1093/bjps/20.4.325}, ISSN = {00070882} } @Article{Schaffner1967, Title = {{Approaches to Reduction}}, Author = {Schaffner, Kenneth F.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1967}, Pages = {137--147}, Volume = {34} } @Article{Schippers2017, Title = {{A Representation Theorem for Absolute Confirmation}}, Author = {Schippers, Michael}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Pages = {82-91}, Volume = {84} } @InCollection{Schupbach2016a, Title = {{Inference to the Best Explanation, Cleaned Up and Made Respectable}}, Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.}, Booktitle = {{Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation}}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2018}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Kevin McCain and Ted Poston}, Pages = {39--61}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @PhdThesis{Schupbach2011c, Title = {{Inference to the Best Explanation, Cleaned Up and Made Respectable}}, Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.}, School = {University of Pittsburgh}, Year = {2011}, Annote = {Unpublished. Online:}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Article{Schupbach2011d, Title = {{Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power}}, Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2011}, Month = {dec}, Number = {5}, Pages = {813--829}, Volume = {78}, Keywords = {Experimental Philosophy,Explanatory Reasoning,Explication} } @Article{Schupbach2005, Title = {{On a Bayesian Analysis of the Virtue of Unification}}, Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {594-607}, Volume = {72}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{SchupbachSprenger2011, Title = {{The Logic of Explanatory Power}}, Author = {Schupbach, Jonah N. and Jan Sprenger}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {105--127}, Volume = {78}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning} } @Book{Schurz2006, Title = {{Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie}}, Author = {Schurz, Gerhard}, Publisher = {Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft}, Year = {2006}, Address = {Darmstadt} } @Article{Schurz1991, Title = {{Relevant Deduction}}, Author = {Schurz, Gerhard}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {1991}, Pages = {391--437}, Volume = {35} } @Article{SchwanStern2016, Title = {{A Causal Understanding of When and When Not to Jeffrey Conditionalize}}, Author = {Schwan, Ben and Stern, Reuben}, Journal = {Philosophers' Imprint}, Year = {2016}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0017.008}}, Pages = {1--21}, Volume = {17}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Schwarz1978, Title = {{Estimating the Dimension of a Model}}, Author = {Schwarz, Gideon}, Journal = {Annals of Statistics}, Year = {1978}, Pages = {461-464}, Volume = {6}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D40{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:B2rIPIGFPLEC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @Article{Scott1964, Title = {{Measurement Structures and Linear Inequalities}}, Author = {Scott, Dana}, Journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, Year = {1964}, Pages = {233--247}, Volume = {1}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Article{Seidenfeld1986, Title = {{Entropy and Uncertainty}}, Author = {Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1986}, Number = {4}, Pages = {467--491}, Volume = {53}, Keywords = {Subjective Probability;Objective Probability} } @Article{Seidenfeld1981, Title = {{On After-Trial Properties of Best Neyman--Pearson Confidence Intervals}}, Author = {Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1981}, Number = {2}, Pages = {281--291}, Volume = {48}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {JSTOR}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Seidenfeld1979a, Title = {{Why I Am Not an Objective Bayesian: Some Reflections Prompted by Rosenkrantz}}, Author = {Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Journal = {Theory and Decision}, Year = {1979}, Pages = {413--440}, Volume = {11}, Url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D180%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:3A3nxV7CjKIC&hl=nl&oi=p} } @Book{Seidenfeld1979b, Title = {{Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference: Learning from R.A. Fisher}}, Author = {Seidenfeld, Teddy}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {1979}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20}, Url = {/citations?view\_op=view\_citation\&continue=/scholar\%3Fhl\%3Dnl\%26start\%3D60\%26as\_sdt\%3D0,5\%26scilib\%3D1\&citilm=1\&citation\_for\_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:hKjooKYXoHIC\&hl=nl\&oi=p} } @Article{Senn2011, Title = {{You May Believe You Are a Bayesian but You Are Probably Wrong}}, Author = {Senn, Stephen}, Journal = {Rationality, Markets and Morals}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {48--66}, Volume = {2}, Abstract = {An elementary sketch of some issues in statistical inference and in particular of the cen- tral role of likelihood is given. This is followed by brief outlines of what George Barnard considered were the four great systems of statistical inferences. These can be thought of terms of the four combinations of two factors at two levels. The first is fundamental purpose (decision or inference) and the second probability argument (direct or inverse). Of these four systems the ‘fully Bayesian' approach of decision-making using inverse probability particularly associated with the Ramsay, De Finetti, Savage and Lindley has some claims to be the most impressive. It is claimed, however, and illustrated by example, that this approach seems to be impossible to follow. It is speculated that there may be some advantage to the practising statistician to follow George Barnard's advice of being familiar with all four systems.}, File = {:home/jsprenger/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Senn - 2011 - You may believe you are a Bayesian but you are probably wrong.pdf:pdf}, ISSN = {1869-778X}, Url = {http://www.rmm-journal.com/downloads/Article_Senn.pdf} } @Article{Senn2001, Title = {{Two Cheers for $P$-Values?}}, Author = {Senn, Stephen}, Journal = {Journal of epidemiology and biostatistics}, Year = {2001}, Number = {2}, Pages = {193--210}, Volume = {6}, Abstract = {P-values are a practical success but a critical failure. Scientists the world over use them, but scarcely a statistician can be found to defend them. Bayesians in particular find them ridiculous, but even the modern frequentist has little time for them. In this essay, I consider what, if anything, might be said in their favour.}, Doi = {10.1080/135952201753172953}, ISSN = {1359-5229}, Keywords = {bayesian,hypothesis-tests,jeffreys,lindley paradox,replication probabilities,significance tests}, Pmid = {11434499} } @Book{Shafer1976, Title = {{A Mathematical Theory of Evidence}}, Author = {Shafer, Glenn}, Publisher = {Princeton University Press}, Year = {1976}, Address = {Princeton, N.J.} } @Article{Shannon1949, Title = {{Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems}}, Author = {Shannon, Claude}, Journal = {Bell Systems Technical Journal}, Year = {1949}, Pages = {656--715}, Volume = {28} } @Article{Shogenji2012, Title = {{The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy}}, Author = {Shogenji, Tomoji}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {29-48}, Volume = {184}, Keywords = {Confirmation; Formal meets Mainstream}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.08.12} } @Article{Shogenji1999, Title = {{Is Coherence Truth-Conducive?}}, Author = {Shogenji, Tomoji}, Journal = {Analysis}, Year = {1999}, Number = {4}, Pages = {338--345}, Volume = {59}, Keywords = {Coherence}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.08.12} } @Article{SimonsohnNelsonSimmons2014a, Title = {{$P$-curve: A Key to the File Drawer}}, Author = {Simonsohn, Uri and Nelson, Leif D. and Simmons, Joseph P.}, Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {534--547}, Volume = {143}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Article{SimonsohnNelsonSimmons2014b, Title = {{$P$-curve and Effect Size}}, Author = {Simonsohn, Uri and Nelson, Leif D. and Simmons, Joseph P.}, Journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, Year = {2014}, Pages = {666--681}, Volume = {9}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.03} } @Article{SistromGarvan2004, Title = {{Proportions, Odds, and Risk}}, Author = {Sistrom, Christopher L and Garvan, Cynthia W}, Journal = {Radiology}, Year = {2004}, Pages = {12--19}, Volume = {230}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.08.19} } @Book{Skyrms2010, Title = {{Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information}}, Author = {Skyrms, Brian}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Skyrms2000, Title = {{Choice {\&} Chance}}, Author = {Skyrms, Brian}, Publisher = {Wadsworth}, Year = {2000}, Address = {Belmont, Calif.}, Edition = {4th}, Keywords = {Confirmation,Decision Theory,Inductive Logic,Probability}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Skyrms1987, Title = {{Updating, Supposing, and Maxent}}, Author = {Skyrms, Brian}, Journal = {Theory and Decision}, Year = {1987}, Number = {3}, Pages = {225--246}, Volume = {22}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Springer}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Sloman1994, Title = {{When Explanations Compete: The Role of Explanatory Coherence on Judgements of Likelihood}}, Author = {Sloman, Steven A}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {1994}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1--21}, Volume = {52}, Abstract = {The likelihood of a statement is often derived by generating an explanation for it and evaluating the plausibility of the explanation. The explanation discounting principle states that people tend to focus on a single explanation; alternative explanations compete with the effect of reducing one another's credibility. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that this principle applies to inductive inferences concerning the properties of everyday categories. In both experiments, subjects estimated the probability of a series of statements (conclusions) and the conditional probabilities of those conclusions given other related facts. For example, given that most lawyers make good sales people, what is the probability that most psychologists make good sales people? The results showed that when the fact and the conclusion had the same explanation the fact increased people's willingness to believe the conclusion, but when they had different explanations the fact decreased the conclusion's credibility. This decrease is attributed to explanation discounting; the explanation for the fact had the effect of reducing the plausibility of the explanation for the conclusion. {{{\textcopyright}}} 1994.}, Doi = {10.1016/0010-0277(94)90002-7}, ISBN = {0010-0277}, ISSN = {00100277}, Pmid = {7924197} } @Article{SlomanLagnado2015, Title = {{Causality in Thought}}, Author = {Sloman, Steven A. and Lagnado, David}, Journal = {Annual Review of Psychology}, Year = {2015}, Number = {1}, Pages = {223--247}, Volume = {66}, Abstract = {Causal knowledge plays a crucial role in human thought, but the nature of causal representation and inference remains a puzzle. Can human causal inference be captured by relations of probabilistic dependency, or does it draw on richer forms of representation?This article explores this question by reviewing research in reasoning, decision making, various forms of judgment, and attribution.Weendorse causal Bayesian networks as the best normative framework and as a productive guide to theory building. However, it is incomplete as an account of causal thinking. On the basis of a range of experimentalwork, we identify three hallmarks of causal reasoning—the role of mechanism, narrative, and mental simulation—all of which go beyond mere probabilistic knowledge. We propose that the hallmarks are closely related. Mental simulations are representations over time of mechanisms. When multiple actors are involved, these simulations are aggregated into narratives.}, Doi = {10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135}, ISBN = {1545-2085 (Electronic)\r0066-4308 (Linking)}, ISSN = {0066-4308}, Keywords = {causal,causal decision making,causal judgment,causal reasoning}, Pmid = {25061673}, Url = {http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135} } @Article{Smith1986, Title = {{Comment [on ``Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?'', \citealt{Efron1986}]}}, Author = {Smith, Adrian F. M.}, Journal = {American Statistician}, Year = {1986}, Pages = {10}, Volume = {40}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.03.23} } @Article{Sober2009, Title = {{Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads}}, Author = {Sober, Elliott}, Journal = {Philosophical Studies}, Year = {2009}, Number = {1}, Pages = {63--90}, Volume = {143}, Abstract = {Absence of evidence isnt evidence of absence is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (Is E evidence about H?) and quantitative questions (How much evidence does E provide about H?) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11098-008-9315-0}, ISBN = {0031-8116}, ISSN = {00318116}, Keywords = {Anthropic principle; Bayesianism; Common ancestry;} } @Book{Sober2008, Title = {{Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science}}, Author = {Sober, Elliott}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2008}, Address = {Cambridge}, Keywords = {Philosophy of Biology;Formal Philosophy of Science} } @Article{Sober2002, Title = {{Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike Framework}}, Author = {Sober, Elliott}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2002}, Pages = {S112--S123}, Volume = {69}, Abstract = {Abstract Akaike{\{}$\backslash$rq{\}}s framework for thinking about model selection in terms of the goal of predictive accuracy and his criterion for model selection have important philosophical implications. Scientists often test models whose truth values they already know, and they often decline to reject models that they know full well are false. Instrumentalism helps explain this pervasive feature of scientific practice, and Akaike{\{}$\backslash$rq{\}}s framework helps provide instrumentalism with the epistemology it needs. Akaike{\{}$\backslash$rq{\}}s criterion for model selection also throws light on the role of parsimony considerations in hypothesis evaluation. I explain the basic ideas behind Akaike{\{}$\backslash$rq{\}}s framework and criterion; several biological examples, including the use of maximum likelihood methods in phylogenetic inference, are considered.}, ISSN = {00318248, 1539767X}, Publisher = {[University of Chicago Press, Philosophy of Science Association]}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/341839} } @Article{SpiegelhalterEtAl2002, Title = {{Bayesian Measures of Model Complexity and Fit}}, Author = {Spiegelhalter, David J. and Best, Nicola G. and Carlin, Bradley P. and van der Linde, Angelika}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~B}, Year = {2002}, Pages = {583--639}, Volume = {64}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D80{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:cSdaV2aYdYsC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @Article{Spiegelhalter1980, Title = {{Bayes Factors and Choice Criteria for Linear Models}}, Author = {Spiegelhalter, David J. and Smith, Adrian F. M.}, Journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series~B}, Year = {1980}, Pages = {213--220}, Volume = {42} } @Article{Spielman1978, Title = {{Statistical Dogma and the Logic of Significance Testing}}, Author = {Spielman, S}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1978}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25}, Url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/186903} } @Article{Spielman1974, Title = {{The Logic of Tests of Significance}}, Author = {Spielman, Stephen}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1974}, Number = {3}, Pages = {211--226}, Volume = {41}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Book{SGS2000, title = {{Causation, Prediction, and Search}}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2000}, author = {Spirtes, Peter and Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines}, address = {New York}, edition = {2nd}, } } } @InCollection{Spohn1988, Title = {{Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States}}, Author = {Spohn, Wolfgang}, Booktitle = {Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics}, Publisher = {Kluwer}, Year = {1988}, Address = {Dordrecht}, Editor = {Harper, W. L. and Skyrms, B.}, Pages = {105--134}, Volume = {2}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @InCollection{Spohn1990, Title = {{A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning}}, Author = {Spohn, Wolfgang}, Booktitle = {Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 4}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Year = {1990}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Shachter, R D and Levitt, T S and Lemmer, J and Kanal, L N}, Abstract = {Probability theory, epistemically interpreted, provides an excellent, if not the best available account of inductive reasoning. This is so because there are general and definite rules for the change of subjective probabilities through information or experience; induction and belief change are one and same topic, after all. The most basic of these rules is simply to conditionalize with respect to the information received; and there are similar and more general rules. 1 Hence, a fundamental reason for the epistemological success of probability theory is that there at all exists a well-behaved concept of conditional probability. Still, people have, and have reasons for, various concerns over probability theory. One of these is my starting point: Intuitively, we have the notion of plain belief; we believe propositions2 to be true (or to be false or neither). Probability theory, however, offers no formal counterpart to this notion. Believing A is not the same as having probability 1 for A, because probability 1 is incorrigible3; but plain belief is clearly corrigible. And believing A is not the same as giving A a probability larger than some 1 - c, because believing A and believing B is usually taken to be equivalent to believing A & B.4 Thus, it seems that the formal representation of plain belief has to take a non-probabilistic route. Indeed, representing plain belief seems easy enough: simply represent an epistemic state by the set of all propositions believed true in it or, since I make the common assumption that plain belief is deductively closed, by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it. But this does not yet provide a theory of induction, i.e. an answer to the question how epistemic states so represented are changed tbrough information or experience. There is a convincing partial answer: if the new information is compatible with the old epistemic state, then the new epistemic state is simply represented by the conjunction of the new information and the old beliefs. This answer is partial because it does not cover the quite common case where the new information is incompatible with the old beliefs. It is, however, important to complete the answer and to cover this case, too; otherwise, we would not represent plain belief as conigible. The crucial problem is that there is no good completion. When epistemic states are represented simply by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it, the answer cannot be completed; and though there is a lot of fruitful work, no other representation of epistemic states has been proposed, as far as I know, which provides a complete solution to this problem. In this paper, I want to suggest such a solution. In [4], I have more fully argued that this is the only solution, if certain plausible desiderata are to be satisfied. Here, in section 2, I will be content with formally defining and intuitively explaining my proposal. I will compare my proposal with probability theory in section 3. It will turn out that the theory I am proposing is structurally homomorphic to probability theory in important respects and that it is thus equally easily implementable, but moreover computationally simpler. Section 4 contains a very brief comparison with various kinds of logics, in particular conditional logic, with Shackle's functions of potential surprise and related theories, and with the Dempster - Shafer theory of belief functions.} } @Book{Spohn2012, Title = {The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications}, Author = {Spohn, Wolfgang}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @InCollection{Sprenger2016d, Title = {{Bayésianisme versus fréquentisme en \frz{inférence statistique}}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {\frz{Le Bayésianisme aujourd'hui}}, Publisher = {\frz{\'Editions matériologiques}}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Paris}, Editor = {Drouet, Isabelle}, Pages = {167--192} } @InCollection{Sprenger2010b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation}}, booktitle = {Handbook of the History of Logic}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {2011}, editor = {Gabbay, Dov and Hartmann, Stephan and Woods, John}, volume = {10}, pages = {235--263}, address = {Amsterdam}, doi = {10.1016/B978-0-444-52936-7.50007-0}, issn = {18745857}, keywords = {Confirmation,Inductive Logic,Logic}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2016c, Title = {{Bayesianism and Frequentism in Statistical Inference}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {Handbook of Philosophy of Probability}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Hájek, Alan and Hitchcock, Christopher}, Pages = {382--405} } @InCollection{Sprenger2016a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, booktitle = {Handbook of Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {{Confirmation and Induction}}, year = {2016}, address = {Oxford}, editor = {Humphreys, Paul W.}, pages = {185--209}, } @Article{Sprenger2020a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Conditional Degree of Belief}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2020}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, pages = {319--335}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2016.07.20}, } @Article{Sprenger2016b, Title = {{The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {173--189}, Volume = {6} } @Article{Sprenger2015b, Title = {{A Novel Solution of the Problem of Old Evidence}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {383-401}, Volume = {82} } @Article{Sprenger2013, Title = {{The Role of Bayesian Philosophy within Bayesian Model Selection}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {101--114}, Volume = {2} } @Article{Sprenger2013a, Title = {{A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {727--738}, Volume = {78}, Abstract = {This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10670-013-9487-7}, ISSN = {01650106} } @Article{Sprenger2013b, Title = {{Testing a Precise Null Hypothesis: The Case of Lindley's Paradox}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {733--744}, Volume = {80}, Abstract = {Testing a point null hypothesis is a classical but controversial issue in statistical methodology. A prominent illustration is Lindley's Paradox, which emerges in hypothesis tests with large sample size and exposes a salient divergence between Bayesian and frequentist inference. A close analysis of the paradox reveals that both Bayesians and frequentists fail to satisfactorily resolve it. As an alternative, I suggest Bernardo's Bayesian Reference Criterion: (i) it targets the predictive performance of the null hypothesis in future experiments; (ii) it provides a proper decision-theoretic model for testing a point null hypothesis; (iii) it convincingly addresses Lindley's Paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]}, ISSN = {00318248}, Keywords = {BAYESIAN analysis,Dennis,FREQUENTIST statistics,INFERENTIAL statistics,LINDLEY,PARADOX,STATISTICAL hypothesis testing,STATISTICS -- Methodology}, Url = {http://offcampus.lib.washington.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=93642178&site=ehost-live} } @Article{Sprenger2012, Title = {{The Renegade Subjectivist: Jos{é} Bernardo's Reference Bayesianism}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Rationality, Markets and Morals}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {1--13}, Volume = {3}, Abstract = {This article motivates and discusses JosE Bernardo's attempt to reconcile the subjective Bayesian framework with a need for objective scientific inference, leading to a special kind of objective Bayesianism, namely reference Bayesianism. We elucidate principal ideas and foundational implications of Bernardo's approach, with particular attention to the classical problem of testing a precise null hypothesis against an unspecified alternative.}, Url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/rmm/journl/v3y2012i50.html} } @Article{Sprenger2011c, Title = {{Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Philosophy Compass}, Year = {2011}, Number = {7}, Pages = {497--508}, Volume = {6}, Abstract = {Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a sound and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of H-D confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the H-D method is also highly relevant for scientific practice.} } @InCollection{Sprenger2010a, Title = {{Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Booktitle = {EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Berlin}, Pages = {289--297}, Abstract = {In modern science, inductive inference often amounts to statistical inference. Statistical techniques have steadily conquered terrain over the last decades and extended their scope of application to more and more disciplines. Explanations and predictions, in high-level as well as in low-level sciences, are nowadays fueled by statistical models. However, this development did not occur because scientists believe the underlying systems to be irreducibly stochastic. This might sometimes be the case, but certainly not in general. Rather, even traditionally “deterministic” sciences (such as several branches of physics, psychology and economics) use statistics to model noise and imperfect measurement and to express their uncertainty about the nature of the data-generating process. A wide spectrum of techniques can be used to draw valid conclusions from data: Hypothesis tests help scientists to see which of two competing hypotheses is better supported. Confidence intervals narrow down the set of values of an unknown model parameter which is compatible with the observations. And so on.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8{\_}25}, ISBN = {9789048132621}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Sprenger2010c, Title = {{Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2010}, Number = {3}, Pages = {331--340}, Volume = {174}, Abstract = {The application of probabilistic arguments to rational decisions in a single case is a contentious philosophical issue which arises in various contexts. Some authors (e.g. Horgan, Philos Pap 24:209–222, 1995; Levy, Synthese 158:139–151, 2007) affirm the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases while others (Baumann, Am Philos Q 42:71–79, 2005; Synthese 162:265–273, 2008) deny it. I demonstrate that both sides do not give convincing arguments for their case and propose a new account of the relationship between probabilistic reasoning and rational decisions. In particular, I elaborate a flaw in Baumann's reductio of rational single-case decisions in a modified Monty Hall Problem}, Keywords = {Decision Theory,Monty Hall Problem,Probability,Rationality} } @Article{Sprenger2009a, Title = {{Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {637--649}, Volume = {76}, Abstract = {To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and fre- quentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions.Toresolve the deadlock, I suggest a three-part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision-theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre-experimental rel- evance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, post- experimental irrelevance.}, ISSN = {0031-8248} } @Article{Sprenger2009b, Title = {{Statistics between Inductive Logic and Empirical Science}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan}, Journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {239--250}, Volume = {7}, Abstract = {To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and fre- quentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions.Toresolve the deadlock, I suggest a three-part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision-theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre-experimental rel- evance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, post- experimental irrelevance.}, ISSN = {0031-8248}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.04.27} } @Article{SprengerStegenga2017, Title = {{Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures}}, Author = {Sprenger, Jan and Jacob Stegenga}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2017}, Number = {5}, Pages = {840--852}, Volume = {84} } @Book{SprengerHartmann2019, title = {Bayesian Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2019}, author = {Sprenger, Jan, and Hartmann, Stephan}, address = {Oxford}, } @Article{StainforthEtAl2007, Title = {{Confidence, Uncertainty and Decision-Support Relevance in Climate Predictions}}, Author = {Stainforth, D. A. and Allen, M. R. and Tredger, E. R. and Smith, L. A.}, Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series~A}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {2145--2161}, Volume = {365}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{Staley2012, Title = {{Strategies for Securing Evidence through Model Criticism}}, Author = {Staley, Kent}, Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {21--43}, Volume = {2}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @InCollection{Stalnaker1968, Title = {{A Theory of Conditionals}}, Author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, Booktitle = {Studies in Logical Theory}, Publisher = {Blackwell}, Year = {1968}, Address = {Oxford}, Editor = {Nicholas Rescher}, Number = {2}, Pages = {98--112}, Series = {American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series} } @Article{Stalnaker1975, Title = {{Indicative Conditionals}}, Author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, Journal = {Philosophia}, Year = {1975}, Number = {3}, Pages = {269--286}, Volume = {5}, Keywords = {Debunking Arguments,Logic} } @Article{Stalnaker1970, Title = {{Probability and Conditionals}}, Author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1970}, Pages = {64--80}, Volume = {37} } @Book{Stanford2006, Title = {{Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives}}, Author = {Stanford, P. Kyle}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2006}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Explanatory Reasoning,Scientific Realism} } @Article{Stegenga2015, Title = {{Measuring Effectiveness}}, Author = {Stegenga, Jacob}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {62--71}, Volume = {54} } @Article{SternHartmann2018, Title = {{Two Sides of Modus Ponens}}, Author = {Stern, Reuben and Hartmann, Stephan}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {forthcoming} } @Article{SterneDaveySmith2001, Title = {{Sifting the Evidence--What's Wrong with Significance Tests?}}, Author = {Sterne, Jonathan A. C., and Davey Smith, George}, Journal = {British Medical Journal}, Year = {2001}, Pages = {226}, Volume = {322} } @Article{Stich1988, Title = {{Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity}}, Author = {Stich, Stephen}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1988}, Number = {3}, Pages = {391--413}, Volume = {74}, Keywords = {Conceptual Analysis,Experimental Philosophy,Explication}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Article{StormEtAl2010, Title = {{Meta-Analysis of Free Response Studies 1992--2008: Assessing the Noise Reduction Model in Parapsychology}}, Author = {Storm, Lance and Tressoldi, Patrizio E. and Di Risio, Lorenzo}, Journal = {Psychological Bulletin}, Year = {2010}, Pages = {471--485}, Volume = {136}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @InCollection{Strawson1963, Title = {{Carnap's View on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy}}, Author = {Strawson, P. F.}, Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap}, Publisher = {Open Court}, Year = {1963}, Address = {La Salle, Ill.}, Editor = {Schilpp, Paul Arthur}, Pages = {503--518}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Book{Strevens2009, Title = {{Depth}}, Author = {Strevens, Michael}, Publisher = {Harvard University Press}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.} } @Article{Strevens1999, Title = {{Objective Probability as a Guide to the World}}, Author = {Strevens, Michael}, Journal = {Philosophical Studies}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {243--275}, Volume = {95}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D40{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:zdX0sdgBH{\_}kC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p} } @InCollection{Suarez2016, Title = {{Representations in Science}}, Author = {Suárez, Mauricio}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2016}, Address = {New York}, Editor = {Humphreys, P.}, Pages = {440--459}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.20} } @Article{Suarez2017, Title = {{The Chances of Propensities}}, Author = {Suárez, Mauricio}, Journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, Year = {forthcoming}, Note = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axx010}}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.09.20} } @Book{Suarez2011, Title = {{Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics}}, Author = {Suárez, Mauricio}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2011}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Suarez2011a, Title = {{Propensities and Pragmatism}}, Author = {Suárez, Mauricio}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {2011}, Pages = {61--92}, Volume = {100}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @InCollection{Suppes1966, Title = {{A Bayesian Approach to the Paradoxes of the Ravens}}, Author = {Suppes, Patrick}, Booktitle = {Aspects of Inductive Logic}, Publisher = {North-Holland}, Year = {1966}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Hintikka, Jaakko, and Suppes, Patrick}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.05.09} } @Book{Suppes1970, Title = {{A Probabilistic Theory of Causality}}, Author = {Suppes, Patrick}, Publisher = {North-Holland}, Year = {1970}, Address = {Amsterdam} } @Article{TebaldiKnutti2007, Title = {{The Use of the Multi-Model Ensemble in Probabilistic Climate Projections}}, Author = {Tebaldi, Claudia and Knutti, Reto}, Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series~A}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {2053--2075}, Volume = {365}, Abstract = {Recent coordinated efforts, in which numerous climate models have been run for a common set of experiments, have produced large datasets of projections of future climate for various scenarios. Those multi-model ensembles sample initial condition, parameter as well as structural uncertainties in the model design, and they have prompted a variety of approaches to quantify uncertainty in future climate in a probabilistic way. This paper outlines the motivation for using multi-model ensembles, reviews the methodologies published so far and compares their results for regional temperature projections. The challenges in interpreting multi-model results, caused by the lack of verification of climate projections, the problem of model dependence, bias and tuning as well as the difficulty in making sense of an 'ensemble of opportunity', are discussed in detail.}, Doi = {10.1098/rsta.2007.2076}, ISBN = {1364-503X}, ISSN = {1364-503X}, Keywords = {global climate models; multi-model ensembles; perf}, Pmid = {17569654} } @Article{Teller1973, Title = {{Conditionalization and Observation}}, Author = {Teller, Paul}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1973}, Pages = {218--258}, Volume = {26}, Keywords = {Diachronic Dutch Books; Subjective Probability} } @Article{Tentori2007, Title = {{Comparison of Confirmation Measures}}, Author = {Tentori, Katya and Crupi, Vincenzo and Bonini, Nicolao and Osherson, Daniel}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {107--119}, Volume = {103}, Keywords = {Confirmation; Psychology of Human Reasoning} } @Article{TentoriCrupiOsherson2007, Title = {{Determinants of Confirmation}}, Author = {Tentori, Katya and Crupi, Vincenzo and Osherson, Daniel}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2007}, Number = {5}, Pages = {877--883}, Volume = {14}, Keywords = {Confirmation; Psychology of Human Reasoning} } @Article{Thagard1989, Title = {{Explanatory Coherence}}, Author = {Thagard, Paul}, Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {435--502}, Volume = {12}, Abstract = {This target article presents a new computational theory of explanatory coherence that applies to the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses as well as to reasoning in everyday life. The theory consists of seven principles that establish relations of local coherence between a hypothesis and other propositions. A hypothesis coheres with propositions that it explains, or that explain it, or that participate with it in explaining other propositions, or that offer analogous explanations. ...}, Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00057046}, ISBN = {0140-525X}, ISSN = {0140-525X}, Pmid = {15012540} } @Article{Tichy1974, Title = {{On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude}}, Author = {Tich{\'y}, Pavel}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {1974}, Pages = {155--160}, Volume = {25}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.20} } @Book{Titelbaum2016, Title = {{Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology}}, Author = {Titelbaum, Michael G.}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {forthcoming}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.08.03} } @Book{Titelbaum2013, Title = {{Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief}}, Author = {Titelbaum, Michael G.}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2013}, Address = {Oxford}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Article{TrafimowMarks2015, Title = {Editorial}, Author = {Trafimow, David and Marks, Michael}, Journal = {Basic and Applied Social Psychology}, Year = {2015}, Pages = {1-2}, Volume = {37}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{TrpinPellert2018, Title = {{Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations}}, Author = {Trpin, Borut and Pellert, Max}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {forthcoming}, Note = {\doi{10.1093/bjps/axy027}}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.11.12} } @Misc{FDA2010, Title = {{Guidance for the Use of Bayesian Statistics in Medical Device Clinical Trials}}, Author = {{US Food and Drug Administration}}, Year = {2010}, Annote = {Available at \url{http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071072.htm}. Last access 26/01/2012} } @Article{Utts1991, Title = {{Replication and Meta-Analysis in Parapsychology}}, Author = {Utts, Jessica}, Journal = {Statistical Science}, Year = {1991}, Pages = {363--403 (with discussion)}, Volume = {6}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.25} } @Article{vanDongenEtAl2019, Title = {Multiple Perspectives on Inference for Two Simple Statistical Scenarios}, Author = {{van Dongen}, N. N. N. and {van Doorn}, J. B. and Gronau, Q. F. and {van Ravenzwaaij}, D. and Hoekstra, R. and Haucke, M. N. and Lakens, D. and Hennig, C. and Morey, R. D. and Homer, S. and Gelman, A. and Sprenger, J. and Wagenmakers, E.--J.}, Journal = {The American Statistician}, Year = {in press} } @Article{Vassend2019, author = {Vassend, Olav Benjamin}, title = {{New Semantics for Bayesian Inference: The Interpretive Problem and Its Solutions}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {forthcoming}, note = {Retrieved from \url{https://sites.google.com/site/olavbvassend/research} on March 29, 2019}, owner = {jsprenger}, timestamp = {2017.09.18}, } @Article{Vassend2016, Title = {{Goals and the Informativeness of Prior Probabilities}}, Author = {Vassend, Olav Benjamin}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2018}, Pages = {647--670}, Volume = {83}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Villegas1964, Title = {{On Qualitative Probability Sigma-Algebras}}, Author = {Villegas, C.}, Journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, Year = {1964}, Pages = {1787--1796}, Volume = {35}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @Article{WacholderEtAl2004, Title = {Assessing the Probability That a Positive Report is False: An Approach for Molecular Epidemiology Studies}, Author = {Wacholder, Sholom and Chanock, Stephen and Garcia-Closas, Montserrat and El Ghormli, Laure and Rothman, Nathaniel}, Journal = {JNCI: Journal of the National Cancer Institute}, Year = {2004}, Number = {6}, Pages = {434-442}, Volume = {96}, Doi = {10.1093/jnci/djh075}, Eprint = {/oup/backfile/content_public/journal/jnci/96/6/10.1093_jnci_djh075/1/zv800604000434.pdf}, Url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jnci/djh075} } @Article{WagenmakersEtAl2011a, Title = {{Why Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case of Psi: Comment on Bem (2011)}}, Author = {Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan and Wetzels, Ruud and Borsboom, Denny and Maas, Han L. J. van der}, Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, Year = {2011}, Number = {3}, Pages = {426--432}, Volume = {100}, Keywords = {Psychology,Statistics} } @Unpublished{WagenmakersEtAl2011b, Title = {{Yes, Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: Clarifications for Bem, Utts and Johnson (2011)}}, Author = {Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan and Wetzels, Ruud and Borsboom, Denny and Maas, Han L. J. van der}, Note = {Unpublished manuscript, retrieved from \url{http://www.ejwagenmakers.com/2011/ClarificationsForBemUttsJohnson.pdf} on August 10, 2018}, Year = {2011}, Journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, Keywords = {Psychology,Statistics}, Number = {3}, Owner = {grenache}, Pages = {426--432}, Timestamp = {2017.02.24}, Volume = {100} } @Article{Walker2013, Title = {{Bayesian Inference with Misspecified Models}}, Author = {Walker, S.G.}, Journal = {{Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference}}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {1621--1633}, Volume = {143}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2019.03.30} } @Book{Wallace2005, Title = {Statistical and Inductive Inference by Minimum Message Length}, Author = {Wallace, Chris}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2005}, Address = {New York}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Book{Walton1995, Title = {{Arguments from Ignorance}}, Author = {Walton, Douglas}, Publisher = {Penn State University Press}, Year = {1995}, Address = {Philadelphia, Pa.} } @Book{Wasserman2004, Title = {{All of Statistics}}, Author = {Wasserman, Larry}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2004}, Address = {New York} } @Article{Waters2007, Title = {{Causes That Make a Difference}}, Author = {Waters, C. Kenneth}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {551--579}, Volume = {104}, Publisher = {Journal of Philosophy Inc} } @Article{Weber2006, Title = {{The Central Dogma as a Thesis of Causal Specificity}}, Author = {Weber, Marcel}, Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences}, Year = {2006}, Pages = {595--609}, Volume = {28} } @InCollection{Weber1917, Title = {{Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften}}, Author = {Weber, Max}, Booktitle = {Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre}, Publisher = {UTB}, Year = {1917}, Address = {Tübingen}, Note = {Reprint edition, 1988}, Pages = {451--502} } @InCollection{Weber1904, Title = {{Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis}}, Author = {Weber, Max}, Booktitle = {Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre}, Publisher = {UTB}, Year = {1904}, Address = {Tübingen}, Note = {Reprint edition, 1988}, Pages = {146--214} } @Article{WeinbergNicholsStich2001, Title = {{Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions}}, Author = {Weinberg, Jonathan M. and Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen}, Journal = {Philosophical Topics}, Year = {2001}, Pages = {429--460}, Volume = {29}, Keywords = {Experimental Philosophy}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @InCollection{Weisberg2009, Title = {{Varieties of Bayesianism}}, Author = {Weisberg, Jonathan}, Booktitle = {Handbook of the History of Logic}, Publisher = {North-Holland}, Year = {2009}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Editor = {Gabbay, Dov and Hartmann, Stephan and Woods, John}, Pages = {477--551}, Volume = {10: Inductive Logic}, Keywords = {Conditionalization,Inductive Logic,Jeffrey Conditioning,Probabilism}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.21} } @Book{Weisberg2012, Title = {{Simulations and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World}}, Author = {Weisberg, Michael}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2012}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Philosophy of Biology,Robustness,Simulations}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{Weisberg2007a, Title = {{Who is a Modeler?}}, Author = {Weisberg, Michael}, Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {207--233}, Volume = {58}, Url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/58/2/207.short} } @Article{WeisbergMuldoon2009, Title = {{Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor}}, Author = {Weisberg, Michael and Muldoon, Ryan}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {225--252}, Volume = {76} } @Article{WenmackersRomeijn2016, Title = {{A New Theory about Old Evidence}}, Author = {Wenmackers, Sylvia and Romeijn, Jan-Willem}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2016}, Pages = {1225--1250}, Volume = {193}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{WetzelsEtAl2009, Title = {{How to Quantify Support For and Against the Null Hypothesis: A Flexible \textsc{w}in\textsc{bugs} Implementation of a Default Bayesian $t$~Test}}, Author = {Wetzels, Ruud and Raaijmakers, Jeroen G. W. and Jakab, Emöke and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {752--760}, Volume = {16}, Abstract = {We propose a sampling-based Bayesian t test that allows researchers to quantify the statistical evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. This Savage-Dickey (SD) t test is inspired by the Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) t test recently proposed by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). The SD test retains the key concepts of the JZS test but is applicable to a wider range of statistical problems. The SD test allows researchers to test order restrictions and applies to two-sample situations in which the different groups do not share the same variance.}, Institution = {University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. wetzels.ruud@gmail.com}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2016.07.20} } @Article{WetzelsWagenmakers2012, Title = {{A Default Bayesian Hypothesis Test for Correlations and Partial Correlations}}, Author = {Wetzels, Ruud and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, Journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, Year = {2012}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1057--1064}, Volume = {19}, Abstract = {We propose a default Bayesian hypothesis test for the presence of a correlation or a partial correlation. The test is a direct application of Bayesian techniques for variable selection in regression models. The test is easy to apply and yields practical advantages that the standard frequentist tests lack; in particular, the Bayesian test can quantify evidence in favor of the null hypothesis and allows researchers to monitor the test results as the data come in. We illustrate the use of the Bayesian correlation test with three examples from the psychological literature. Computer code and example data are provided in the journal archives.}, Doi = {10.3758/s13423-012-0295-x}, ISBN = {1069-9384}, ISSN = {1069-9384}, Keywords = {bayesian inference,correlation,statistical}, Pmid = {22798023} } @Book{Whewell1847, Title = {{Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History}}, Author = {Whewell, William}, Publisher = {Parker}, Year = {1847}, Address = {London} } @Article{WilkinsonTaskForce1999, Title = {{Statistical Methods in Psychology Journals: Guidelines and Explanations}}, Author = {Wilkinson, L. and {Task Force on Statistical Inference}}, Journal = {American Psychologist}, Year = {1999}, Pages = {594--604}, Volume = {54}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.24} } @Article{Williams2012, Title = {{Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination}}, Author = {Williams, J. Robert G.}, Journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, Year = {2012}, Pages = {811--840}, Volume = {41}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.01.30} } @InCollection{Williamson2007b, Title = {{Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities}}, Author = {Williamson, Jon}, Booktitle = {Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry~E. Kyburg Jr.}, Publisher = {College Publications}, Year = {2007}, Address = {London}, Editor = {Harper, William and Wheeler, Gregory}, Pages = {151--179}, Keywords = {Objective Probability} } @Book{Williamson2017, Title = {Lectures on Inductive Logic}, Author = {Williamson, Jon}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2017}, Address = {Oxford} } @Article{Williamson2013, Title = {{Why Frequentists and Bayesians Need Each Other}}, Author = {Williamson, Jon}, Journal = {Erkenntnis}, Year = {2013}, Pages = {293--318}, Volume = {78}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.11.03} } @Book{Williamson2010, Title = {{In Defence of Objective Bayesianism}}, Author = {Williamson, Jon}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2010}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Objective Probability} } @InCollection{Woodward2012, Title = {{Causation and Manipulability}}, Author = {Woodward, James}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2016}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/causation-mani/}}, Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/} } @InCollection{Woodward2014, Title = {{Scientific Explanation}}, Author = {Woodward, James}, Booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Year = {2014}, Editor = {Zalta, Ed}, Note = {Retrieved from \url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/scientific-explanation/}}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation}, Url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-explanation/} } @Book{Woodward2003, Title = {{Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation}}, Author = {Woodward, James}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {2003}, Address = {Oxford}, Keywords = {Nature of Explanation} } @Article{Woodward1989, Title = {{Data and Phenomena}}, Author = {Woodward, James}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {1989}, Number = {3}, Pages = {393--472}, Volume = {79}, Abstract = {This paper explores how data serveas evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidentialrelationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00869282}, ISBN = {0300104251}, ISSN = {00397857} } @Article{worrall2008, Title = {{Evidence and Ethics in Medicine}}, Author = {Worrall, John}, Journal = {Perspectives in Biology and Medicine}, Year = {2008}, Number = {3}, Pages = {418--431}, Volume = {51} } @Article{Worrall1989, Title = {{Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?}}, Author = {Worrall, John}, Journal = {Dialectica}, Year = {1989}, Pages = {99--124}, Volume = {43}, File = {:home/jsprenger/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Worrall - 1989 - Structural Realism The Best of Both Worlds.pdf:pdf}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13} } @Article{Yang2005, Title = {{Can the Strengths of \AIC\ and \BIC\ be Shared? A Conflict between Model Identification and Regression Estimation}}, Author = {Yang, Yuhong}, Journal = {Biometrika}, Year = {2005}, Pages = {937--950}, Volume = {92}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.31} } @Article{Zamora2000, Title = {{Truthlikeness, Rationality and Scientific Method}}, Author = {Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro}, Journal = {Synthese}, Year = {2000}, Pages = {321--335}, Volume = {122}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.25} } @Article{ZhaoEtAl2012, Title = {{Updating: Learning versus Supposing}}, Author = {Zhao, Jiaying and Crupi, Vincenzo and Tentori, Katya and Fitelson, Branden and Osherson, Daniel}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2012}, Month = {aug}, Pages = {373--378}, Volume = {124}, ISSN = {ISSN-0010-0277}, Keywords = {Cognitive Development,Comparative Analysis,Correlation,Experiments,Learning,Learning Processes,Mathematics Instruction,Probability,Thinking Skills}, Language = {en}, Owner = {grenache}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ974436} } @Article{ZhaoShahOsherson2009, Title = {{On the Provenance of Judgments of Conditional Probability}}, Author = {Zhao, Jiaying and Shah, Anuj and Osherson, Daniel}, Journal = {Cognition}, Year = {2009}, Pages = {26--36}, Volume = {113}, Abstract = {In standard treatments of probability, Pr(A|B) is defined as the ratio of Pr(A intersectionB) to Pr(B), provided that Pr(B)>0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr(A|B) arise in the mind via implicit calculation of Pr(A intersectionB)/Pr(B). We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by Pr(A intersectionB)/Pr(B). Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that Pr(A|B) arises from the ratio Pr(A intersectionB)/[Pr(A intersectionB)+Pr(A intersectionB)] fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.006}, ISSN = {1873-7838}, Keywords = {Adult,Cognition,Cognition: physiology,Concept Formation,Concept Formation: physiology,Decision Making,Decision Making: physiology,Female,Humans,Judgment,Judgment: physiology,Male,Models,Pattern Recognition,Photic Stimulation,Probability,Problem Solving,Problem Solving: physiology,Statistical,Visual,Visual: physiology}, Owner = {grenache}, Pmid = {19665110}, Publisher = {Manuscript under review.}, Timestamp = {2016.07.13}, Url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19665110} } @Book{ZiliakMcCloskey2008, Title = {{The Cult of Statistical Significance: How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives}}, Author = {Ziliak, Stephen T. and McCloskey, Deirdre N.}, Publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, Year = {2008}, Address = {Ann Arbor, Mich.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.24} } @Article{Zollman2007a, Title = {{The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities}}, Author = {Zollman, Kevin J. S.}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Year = {2007}, Pages = {574--587}, Volume = {74} } @Book{DoyaEtAl2007, Title = {Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding}, Editor = {Doya, Kenji and Ishii, Shin and Pouget, Alexandre and Rao, Rajesh P. N.}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {2007}, Address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2016.10.03} } @Book{FestaAlisedaPeijnenburg2005, Title = {{Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers}}, Editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne}, Publisher = {Rodopi}, Year = {2005}, Address = {Amsterdam}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2018.02.16} } @Book{KahnemanSlovicTversky1982, Title = {Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, Editor = {Kahneman, Daniel and Slovic, Paul and Tversky, Amos}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1982}, Address = {Cambridge}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.08.02} } @Book{Megill1994, Title = {Rethinking Objectivity}, Editor = {Megill, Alan}, Publisher = {Duke University Press}, Year = {1994}, Address = {Durham, N.C., and London}, Owner = {grenache}, Timestamp = {2017.02.26} } @Book{TaperLele2004, Title = {{The Nature of Scientific Evidence}}, Editor = {Taper, Mark and Lele, Subhash}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {2004}, Address = {Chicago}, Owner = {jsprenger}, Timestamp = {2017.07.27} } @Article{Simmons2011, author = {Simmons, Joseph P. and Nelson, Leif D. and Simonsohn, Uri}, title = {{False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant.}}, journal = {Psychological Science}, year = {2011}, volume = {22}, number = {11}, pages = {1359--1366}, issn = {1467-9280}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.01.02}, } @Article{Schmidt1996, author = {Schmidt, Frank L.}, title = {{Statistical Significance Testing and Cumulative Knowledge in Psychology: Implications for Training of Researchers.}}, journal = {Psychological Methods}, year = {1996}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {115--129}, issn = {1082-989X}, abstract = {Data analysis methods in psychology still emphasize statistical significance testing, despite numerous articles demonstrating its severe deficiencies. It is now possible to use meta-analysis to show that reliance on significance testing retards the development of cumulative knowledge. But reform of teaching and practice will also require that researchers learn that the benefits that they believe flow from use of significance testing are illusory. Teachers must revamp their courses to bring students to understand that (a) reliance on significance testing retards the growth of cumulative research knowledge; (b) benefits widely believed to flow from significance testing do not in fact exist; and (c) significance testing methods must be replaced with point estimates and confidence intervals in individual studies and with meta-analyses in the integration of multiple studies. This reform is essential to the future progress of cumulative knowledge in psychological research. (PsycINFO Databas}, keywords = {statistical significance testing vs meta-analysis in growth of cumulative knowledge in psychology, implications for graduate training of researchers, Meta Analysis, Statistical Significance, Statistical Tests, Graduate Psychology Education}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.01.02}, } @Article{SzucsIoannidis2017, author = {Szucs, Denes, and Ioannnidis, John}, title = {Empirical assessment of published effect sizes and power in the recent cognitive neuroscience and psychology literature.}, journal = {PLoS Biology}, year = {2017}, volume = {15}, pages = {e2000797}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2000797}, } @Article{Romero2018, author = {Romero, Felipe}, title = {{Who Should Do Replication Labor?}}, journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science}, year = {2018}, doi = {10.31234/osf.io/ab3y9}, owner = {jsprenger}, timestamp = {2017.07.28}, } @Article{AczelEtAl2018, author = {Balazs Aczel and Bence Palfi and Aba Szollosi and Marton Kovacs and Barnabas Szaszi and Peter Szecsi and Mark Zrubka and Quentin F. Gronau and Don van den Bergh and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers}, journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science}, title = {Quantifying Support for the Null Hypothesis in Psychology: An Empirical Investigation}, year = {2018}, number = {3}, pages = {357-366}, volume = {1}, abstract = {In the traditional statistical framework, nonsignificant results leave researchers in a state of suspended disbelief. In this study, we examined, empirically, the treatment and evidential impact of nonsignificant results. Our specific goals were twofold: to explore how psychologists interpret and communicate nonsignificant results and to assess how much these results constitute evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. First, we examined all nonsignificant findings mentioned in the abstracts of the 2015 volumes of Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, and Psychological Science (N = 137). In 72\% of these cases, nonsignificant results were misinterpreted, in that the authors inferred that the effect was absent. Second, a Bayes factor reanalysis revealed that fewer than 5\% of the nonsignificant findings provided strong evidence (i.e., BF01 > 10) in favor of the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis. We recommend that researchers expand their statistical tool kit in order to correctly interpret nonsignificant results and to be able to evaluate the evidence for and against the null hypothesis.}, doi = {10.1177/2515245918773742}, eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918773742}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918773742}, } @Article{LakensScheelIsager2018, author = {Lakens, Dani\"el and Scheel, Anne M. and Isager, Peder M.}, title = {{Equivalence Testing for Psychological Research: A Tutorial}}, journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science}, year = {2018}, volume = {1}, pages = {259--269}, } @Article{Sprenger2018a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Foundations for a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength}}, journal = {{Philosophical Review}}, year = {2018}, volume = {127}, pages = {371--398}, } @Article{Sprenger2018b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{Two Impossibility Results for Popperian Corroboration}}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2018}, volume = {69}, pages = {139--159}, } @Article{Sprenger2018d, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {{The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism}}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2018}, volume = {8}, pages = {539--558}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.03.14}, } @Article{Quintana2015, author = {Quintana, Daniel S.}, title = {From pre-registration to publication: a non-technical primer for conducting a meta-analysis to synthesize correlational data}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, year = {2015}, volume = {6}, pages = {1549}, issn = {1664-1078}, abstract = {Meta-analysis synthesizes a body of research investigating a common research question. Outcomes from meta-analyses provide a more objective and transparent summary of a research area than traditional narrative reviews. Moreover, they are often used to support research grant applications, guide clinical practice and direct health policy. The aim of this article is to provide a practical and nontechnical guide for psychological scientists that outlines the steps involved in planning and performing a meta-analysis of correlational datasets. I provide a supplementary R script to demonstrate each analytical step described in the paper, which is readily adaptable for researchers to use for their analyses. While the worked example is the analysis of correlational dataset, the general meta-analytic process described in this paper is applicable for all types of effect sizes. I also emphasise the importance of meta-analysis protocols and pre-registration to improve transparency and help avoid unintended duplication. An improved understanding this tool will not only help scientists to conduct their own meta-analyses but also improve their evaluation of published meta-analyses.}, doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01549}, url = {https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01549}, } @Book{Fisher1935, title = {{The Design of Experiments}}, publisher = {Hafner Press}, year = {1935/74}, author = {Fisher, R. A.}, address = {New York}, note = {Reprint of the ninth edition from 1971. Originally published in 1935 (Edinburgh: Oliver \& Boyd).}, url = {/citations?view_op=view_citation&continue=/scholar%3Fhl%3Dnl%26start%3D40%26as_sdt%3D0,5%26scilib%3D1&citilm=1&citation_for_view=t7brD90AAAAJ:iKswqCX-FLkC&hl=nl&oi=p}, } @Article{BenjaminEtAl2018, author = {Benjamin, Daniel J. and Berger, James O. and Johannesson, Magnus and et al.}, title = {Redefine statistical significance}, journal = {Nature Human Behaviour}, year = {2018}, volume = {2}, pages = {6--10}, abstract = {We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.}, refid = {Benjamin2018}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0189-z}, } @Article{Moretti2006, author = {Luca Moretti}, title = {The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {2006}, volume = {64}, pages = {115--138}, } @Book{Horwich1982, title = {Probability and Evidence}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1982}, author = {Paul Horwich}, address = {Cambridge}, } @Article{Grimes1990, author = {Thomas R. Grimes}, title = {Truth, Content, and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1990}, volume = {57}, pages = {514--522}, } @Book{HowsonUrbach2006, title = {{Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach}}, publisher = {Open Court}, year = {1989/2006}, author = {Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter}, address = {La Salle, Ill.}, edition = {3rd}, note = {Originally published in 1989}, keywords = {Formal Philosophy of Science}, } @Article{Vranas2004, author = {Peter B. M. Vranas}, title = {Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, volume = {55}, pages = {545--560}, } @InCollection{Huber2007, author = {Huber, Franz}, title = {{Confirmation and Induction}}, booktitle = {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, editor = {Fieser J. and Dowden B.}, note = {Retrieved from \url{https://www.iep.utm.edu/conf-ind/} on \today}, } @Article{dubins1975, author = {Dubins, Lester E.}, title = {Finitely Additive Conditional Probabilities, Conglomerability and Disintegrations}, journal = {The Annals of Probability}, year = {1975}, volume = {3}, pages = {89--99}, } @Article{Heesen2018a, author = {Heesen, Remco}, title = {{Why the Reward Structure of Science Makes Reproducibility Problems Inevitable}}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2018}, volume = {115}, pages = {661--674}, owner = {jsprenger}, timestamp = {2016.07.20}, } @Article{Strevens2003, author = {Strevens, Michael}, title = {{The Role of the Priority Rule in Science}}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {100}, pages = {55--79}, owner = {grenache}, publisher = {Manuscript under review}, timestamp = {2016.07.13}, url = {/citations?view{\_}op=view{\_}citation{\&}continue=/scholar{\%}3Fhl{\%}3Dnl{\%}26start{\%}3D40{\%}26as{\_}sdt{\%}3D0,5{\%}26scilib{\%}3D1{\&}citilm=1{\&}citation{\_}for{\_}view=t7brD90AAAAJ:zdX0sdgBH{\_}kC{\&}hl=nl{\&}oi=p}, } @Article{Kitcher1990, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {{The Division of Cognitive Labor}}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1990}, volume = {87}, pages = {5-22}, keywords = {Nature of Explanation; Unification}, } @Article{Ruse1982, author = {Ruse, Michael}, title = {{Creation Science is Not Science}}, journal = {{Science, Technology and Human Values}}, year = {1982}, volume = {7}, number = {40}, pages = {72--78}, } @Article{Laudan1982, author = {Laudan, Larry}, title = {{Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern}}, journal = {{Science, Technology and Human Values}}, year = {1982}, volume = {7}, number = {41}, pages = {16--19}, } @Article{Carnap1930, author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, title = {{Die alte und die neue Logik}}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {1930}, volume = {1}, pages = {12-26}, } @Article{MacCoun1998, author = {MacCoun, Robert J.}, title = {Biases in the interpretation and use of research results}, journal = {Annual Review of Psychology}, year = {1998}, volume = {49}, pages = {259--287}, } @Article{MoreyRouder2011, author = {Morey, Richard D. and Rouder, Jeffrey N.}, title = {Bayes factor approaches for testing interval null hypotheses}, journal = {Psychological Methods}, year = {2011}, volume = {16}, pages = {406--419}, attachments = {http://pcl.missouri.edu/sites/default/files/Morey.Rouder.2011_0.pdf}, } @Article{Jackson1977, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {{A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals}}, journal = {{Australasian Journal of Philosophy}}, year = {1977}, volume = {55}, pages = {3--21}, } @Article{Hitchcock2001:ICR, author = {Hitchcock, Christopher}, title = {{The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs}}, journal = {{Journal of Philosophy}}, year = {2001}, volume = {98}, pages = {273--299}, } @Article{BeckersVennekens2017, author = {Beckers, Sander and Vennekens, Joost}, title = {{The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation}}, journal = {{Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy}}, year = {2017}, volume = {4}, doi = {10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.001}, } @InCollection{Woodward2016, author = {Woodward, James}, title = {{Causation in Science}}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2016}, editor = {Humphreys, Paul}, pages = {163--184}, address = {Oxford}, } @Article{Weinberger2019, author = {Weinberger, Naftali}, title = {{Path-Specific Effects}}, journal = {{British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}}, year = {2019}, volume = {70}, pages = {53--76}, } @Article{Frege1892, author = {Frege, Gottlob}, title = {{Über Sinn und Bedeutung}}, journal = {{Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik}}, year = {1892}, volume = {100}, pages = {25--50}, } @Book{Frege1879, title = {Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens}, publisher = {Louis Nebert}, year = {1879}, author = {Frege, Gottlob}, address = {Halle}, } @InCollection{Frege1977, author = {Frege, G.}, title = {Negation}, booktitle = {Logical {I}nvestigations}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1977}, editor = {Geach, P. T.}, address = {Oxford}, date-added = {2008-03-11 16:43:31 +0000}, date-modified = {2008-03-11 16:44:48 +0000}, } @Article{Frege1919, author = {Frege, G.}, title = {The Thought: A Logical Inquiry}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1956}, volume = {65}, number = {265}, pages = {289-311}, date-added = {2007-09-20 09:05:54 +0100}, date-modified = {2007-09-20 09:05:54 +0100}, } @Article{Romero2020, author = {Romero, Felipe}, title = {{The Division of Replication Labor}}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2020}, note = {\doi{10.31234/osf.io/ab3y9}}, owner = {jsprenger}, timestamp = {2017.07.28}, } @Article{Hitchcock2001:CGA, author = {Christopher Hitchcock}, title = {Causal Generalizations and Good Advice}, journal = {The Monist}, year = {2001}, volume = {84}, number = {2}, pages = {218--241}, publisher = {The Hegeler Institute}, } @Article{LakensEtAl2018, author = {Lakens, Daniël and McLatchie, Neil and Isager, Peder M. and Scheel, Anne M. and Dienes, Zoltan}, title = {{Improving Inferences About Null Effects With Bayes Factors and Equivalence Tests}}, journal = {The Journals of Gerontology: Series B}, year = {2018}, volume = {75}, pages = {45-57}, } @Article{TendeiroKiers2019, author = {Jorge Tendeiro and Kiers, {H. A. L.}}, title = {{A Review of Issues About Null Hypothesis Bayesian Testing}}, journal = {Psychological Methods}, year = {2019}, volume = {24}, pages = {774--795}, doi = {10.1037/met0000221}, keywords = {P-VALUES, MODEL SELECTION, PSYCHOLOGY, INFERENCE, IRRECONCILABILITY, SENSITIVITY, STATISTICS, COMPLEXITY, SCIENCE, CHOICE}, language = {English}, publisher = {AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC}, } @Article{Kruschke2018, author = {John K. Kruschke}, journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science}, title = {{Rejecting or Accepting Parameter Values in Bayesian Estimation}}, year = {2018}, number = {2}, pages = {270-280}, volume = {1}, abstract = {This article explains a decision rule that uses Bayesian posterior distributions as the basis for accepting or rejecting null values of parameters. This decision rule focuses on the range of plausible values indicated by the highest density interval of the posterior distribution and the relation between this range and a region of practical equivalence (ROPE) around the null value. The article also discusses considerations for setting the limits of a ROPE and emphasizes that analogous considerations apply to setting the decision thresholds for p values and Bayes factors.}, doi = {10.1177/2515245918771304}, eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918771304}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918771304}, } @Article{KruschkeLiddell2018, author = {Kruschke, John K. and Liddell, Torrin M.}, title = {{The Bayesian New Statistics: Hypothesis testing, estimation, meta-analysis, and power analysis from a Bayesian perspective}}, journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}, year = {2018}, volume = {25}, pages = {178--206}, issn = {1531-5320}, abstract = {In the practice of data analysis, there is a conceptual distinction between hypothesis testing, on the one hand, and estimation with quantified uncertainty on the other. Among frequentists in psychology, a shift of emphasis from hypothesis testing to estimation has been dubbed “the New Statistics” (Cumming 2014). A second conceptual distinction is between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods. Our main goal in this article is to explain how Bayesian methods achieve the goals of the New Statistics better than frequentist methods. The article reviews frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing and to estimation with confidence or credible intervals. The article also describes Bayesian approaches to meta-analysis, randomized controlled trials, and power analysis.}, url = {https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1221-4}, } @Article{Kruschke2011, author = {John K. Kruschke}, journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, title = {{Bayesian Assessment of Null Values Via Parameter Estimation and Model Comparison}}, year = {2011}, note = {PMID: 26168520}, number = {3}, pages = {299-312}, volume = {6}, abstract = {Psychologists have been trained to do data analysis by asking whether null values can be rejected. Is the difference between groups nonzero? Is choice accuracy not at chance level? These questions have been traditionally addressed by null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). NHST has deep problems that are solved by Bayesian data analysis. As psychologists transition to Bayesian data analysis, it is natural to ask how Bayesian analysis assesses null values. The article explains and evaluates two different Bayesian approaches. One method involves Bayesian model comparison (and uses Bayes factors). The second method involves Bayesian parameter estimation and assesses whether the null value falls among the most credible values. Which method to use depends on the specific question that the analyst wants to answer, but typically the estimation approach (not using Bayes factors) provides richer information than the model comparison approach.}, doi = {10.1177/1745691611406925}, eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611406925}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611406925}, } @Article{Payne1974, author = {James L. Payne}, title = {Fishing Expedition Probability: The Statistics of Post Hoc Hypothesizing}, journal = {Polity}, year = {1974}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {130--138}, issn = {00323497, 17441684}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan Journals}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234273}, } @Article{SedlmeierGigerenzer1989, author = {Sedlmeier, Peter and Gigerenzer, Gerd}, title = {Do studies of statistical power have an effect on the power of studies?}, journal = {Psychological Bulletin}, year = {1989}, volume = {105}, pages = {309--316}, } @Article{Meehl1967, author = {Paul E. Meehl}, title = {Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1967}, volume = {34}, pages = {103--115}, } @Misc{Rodgers2002, author = {Rodgers, Joseph Lee and Rowe, David C.}, title = {{Theory development should begin (but not end) with good empirical fits: A comment on Roberts and Pashler (2000)}}, year = {2002}, abstract = {S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000) argued against using goodness of fit as evidence to support theories. The authors agree with their suggestions for how to go beyond good fits but disagree with their starting point. In this comment, the authors argue that good fits are part and parcel of theory development, that they are part and parcel of the processes suggested by S. Roberts and H. Pashler, and that they must be the starting point (though far from the ending point) in theoretical development. The authors discuss historical examples of scientific theory development, recent examples of psychological theory development, and development of a particular theory (social contagion theory; J. L. Rodgers {\&} D. C. Rowe, 1993) that S. Roberts and H. Pashler criticized.}, booktitle = {Psychological Review}, doi = {10.1037//0033-295X.109.3.599}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/00006832-200207000-00008.pdf:pdf}, issn = {0033295X}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, number = {3}, pages = {599--604}, url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0033-295X.109.3.599}, volume = {109}, } @Article{Roberts2000, author = {Roberts, Seth and Pashler, Harold}, title = {{How Persuasive is a Good Fit? A comment on theory testing}}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {107}, number = {2}, pages = {358--367}, abstract = {Quantitative theories with free parameters often gain credence when they "fit" data closely. This is a mistake, we argue. A good fit reveals nothing about (a) the flexibility of the theory (how much it cannot fit), (b) the variability of the data (how firmly the data rule out what the theory cannot fit), and (c) the likelihood of other outcomes (perhaps the theory could have fit any plausible result)-and a reader needs to know all three to decide how much the fit should increase belief in the theory. As far as we can tell, the use of good fits as evidence receives no support from philosophers of science nor from the history of psychology; we have been unable to find examples of a theory supported mainly by good fits that has led to demonstrable progress. We consider and rebut arguments used to defend the use of good fits as evidence-for example, that a good fit is meaningful when the number of free parameters is small compared to the number of data points, or when one model fits better than others. A better way to test a theory with free parameters is to (a) determine how the theory constrains possible outcomes (i.e., what it predicts); (b) assess how firmly actual outcomes agree with those constraints; and (c) determine if plausible alternative outcomes would have been inconsistent with the theory, allowing for the variability of the data. How Persuasive is a Good Fit? Many quantitative psychological theories with free parameters are supported mainly or entirely by demonstrations that they can "fit" data-that the parameters can be adjusted so that the output of the theory resembles actual results. The similarity is often shown via a graph with two functions: one labeled observed (or data), the other labeled predicted (or theory or simulated). That the theory fits data is supposed to show that the theory should be taken seriously-should be published, for example. This type of argument is common; judging from a search of Psychological Abstracts, the research literature probably contains thousands of examples. Early instances involved sensory processes (Hecht, 1934) and animal learning (Hull, 1943), but it is now used in many areas. Here are three recent examples: 1. Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) proposed a parallel-distributed-processing model to explain the Stroop effect and related data. The model was meant to embody a "continuous" view of automaticity, in contrast to an "all-or-none" (p. 332) view. The model contained many adjustable parameters, including number of units per module, ratio of training frequencies, learning rate, maximum response time, initial input weights, indirect pathway strengths, cascade rate, noise, magnitude of attentional influence (two parameters), and response-mechanism parameters (three). The model was fit to six data sets. Some parameters (e.g., number of units per module) were separately adjusted for each data set; other parameters were adjusted based on one data set and held constant for the rest. The function relating cycle time (model) to average reaction time (observed) was always linear but its slope}, annote = {Essay of theory testing. Good arguments against goodness-of-fit. Good arguments for - precise predictions - necessity of plausible alternatives (contradicting the theory) - necessity of taking the variance of the data into account. has some nice quotes and sources to read on the subject}, doi = {10.1037//0033-295X.107.2.358}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Roberts, Pashler - 2000 - How Persuasive is a Good Fit A comment on theory testing.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt5vt0z72k/qt5vt0z72k.pdf}, } @Article{neyman1933, author = {Neyman, Jerzy and Pearson, Egon}, title = {On the problem of the most efficient tests of statistical hypotheses}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A}, year = {1933}, volume = {231}, number = {694-706}, pages = {289--337}, publisher = {The Royal Society London}, } @Article{neyman1950first, author = {Neyman, Jerzy}, title = {First course in probability and statistics}, journal = {First course in probability and statistics, by J. Neyman. Published by Henry Holt, 1950.}, year = {1950}, } @Article{Myung2006, author = {Myung, Jay I and Navarro, Daniel J and Pitt, Mark A}, title = {{Model selection by normalized maximum likelihood}}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, year = {2006}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, pages = {167--179}, issn = {10960880}, abstract = {The Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle is an information theoretic approach to inductive inference that originated in algorithmic coding theory. In this approach, data are viewed as codes to be compressed by the model. From this perspective, models are compared on their ability to compress a data set by extracting useful information in the data apart from random noise. The goal of model selection is to identify the model, from a set of candidate models, that permits the shortest description length (code) of the data. Since Rissanen originally formalized the problem using the crude 'two-part code' MDL method in the 1970s, many significant strides have been made, especially in the 1990s, with the culmination of the development of the refined 'universal code' MDL method, dubbed Normalized Maximum Likelihood (NML). It represents an elegant solution to the model selection problem. The present paper provides a tutorial review on these latest developments with a special focus on NML. An application example of NML in cognitive modeling is also provided. {\textcopyright} 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, doi = {10.1016/j.jmp.2005.06.008}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Myung, Navarro, Pitt - 2006 - Model selection by normalized maximum likelihood.pdf:pdf}, keywords = {Cognitive modeling,Inductive inference,Minimum Description Length,Model complexity}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {www.elsevier.com/locate/jmp}, } @Article{Meehl1978, author = {Meehl, Paul E}, title = {{Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology}}, journal = {Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {806--834}, abstract = {Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology Paul E. Meehl University of Minnesota Theories in “soft” areas of psychology lack the cumulative character of scientific knowledge. They tend neither to be refuted nor corroborated, but instead merely fade away as people lose interest. Even though intrinsic subject matter difficulties (20 listed) contribute to this, the excessive reliance on significance testing is partly responsible, being a poor way of doing science. Karl Popper's approach, with modifications, would be prophylactic. Since the null hypothesis is quasi-always false, tables summarizing research in terms of patterns of “significant differences” are little more than complex, causally uninterpretable outcomes of statistical power functions. Multiple paths to estimating numerical point values (“consistency tests”) are better, even if approximate with rough tolerances; and lacking this, ranges, orderings, second-order differences, curve peaks and valleys, and function forms should be used. Such methods are usual in developed sciences that seldom report statistical significance. Consistency tests of a conjectural taxometric model yielded 94{\%} success with zero false negatives.}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/Google Drive/Wetenschap/MSIO PhD/Sources/Methodology/problems with science/Meehl(1978).pdf:pdf}, isbn = {0962-1849}, keywords = {AMERICAN,AREA,AREAS,ASSOCIATION,consistency te}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,NHST-SR/NHST-SR second search,METHODS/(severe) testing}, } @Article{Meehl1992, author = {Meehl, P. E.}, title = {{Cliometric metatheory : the actuarial approach to empirical, history-based philosophy of science}}, journal = {Psychological reports}, year = {1992}, volume = {71}, number = {2}, pages = {339--467}, issn = {0033-2941}, abstract = {Metatheory is the empirical theory of scientific theorizing. Its descriptive data base is scientific practice, history of science, and the facts of human cognition and communication. “Scientific method” is a loose set of principles (guidelines, policies, rules of thumb, helpful hints, preferences) plus a few strict rules. The analytical and prescriptive functions of metatheory try to explain scientific success and failure and to justify (rationalize) the principles as conducive to science's epistemic aims, employing the findings of behavioral science, probability theory, formal logic, and armchair epistemology as explanatory tools and constructs. Because the several methodological principles are incommensurable and their relation to our epistemic goal stochastic, metatheoretical research should supplement case studies with explicitly actuarial methods, sampling episodes from history of science and subjecting them to formal psychometric treatment. Psychologists' mental habits and quantitative skills should enable us to take the lead in developing cliometric metatheory as a new discipline. CONTENTS}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Meehl - Unknown - Cliometric Metathoery the Actuarial Approach to Empirical, History-Based Philosophy of Science.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {http://meehl.dl.umn.edu/sites/g/files/pua1696/f/154cliometricmetatheory.pdf}, } @Misc{Meehl2004, author = {Meehl, Paul E.}, title = {{Cliometric metatheory III: Peircean consensus, verisimilitude and asymptotic method}}, month = {dec}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Statistical procedures can be applied to episodes in the history of science in order to weight attributes to predict short-term survival of theories; an asymptotic method is used to show that short-term survival is a valid proxy for ultimate survival; and a theoretical argument is made that ultimate survival is a valid proxy for objective truth. While realists will appreciate this last step, instrumentalists do not need it to benefit from the actuarial procedures of cliometric metatheory.}, booktitle = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/55.4.615}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/meehl2004.pdf:pdf}, issn = {00070882}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, number = {4}, pages = {615--643}, publisher = {Narnia}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/bjps/55.4.615}, volume = {55}, } @InCollection{Meehl1986, author = {Meehl, P E}, title = {{What Social Scientists Don ' t Understand}}, booktitle = {Metatheory in social science: Pluralisms and subjectivities}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1986}, editor = {Fiske, D. W. and Shweder, R. A.}, chapter = {14}, pages = {315--338}, address = {Chicago}, abstract = {In the papers prepared for the conference on which this book is based and in the discussion, there were some matters almost universally agreed upon but repeated unnecessarily. Then there were some things that should have been agreed upon but were not. Finally, there were matters that were not agreed upon that needed more intensive examination—matters playing a central role in the philosophy of the social sciences and in the present intellectual gloominess that seems to prevail in all of the disciplines represented.}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Meehl - 1986 - What Social Scientists Don ' t Understand.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {Statistics,00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, } @Article{Meehl1990, author = {Meehl, Paul E}, title = {{Why summaries of research on psychological theories are often uninterpretable.}}, journal = {Psychological Reports}, year = {1990}, volume = {66}, number = {1}, pages = {195--244}, month = {feb}, issn = {0033-2941}, abstract = {Proposes that null hypothesis testing of correlational predictions from weak substantive theories in soft psychology is subject to the influence of obfuscating factors whose effects are usually sizeable, opposed, variable, and unknown. These factors include (1) loose derivation chain, (2) problematic auxiliary theories, (3) inadequate statistical power, and (4) selective bias in submitting reports. The net epistemic effect of these influences is suggested to make the usual research literature review nearly uninterpretable. Changes in the conduct of research and editorial policy are proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)}, address = {US}, annote = {Accession Number: 1990-21383-001. Partial author list: First Author {\&} Affiliation: Meehl, Paul E.; U Minnesota, Minneapolis, US. Other Publishers: Sage Publications. Release Date: 19900901. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Print. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Experimentation; Null Hypothesis Testing; Scientific Communication; Statistical Correlation; Theories. Classification: Research Methods {\&} Experimental Design (2260). Population: Human (10). Page Count: 50. Issue Publication Date: Feb, 1990.}, doi = {10.2466/PR0.66.1.195-244}, keywords = {1990,Experimentation,Null Hypothesis Testing,Scientific Communication,Statistical Correlation,Theories,problems with null hypothesis testing of correlati}, mendeley-groups = {METHODS/(severe) testing}, publisher = {Psychological Reports}, url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true{\&}db=psyh{\&}AN=1990-21383-001{\&}site=ehost-live}, } @Article{Meehl1990a, author = {Meehl, Paul E}, title = {{Why Summaries of Research on Psychological theories are often uninterpretable}}, journal = {Psychological Reports}, year = {1990}, volume = {66}, pages = {195--244}, abstract = {Null hypothesis testing of correlational predictions from weak sub- stantive theories in soft psychology is subject to the influence of ten obfuscating fac- tors whose effects are usually (1) sizeable, (2) opposed, (3) variable, and (4) unknown. The net episternic effect of these ten obfuscating influences is that the usual research literature review is well-nigh uninterpretable. Major changes in graduate education, conduct of research, and editorial policy are proposed. Recently,}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/Google Drive/Wetenschap/MSIO PhD/Minor endeavours/Reading groups{\_}/Everything is Fucked/1-Psychol Rep-1990-Meehl-195-244.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {METHODS/(severe) testing}, } @Article{Meehl2005, author = {Meehl, Paul Everett}, title = {Cliometric Metatheory II: Criteria Scientists Use in Theory Appraisal and Why It Is Rational to Do So}, journal = {Psychological Reports}, year = {2005}, volume = {91}, number = {6}, pages = {339--404}, issn = {0033-2941}, abstract = {Definitive tests of theories are often impossible in the life sciences because auxiliary assumptions are problematic. In the appraisal of competing theories, history of science shows that scientists use various theory characteristics such as aspects of parsimony, the number, qualitative diversity, novelty, and numerical precision of facts derived, number of misderived facts, and reducibility relations to other accepted theories. Statistical arguments are offered to show why, given minimal assumptions about the world and the mind, many of these attributes are expectable correlates of verisimilitude. A statistical composite of these attributes could provide an actuarial basis for theory appraisal (cliometric metatheory).}, doi = {10.2466/pr0.91.6.339-404}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Meehl - 2002 - Cliometric metatheory II. Criteria scientists use.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {file:///C:/Users/Asus1/Downloads/Meehl - 2002 - Cliometric metatheory II. Criteria scientists use.pdf}, } @Article{Meehl1990b, author = {Meehl, Paul E}, title = {{Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It}}, journal = {Psychological Inquiry}, year = {1990}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {108--141}, issn = {15327965}, abstract = {In social science, everything is somewhat correlated with everything ( "crud factor"), so whether H, is refuted depends solely on statistical power. In psychology, the directional counternull of interest, H*, is not equivalent to the substantive theory T, there being many plausible alternative explanations of a mere directional trend (weak use of signijicance tests). Testing against a predictedpoint value (the strong use of significant tests) can discorroborate T by refuting H*. If used thus to abandon T forthwith, it is too strong, not allowing for theoretical verisimilitude as distinguished from truth. Defense and amendment of an apparently falsified T are appropriate strategies only when T has accumulated a good track record ( "money in the bank") by making successful or near-miss predictions of low prior probability (Salmon's "damn strange coinci- dences"). Two rough indexes are proposed for numerifying the track record, by considering jointly how intolerant (risky) and how close (accurate) are its predictions.}, doi = {10.1207/s15327965pli0102_1}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Meehl - 1990 - Appraising and Amending Theories The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It(3).pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=hpli20}, } @Book{mayo2018statistical, title = {Statistical inference as severe testing}, publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press}, year = {2018}, author = {Mayo, Deborah G}, } @Misc{lakens2019pre, author = {Lakens, Daniel}, title = {The Value of Preregistration for Psychological Science: A Conceptual Analysis}, year = {2019}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/jbh4w}, } @InProceedings{lakatos1970methodology, author = {Lakatos, I}, title = {Methodology of scientific research programmes in criticism and the growth of knowledge'}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1970}, } @Book{kuhn2012structure, title = {The structure of scientific revolutions}, publisher = {University of Chicago press}, year = {2012}, author = {Kuhn, Thomas S}, } @Article{Klugkist2005, author = {Klugkist, Irene and Kato, Bernet and Hoijtink, Herbert}, title = {{Bayesian model selection using encompassing priors}}, journal = {Statistica Neerlandica}, year = {2005}, volume = {59}, number = {1}, pages = {57--69}, month = {feb}, issn = {0039-0402}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9574.2005.00279.x}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Klugkist, Kato, Hoijtink - 2005 - Bayesian model selection using encompassing priors.pdf:pdf}, keywords = {Bayes factors,inequality constraints,objective Bayesian inference,posterior probability}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, publisher = {John Wiley {\&} Sons, Ltd (10.1111)}, url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9574.2005.00279.x}, } @Article{Klugkist2005b, author = {Klugkist, Irene and Kato, Bernet and Hoijtink, Herbert}, title = {{Bayesian model selection using encompassing priors}}, journal = {Statistica Neerlandica}, year = {2005}, volume = {59}, number = {1}, pages = {57--69}, month = {mar}, issn = {00390402}, abstract = {This paper deals with Bayesian selection of models that can be specified using inequality constraints among the model parameters. The concept of encompassing priors is introduced, that is, a prior distribution for an unconstrained model from which the prior distributions of the constrained models can be derived. It is shown that the Bayes factor for the encompassing and a constrained model has a very nice interpretation: it is the ratio of the proportion of the prior and posterior distribution of the encompassing model in agreement with the constrained model. It is also shown that, for a specific class of models, selection based on encompassing priors will render a virtually objective selection procedure. The paper concludes with three illustrative examples: an analysis of variance with ordered means; a contingency table analysis with ordered odds-ratios; and a multilevel model with ordered slopes.}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9574.2005.00279.x}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Myung, Pitt - 1997 - Applying Occam's razor in modeling cognition A Bayesian approach.pdf:pdf}, keywords = {Bayes factors,Inequality constraints,Objective bayesian inference,Posterior probability}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing,METHODS}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.3758/BF03210778}, } @Article{Klugkist2005a, author = {Klugkist, Irene and Hoijtink, Herbert}, title = {{Inequality Constrained Analysis of Variance: A Bayesian Approach. Circular Data Analysis View project Self-instruction and math View project}}, year = {2005}, doi = {10.1037/1082-989X.10.4.477}, file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Asus1/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Klugkist, Hoijtink - 2005 - Inequality Constrained Analysis of Variance A Bayesian Approach. Circular Data Analysis View project Self-in.pdf:pdf}, mendeley-groups = {00-Nog te categoriseren,METHODS/(severe) testing}, url = {http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/winbugs/contents.shtml}, } @Article{Mittal1991, author = {Yashaswini Mittal}, title = {Homogeneity of subpopulations and {Simpson}'s paradox}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1991}, volume = {86}, number = {413}, pages = {167--172}, month = mar, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon May 5 12:36:01 MDT 1997}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, mrclass = {62H17 (62A99)}, mrnumber = {92g:62075}, } @Article{Samuels1993, author = {Myra L. Samuels}, title = {{Simpson}'s Paradox and Related Phenomena}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1993}, volume = {88}, number = {421}, pages = {81--88}, month = mar, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon May 5 12:36:01 MDT 1997}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, mrclass = {62H20 (62H17)}, mrnumber = {93m:62133}, } @Article{LindleyNovick1981, author = {D. V. Lindley and Melvin R. Novick}, title = {The Role of Exchangeability in Inference}, journal = j-ann-stat, year = {1981}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, pages = {45--58}, month = jan, issn = {0090-5364 (print), 2168-8966 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jun 4 06:39:55 MDT 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/annstat1980.bib}, coden = {ASTSC7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176345331}, fjournal = {Annals of Statistics}, issn-l = {0090-5364}, journal-url = {http://projecteuclid.org/all/euclid.aos/}, url = {http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176345331}, } @Article{GoodMittal1987, author = {I. J. Good and Y. Mittal}, title = {The Amalgamation and Geometry of Two-by-Two Contingency Tables}, journal = j-ann-stat, year = {1987}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, pages = {694--711}, month = jun, issn = {0090-5364 (print), 2168-8966 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jun 4 06:40:10 MDT 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/annstat1980.bib}, coden = {ASTSC7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176350369}, fjournal = {Annals of Statistics}, issn-l = {0090-5364}, journal-url = {http://projecteuclid.org/all/euclid.aos/}, url = {http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176350369}, } @Article{good:1989:aag, author = {I. J. Good and Y. Mittal}, title = {Addendum: The Amalgamation and Geometry of Two-by-Two Contingency Tables}, journal = j-ann-stat, year = {1989}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {947--947}, month = jun, issn = {0090-5364 (print), 2168-8966 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jun 4 06:40:14 MDT 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/annstat1980.bib}, coden = {ASTSC7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176347155}, fjournal = {Annals of Statistics}, issn-l = {0090-5364}, journal-url = {http://projecteuclid.org/all/euclid.aos/}, url = {http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176347155}, } @Article{Blyth1972, author = {Colin R. Blyth}, title = {On {Simpson}'s Paradox and the Sure-Thing Principle}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1972}, volume = {67}, number = {338}, pages = {364--366}, month = jun, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jan 25 08:05:45 MST 2012}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/01621459.html; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i314218; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc1970.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2284382}, } @Article{Blyth1973, author = {Colin R. Blyth}, title = {{Simpson}'s Paradox and Mutually Favorable Events}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1973}, volume = {68}, number = {343}, pages = {746--746}, month = sep, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jan 25 08:05:46 MST 2012}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/01621459.html; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i314223; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc1970.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2284813}, } @Article{blyth:1972:sps, author = {Colin R. Blyth}, title = {On {Simpson}'s Paradox and the Sure-Thing Principle}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1972}, volume = {67}, number = {338}, pages = {364--366}, month = jun, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jan 25 08:05:45 MST 2012}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/01621459.html; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i314218; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc1970.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2284382}, } @Article{blyth:1973:spm, author = {Colin R. Blyth}, title = {{Simpson}'s Paradox and Mutually Favorable Events}, journal = j-j-am-stat-assoc, year = {1973}, volume = {68}, number = {343}, pages = {746--746}, month = sep, issn = {0162-1459 (print), 1537-274X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Wed Jan 25 08:05:46 MST 2012}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/01621459.html; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i314223; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jamstatassoc1970.bib}, coden = {JSTNAL}, fjournal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, issn-l = {0162-1459}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2284813}, } @Article{PavlidesPerlman2009, author = {Marios G. Pavlides and Michael D. Perlman}, title = {How Likely Is {Simpson's Paradox}?}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {2009}, volume = {63}, number = {3}, pages = {226--233}, month = aug, issn = {0003-1305 (print), 1537-2731 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Thu Aug 26 21:48:27 MDT 2010}, bibsource = {http://www.amstat.org/publications/tas/; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat.bib}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1198/tast.2009.09007}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, } @Article{Pearl2014, author = {Judea Pearl}, title = {Comment: Understanding {Simpson's Paradox}}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {2014}, volume = {68}, number = {1}, pages = {8--13}, issn = {0003-1305 (print), 1537-2731 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon Mar 3 07:07:45 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat2010.bib; http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/utas20/68/1}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2014.876829}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/utas20}, } @Book{Pearl2000, title = {{Causality}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Pearl, Judea}, address = {Cambridge}, } @Article{Armistead2014, author = {Timothy W. Armistead}, title = {Resurrecting the Third Variable: A Critique of {Pearl}'s Causal Analysis of {Simpson's Paradox}}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {2014}, volume = {68}, pages = {1--7}, issn = {0003-1305 (print), 1537-2731 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon Mar 3 07:07:45 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat2010.bib; http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/utas20/68/1}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2013.807750}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, journal-url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/utas20}, } @Article{EellsSober1983, author = {Ellery Eells and Elliott Sober}, title = {Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity}, journal = j-philos-sci, year = {1983}, volume = {50}, number = {1}, pages = {35--57}, month = mar, issn = {0031-8248 (print), 1539-767X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Sat Mar 1 08:07:42 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=philscie; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i209655; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/philossci1980.bib}, coden = {PHSCA6}, fjournal = {Philosophy of Science}, issn-l = {0031-8248}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318248.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/187403}, } @Article{Hesslow1976, author = {Germund Hesslow}, title = {Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to Causality}, journal = j-philos-sci, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, pages = {290--292}, issn = {0031-8248 (print), 1539-767X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Sat Mar 1 08:07:17 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=philscie; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i209628; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/philossci1970.bib}, coden = {PHSCA6}, fjournal = {Philosophy of Science}, issn-l = {0031-8248}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318248.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/187270}, } @Article{hausman:2014:sgc, author = {Daniel M. Hausman and Reuben Stern and Naftali Weinberger}, title = {Systems without a graphical causal representation}, journal = j-synthese, year = {2014}, volume = {191}, number = {8}, pages = {1925--1930}, month = may, issn = {0039-7857 (print), 1573-0964 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon Sep 25 14:19:33 MDT 2017}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/synthese2010.bib}, coden = {SYNTAE}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3}, fjournal = {Synthese}, issn-l = {0039-7857}, journal-url = {http://link.springer.com/journal/11229}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3; http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3.pdf}, } @Article{weinberger:2019:mme, author = {Naftali Weinberger}, title = {Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation}, journal = j-synthese, year = {2019}, volume = {196}, number = {6}, pages = {2323--2340}, month = jun, issn = {0039-7857(print) 1573-0964 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Fri Jul 26 07:56:59 MDT 2019}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/synthese2010.bib}, coden = {SYNTAE}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1538-1}, fjournal = {Synthese}, issn-l = {0039-7857}, journal-url = {http://link.springer.com/journal/11229}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1538-1; http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-017-1538-1.pdf}, } @Article{Weinberger2018, author = {Weinberger, Naftali}, title = {{Faithfulness, Coordination, and Causal Coincidences}}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {2018}, volume = {83}, pages = {113--133}, } @Article{Otte1985, author = {Richard Otte}, title = {Probabilistic Causality and {Simpson}'s Paradox}, journal = j-philos-sci, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {110--125}, issn = {0031-8248 (print), 1539-767X (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Sat Mar 1 08:07:47 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=philscie; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i302053; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/philossci1980.bib}, coden = {PHSCA6}, fjournal = {Philosophy of Science}, issn-l = {0031-8248}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318248.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/187601}, } @Article{Hardcastle1991, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle}, title = {Partitions, probabilistic causal laws, and {Simpson}'s paradox}, journal = j-synthese, year = {1991}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {209--228}, month = feb, issn = {0039-7857 (print), 1573-0964 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon Sep 25 13:43:03 MDT 2017}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/synthese1990.bib}, coden = {SYNTAE}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485809}, fjournal = {Synthese}, issn-l = {0039-7857}, journal-url = {http://link.springer.com/journal/11229}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00485809}, } @Article{BandyopadhyayEtAl2011, author = {Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Davin Nelson and Mark Greenwood and Gordon Brittan and Jesse Berwald}, title = {The logic of {Simpson}'s paradox}, journal = j-synthese, year = {2011}, volume = {181}, number = {2}, pages = {185--208}, month = jul, issn = {0039-7857 (print), 1573-0964 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon Sep 25 14:19:08 MDT 2017}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/synthese2010.bib}, coden = {SYNTAE}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9797-0}, fjournal = {Synthese}, issn-l = {0039-7857}, journal-url = {http://link.springer.com/journal/11229}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-010-9797-0; http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-010-9797-0.pdf}, } @Article{Wardrop1995, author = {Robert L. Wardrop}, title = {{Simpson}'s Paradox and the Hot Hand in Basketball}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {1995}, volume = {49}, number = {1}, pages = {24--??}, month = {????}, issn = {0003-1305 (print), 1537-2731 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Mon May 5 07:48:12 MDT 1997}, bibsource = {http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat.bib}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, } @Article{ChenEtAl2009, author = {Aiyou Chen and Thomas Bengtsson and Tin Kam Ho}, title = {A Regression Paradox for Linear Models: Sufficient Conditions and Relation to {Simpson's Paradox}}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {2009}, volume = {63}, number = {3}, pages = {218--225}, month = aug, issn = {0003-1305 (print), 1537-2731 (electronic)}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Thu Aug 26 21:48:27 MDT 2010}, bibsource = {http://www.amstat.org/publications/tas/; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat.bib}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1198/tast.2009.08220}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, } @Article{Weinberger2015, author = {Naftali Weinberger}, title = {If Intelligence is a Cause, It is a Within-Subjects Cause}, journal = {Theory \& Psychology}, year = {2015}, volume = {25}, pages = {346--361}, } @Article{Fitelson2017, author = {Branden Fitelson}, title = {Confirmation, Causation, and Simpson's Paradox}, journal = {Episteme}, year = {2017}, volume = {14}, pages = {297--309}, } @Article{Edwards1963, author = {A. W. F. Edwards}, title = {The Measure of Association in a $ 2 \times 2 $ Table}, journal = j-J-R-STAT-SOC-SER-A-GENERAL, year = {1963}, volume = {126}, pages = {109--114}, issn = {0035-9238}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Sat Jan 24 11:18:11 MST 2015}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/i349630; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jrss-a-1960.bib}, coden = {JSSAEF}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2982448}, fjournal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General)}, issn-l = {0035-9238}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00359238.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2982448}, } @Article{Yule1903, author = {Yule, George U.}, title = {Notes on the theory of association of attributes in statistics}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1903}, volume = {2}, pages = {121--134}, } @Article{Simpson1951, author = {E. H. Simpson}, title = {The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables}, journal = j-j-r-stat-soc-ser-b-methodol, year = {1951}, volume = {13}, pages = {238--241}, issn = {0035-9246}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Fri Jan 23 11:53:21 MST 2015}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/i349694; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/jrss-b.bib}, coden = {JSTBAJ}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2984065}, fjournal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological)}, issn-l = {0035-9246}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00359246.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2984065}, } @Article{HanleyTheriault2000, author = {Hanley, James A. and Thériault, Gilles}, title = {Simpson’s Paradox in Meta-Analysis}, journal = {Epidemiology}, year = {2000}, volume = {11}, number = {5}, pages = {613}, issn = {1044-3983}, refid = {00001648-200009000-00022}, url = {https://journals.lww.com/epidem/Fulltext/2000/09000/Simpson_s_Paradox_in_Meta_Analysis.22.aspx}, } @Article{ReintjesEtAl2000, author = {Reintjes, Ralf and de Boer, Annette and van Pelt, Wilfrid and Mintjes-de Groot, Joke}, title = {Simpson’s Paradox: An Example from Hospital Epidemiology}, journal = {Epidemiology}, year = {2000}, volume = {11}, pages = {81--83}, issn = {1044-3983}, abstract = {Simpson’s paradox was first recognized at the beginning of the 20 century, but few examples with real data have been presented. In this paper we present an example of this phenomenon from a multicenter study on nosocomial infections, and we try to explain intuitively this type of extreme confounding.}, keywords = {Simpson’s paradox, confounding, nosocomial infections, hospital epidemiology}, refid = {00001648-200001000-00017}, url = {https://journals.lww.com/epidem/Fulltext/2000/01000/Simpson_s_Paradox__An_Example_from_Hospital.17.aspx}, } @Article{Greenland1987, author = {Greenland, Sander}, title = {{Interpretation and Choice of Effect Measures in Epidemiologic Analyses}}, journal = {American Journal of Epidemiology}, year = {1987}, volume = {125}, pages = {761-768}, issn = {0002-9262}, doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a114593}, eprint = {https://academic.oup.com/aje/article-pdf/125/5/761/287809/125-5-761.pdf}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a114593}, } @Article{AltmanDeeks2002, author = {Altman, Douglas G. and Deeks, Jonathan J.}, title = {Meta-analysis, Simpson's paradox, and the number needed to treat}, journal = {BMC Medical Research Methodology}, year = {2002}, volume = {2}, pages = {3}, issn = {1471-2288}, abstract = {There is debate concerning methods for calculating numbers needed to treat (NNT) from results of systematic reviews.}, refid = {Altman2002}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-2-3}, } @Article{RueckerSchumacher2008, author = {Rücker, Gerta and Schumacher, Martin}, title = {Simpson's paradox visualized: The example of the Rosiglitazone meta-analysis}, journal = {BMC Medical Research Methodology}, year = {2008}, volume = {8}, pages = {34}, issn = {1471-2288}, abstract = {Simpson's paradox is sometimes referred to in the areas of epidemiology and clinical research. It can also be found in meta-analysis of randomized clinical trials. However, though readers are able to recalculate examples from hypothetical as well as real data, they may have problems to easily figure where it emerges from.}, refid = {Rücker2008}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-8-34}, } @Article{Cates2002, author = {Cates, Christopher J.}, journal = {BMC Medical Research Methodology}, title = {Simpson's paradox and calculation of number needed to treat from meta-analysis}, year = {2002}, issn = {1471-2288}, pages = {1}, volume = {2}, abstract = {Calculation of numbers needed to treat (NNT) is more complex from meta-analysis than from single trials. Treating the data as if it all came from one trial may lead to misleading results when the trial arms are imbalanced.}, groups = {[grenache:]}, refid = {Cates2002}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-2-1}, } @Article{FiedlerEtAl2003, author = {Klaus Fiedler and Eva Walther and Peter Freytag and Stefanie Nickel}, journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin}, title = {Inductive Reasoning and Judgment Interference: Experiments on Simpson’s Paradox}, year = {2003}, note = {PMID: 15272956}, pages = {14-27}, volume = {29}, abstract = {In a series of experiments on inductive reasoning, participants assessed the relationship between gender, success, and a covariate in a situation akin to Simpson’s paradox: Although women were less successful then men according to overall statistics, they actually fared better then men at either of two universities. Understanding trivariate relationships of this kind requires cognitive routines similar to analysis of covariance. Across the first five experiments, however, participants generalized the disadvantage of women at the aggregate level to judgments referring to the different levels of the covariate, even when motivation was high and appropriate mental models were activated. The remaining three experiments demonstrated that Simpson’s paradox could be mastered when the salience of the covariate was increased and when the salience of gender was decreased by the inclusion of temporal cues that disambiguate the causal status of the covariate.}, doi = {10.1177/0146167202238368}, eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202238368}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202238368}, } @Article{Schaller1992, author = {Schaller, Mark}, title = {In-group favoritism and statistical reasoning in social inference: Implications for formation and maintenance of group stereotypes}, journal = {{ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}}, year = {1992}, volume = {63}, pages = {61--74}, } @InProceedings{WaldmannHagmayer1995, author = {Michael Waldmann and York Hagmayer}, title = {Causal paradox: When a cause simultaneously produces and prevents an effect}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, year = {1995}, editor = {J. D. Moore and J. F. Lehman}, pages = {425--430}, address = {Mahwah, NJ}, publisher = {Erlbaum}, } @Article{HernanEtAl2011, author = {Hernán, Miguel A. and Clayton, David and Keiding, Niels}, journal = {{International Journal of Epidemiology}}, title = {The Simpson's paradox unraveled}, year = {2011}, issn = {0300-5771}, pages = {780--785}, volume = {40}, abstract = {BACKGROUND: In a famous article, Simpson described a hypothetical data example that led to apparently paradoxical results. METHODS: We make the causal structure of Simpson's example explicit. RESULTS: We show how the paradox disappears when the statistical analysis is appropriately guided by subject-matter knowledge. We also review previous explanations of Simpson's paradox that attributed it to two distinct phenomena: confounding and non-collapsibility. CONCLUSION: Analytical errors may occur when the problem is stripped of its causal context and analyzed merely in statistical terms.}, comment = {21454324[pmid] PMC3147074[pmcid]}, database = {PubMed}, edition = {2011/03/30}, groups = {grenache:6}, keywords = {*Confounding Factors, Epidemiologic, *Data Interpretation, Statistical, *Effect Modifier, Epidemiologic, Epidemiologic Research Design, Humans, Models, Statistical, Reproducibility of Results, Sensitivity and Specificity}, language = {eng}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21454324}, } @Article{KievitEtAl2013, author = {Kievit, Rogier and Frankenhuis, Willem and Waldorp, Lourens and Borsboom, Denny}, title = {Simpson's paradox in psychological science: a practical guide}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, year = {2013}, volume = {4}, pages = {513}, issn = {1664-1078}, abstract = {The direction of an association at the population-level may be reversed within the subgroups comprising that population—a striking observation called Simpson's paradox. When facing this pattern, psychologists often view it as anomalous. Here, we argue that Simpson's paradox is more common than conventionally thought, and typically results in incorrect interpretations—potentially with harmful consequences. We support this claim by reviewing results from cognitive neuroscience, behavior genetics, clinical psychology, personality psychology, educational psychology, intelligence research, and simulation studies. We show that Simpson's paradox is most likely to occur when inferences are drawn across different levels of explanation (e.g., from populations to subgroups, or subgroups to individuals). We propose a set of statistical markers indicative of the paradox, and offer psychometric solutions for dealing with the paradox when encountered—including a toolbox in R for detecting Simpson's paradox. We show that explicit modeling of situations in which the paradox might occur not only prevents incorrect interpretations of data, but also results in a deeper understanding of what data tell us about the world.}, doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00513}, url = {https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00513}, } @Article{Peirce1884, author = {Peirce, C. S.}, title = {The numerical measure of the success of predictions}, journal = {Science}, year = {1884}, volume = {4}, number = {93}, pages = {453--454}, issn = {0036-8075}, doi = {10.1126/science.ns-4.93.453-a}, eprint = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/ns-4/93/453.2.full.pdf}, publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science}, url = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/ns-4/93/453.2}, } @Article{RinottTam2003, author = {Yosef Rinott and Michael Tam}, title = {Monotone Regrouping, Regression, and {Simpson's Paradox}}, journal = j-amer-stat, year = {2003}, volume = {57}, pages = {139--141}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Thu Jan 8 07:06:56 MST 2004}, bibsource = {http://www.amstat.org/publications/tas/; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/amstat.bib}, coden = {ASTAAJ}, fjournal = {The American Statistician}, issn-l = {0003-1305}, url = {http://oberon.ingentaselect.com/cgi-bin/linker?ini=asa&reqidx=/cw/asa/00031305/v57n2/s13/p139}, } @Article{Malinas2001, author = {Gary Malinas}, title = {Simpson\textquoteright{}s Paradox: A Logically Benign, Empirically Treacherous Hydra}, journal = {The Monist}, year = {2001}, volume = {84}, pages = {265--283}, } @Article{BickelEtAl1975, author = {Bickel, P. J. and Hammel, E. A. and O{\textquoteright}Connell, J. W.}, title = {Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley}, journal = {Science}, year = {1975}, volume = {187}, number = {4175}, pages = {398--404}, issn = {0036-8075}, abstract = {Examination of aggregate data on graduate admissions to the University of California, Berkeley, for fall 1973 shows a clear but misleading pattern of bias against female applicants. Examination of the disaggregated data reveals few decision-making units that show statistically significant departures from expected frequencies of female admissions, and about as many units appear to favor women as to favor men. If the data are properly pooled, taking into account the autonomy of departmental decision making, thus correcting for the tendency of women to apply to graduate departments that are more difficult for applicants of either sex to enter, there is a small but statistically significant bias in favor of women. The graduate departments that are easier to enter tend to be those that require more mathematics in the undergraduate preparatory curriculum. The bias in the aggregated data stems not from any pattern of discrimination on the part of admissions committees, which seem quite fair on the whole, but apparently from prior screening at earlier levels of the educational system. Women are shunted by their socialization and education toward fields of graduate study that are generally more crowded, less productive of completed degrees, and less well funded, and that frequently offer poorer professional employment prospects.}, doi = {10.1126/science.187.4175.398}, eprint = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/187/4175/398.full.pdf}, publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science}, url = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/187/4175/398}, } @Article{Pearson1899, author = {Pearson, Karl}, title = {On the theory of genetic (reproductive) selection}, journal = {{Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, Series A}}, year = {1899}, volume = {192}, pages = {260--278}, } @Article{Eells1986, author = {Ellery Eells}, title = {Probabilistic Causal Interaction}, journal = j-philos-sci, year = {1986}, volume = {53}, pages = {52--64}, acknowledgement = {#ack-nhfb#}, bibdate = {Sat Mar 1 08:07:49 MST 2014}, bibsource = {http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=philscie; http://www.jstor.org/stable/i302057; http://www.math.utah.edu/pub/tex/bib/philossci1980.bib}, coden = {PHSCA6}, fjournal = {Philosophy of Science}, issn-l = {0031-8248}, journal-url = {http://www.jstor.org/journals/00318248.html}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/187920}, } @Article{Hitchcock2001:TTE, author = {Christopher Hitchcock}, title = {A Tale of Two Effects}, journal = {Philosophical Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {110}, pages = {361--396}, publisher = {Duke University Press}, } @InCollection{MalinasBigelow2016, author = {Malinas, Gary and Bigelow, John}, title = {Simpson's Paradox}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2016}, editor = {Edward N. Zalta}, edition = {Fall 2016. Archived entry and superseded by this version.}, howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/paradox-simpson/}}, } @Book{sober2014, title = {The nature of selection: Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {2014}, author = {Sober, Elliott}, date-added = {2020-04-10 2:48:17 PM +0000}, date-modified = {2020-04-10 2:48:45 PM +0000}, } @Book{sober2018, title = {Philosophy of Biology}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2018}, author = {Sober, Elliott}, date-added = {2020-04-09 1:05:34 PM +0000}, date-modified = {2020-04-10 2:51:42 PM +0000}, } @Book{sober1999, title = {Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan}, number = {218}, date-added = {2020-04-09 1:06:33 PM +0000}, date-modified = {2020-04-10 2:52:24 PM +0000}, } @Article{Romero2019, author = {Romero, Felipe}, title = {{Philosophy of Science and the Replicability Crisis}}, journal = {{Philosophy Compass}}, year = {2019}, volume = {14}, pages = {e12633}, doi = {10.1111/phc3.12633}, } @Article{LandesOsimaniPoellinger2018, author = {Jürgen Landes and Barbara Osimani and Roland Poellinger}, title = {{Epistemology of Causal Inference in Pharmacology. Towards a Framework for the Assessment of Harms}}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2018}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {3-49}, } @InCollection{Hempel1965recent, author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, title = {{Recent Problems of Induction}}, booktitle = {Mind and Cosmos}, publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, year = {1965}, editor = {R.~G.~Colodny}, pages = {112--134}, address = {Pittsburgh}, note = {Reprinted in Hempel, Carl G. and Fetzer, James: ``The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel'', pp. 29--48.}, } @Article{Hempel1981, author = {Carl G. Hempel}, title = {Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1981}, volume = {46}, number = {3}, pages = {389--404}, doi = {10.1007/BF01130050}, publisher = {Springer}, } @Article{Hempel1937, author = {Carl G. Hempel}, title = {Le Probl\`eme de la V\'erit\'e}, journal = {Theoria}, year = {1937}, volume = {3}, pages = {206--244}, } @Article{HempelOppenheim1945, author = {Carl G. 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Hempel}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Fetzer, James}, series = {Studies in Science, Explanation and Rationality}, address = {Oxford}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2021a, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {The Paradoxes of Confirmation}, booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {forthcoming}, editor = {Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio}, address = {London}, } @InCollection{Sprenger2021b, author = {Sprenger, Jan}, title = {Hempel and Confirmation Theory}, booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2021}, editor = {Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Thomas Uebel}, address = {London}, } @Book{Hempel1952, title = {Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1952}, author = {Carl Gustav Hempel}, } @Article{Hempel1950, author = {Carl G. Hempel}, title = {Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning}, journal = {Revue Internationale de Philosophie}, year = {1950}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, pages = {41--63}, publisher = {Michel Meyer}, } @InCollection{Hempel1983, author = {Carl G. Hempel}, title = {Valuation and Objectivity in Science}, booktitle = {Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis}, publisher = {D. Reidel}, year = {1983}, editor = {R. Cohen and L. Laudan}, pages = {73--100}, } @Article{Hempel1967, author = {Carl G. Hempel}, title = {The White Shoe: No Red Herring}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1967}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, pages = {239--240}, } @Article{Agassi1958, author = {Joseph Agassi}, title = {Corroboration Versus Induction}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1958}, volume = {9}, number = {33}, pages = {311}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, } @Article{Watkins1957, author = {J. W. N. 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Fetzer}, } @Book{Carnap1928, title = {Der logische Aufbau der Welt}, publisher = {Felix Meiner}, year = {1928/1998}, author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, note = {Original edition published in 1928 by Weltkreis Verlag, Berlin.}, } @Article{Hempel1988a, author = {Hempel, Carl G.}, title = {{Provisos: A Problem Concerning the Inferential Function of Scientific Theories}}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {1988}, volume = {28}, number = {2}, pages = {147--164}, } @Article{HosiassonLindenbaum1940, author = {Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum}, title = {On Confirmation}, journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic}, year = {1940}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {133--148}, issn = {00224812}, } @Article{Leamer2004Comment, author = {Edward E. Leamer}, title = {Are the roads red? Comments on “Size Matters”}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {555 - 557}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.027}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000861}, } @Article{Horowitz2004Comment, author = {Joel L. Horowitz}, title = {Comments on “Size Matters”}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {551 - 554}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.026}, keywords = {Random sampling errors, Significance test, Specification test}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S105353570400085X}, } @Article{Thorbecke2004Comment, author = {Erik Thorbecke}, title = {Economic and statistical significance: comments on “Size Matters”}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {571 - 575}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.030}, keywords = {Economic and statistical significance, Hypothesis testing}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000897}, } @Article{ElliotGranger2004Comment, author = {Graham Elliott and Clive W.J. Granger}, title = {Evaluating significance: comments on “size matters”}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {547 - 550}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.025}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000848}, } @Article{2004IFC, title = {IFC- Editorial Board}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {IFC}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5357(04)00120-9}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704001209}, } @Article{Altman2004Intro, author = {Morris Altman}, title = {Introduction}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {523 - 525}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.023}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000824}, } @Article{Berg2004, author = {Nathan Berg}, title = {No-decision classification: an alternative to testing for statistical significance}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {631 - 650}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.036}, keywords = {Significance, Statistical significance, Economic significance, Hypothesis test, Critical region, Type II, Power}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000952}, } @Article{ZiliakMcCloskez2004Rejoinder, author = {Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey}, title = {Significance redux}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {665 - 675}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.038}, keywords = {Hypothesis testing, Statistical significance, Economic significance}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000976}, } @Article{ZiliakMcCloskey2004, author = {Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, title = {Size matters: the standard error of regressions in the American Economic Review}, year = {2004}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, number = {5}, pages = {527 - 546}, volume = {33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.024}, keywords = {Standard error, Regression, American Economic Review, Significance, Testing}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000836}, } @Article{FidlerEtAl2004Comment, author = {Fiona Fidler and Cumming Geoff and Burgman Mark and Thomason Neil}, title = {Statistical reform in medicine, psychology and ecology}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {615 - 630}, issn = {1053-5357}, note = {Statistical Significance}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.035}, keywords = {Statistical reform, Confidence intervals, Medicine, Psychology, Ecology}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535704000940}, } @Article{Wooldridge2004, author = {Jeffrey M. 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Orri}, title = {{Decision Theory}}, booktitle = {The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2020}, editor = {Edward N. Zalta}, edition = {Winter 2020}, howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/decision-theory/}}, } @InCollection{Chandler-SEP-decision-theory-descriptive, author = {Chandler, Jake}, title = {{Descriptive Decision Theory}}, booktitle = {The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2017}, editor = {Edward N. Zalta}, edition = {Winter 2017}, howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/decision-theory-descriptive/}}, } @Book{Binmore2009, title = {{Rational Decisions}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2009}, author = {Binmore, Ken}, address = {Cambridge}, } @Article{KahnemanTversky1979, author = {Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky}, title = {Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {263--291}, } @Article{AbdellaouiEtAl2007, author = {Abdellaoui,Mohammed and Barrios, Carolina and Wakker,Peter P.}, title = {{Reconciling Introspective Utility with Revealed Preference: Experimental Arguments Based on Prospect Theory}}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2007}, volume = {138}, pages = {356--378}, } @Book{Bradley2017, title = {Decision Theory with a Human Face}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2017}, author = {Richard Bradley}, } @Article{Sen1977, author = {Amartya K. Sen}, title = {Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1977}, volume = {6}, pages = {317--344}, } @Book{Gilboa2009, title = {{Theory of Decision under Uncertainty}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2009}, author = {Gilboa, Itzhak}, address = {Cambridge}, } @Article{Sen1973, author = {Amartya Sen}, title = {Behaviour and the Concept of Preference}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1973}, volume = {40}, pages = {241--259}, } @TechReport{ChateauneufEtAl2008, author = {Alain Chateauneuf and Mich\`ele Cohen and Jean-Marc Tallon}, title = {Decision under risk: The classical Expected Utility model.}, institution = {HAL archive: halshs-00348818}, year = {2008}, } @Book{Kreps1988, title = {{Notes on the Theory of Choice}}, publisher = {Westview Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Kreps, David M.}, address = {Boulder/CO}, } @Book{Axelrod1984, title = {{The Evolution of Cooperation}}, publisher = {Basic Books}, year = {1984}, author = {Axelrod, Robert}, address = {New York}, } @Book{Gintis2009, title = {{The Bounds of Reason}}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2009}, author = {Gintis, Herbert}, address = {Princeton}, } @InCollection{Ross-SEP-game-theory, author = {Ross, Don}, title = {{Game Theory}}, booktitle = {The {Stanford} Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2019}, editor = {Edward N. Zalta}, edition = {Winter 2019}, howpublished = {\url{https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/game-theory/}}, } @Book{Bicchieri2005, title = {The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Cristina Bicchieri}, } @Book{Binmore2005NJ, title = {Natural Justice: Walter Scott and the Story of Tomorrow}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Ken Binmore}, } @Book{Skyrms1996, title = {Evolution of the Social Contract}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Brian Skyrms}, } @Article{Binmore2004, author = {Ken Binmore}, title = {Reciprocity and the Social Contract}, journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {3}, pages = {5--35}, } @Book{VNM1947, title = {{Theory of Games and Economic Behavior}}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1947}, author = {von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oskar}, edition = {2nd}, } @Article{Nash1950a, author = {John F. Nash}, title = {{The Bargaining Problem}}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1950}, volume = {18}, pages = {155--162}, } @Article{Nash1951, author = {John F. Nash}, title = {{Non-Cooperative Games}}, journal = {{Annals of Mathematics}}, year = {1951}, volume = {54}, pages = {286--295}, } @Article{FehrFischbacher2002, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}, title = {{Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition}}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2002}, volume = {112}, pages = {C1-C33}, } @Article{FFF2003, author = {Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}, title = {{On the Nature of Fair Behavior}}, journal = {{Economic Inquiry}}, year = {2003}, volume = {41}, pages = {20-26}, } @Article{GualaMittone2010, author = {Francesco Guala and Luigi Mittone}, title = {{Paradigmatic experiments: The Dictator Game}}, journal = {{The Journal of Socio-Economics}}, year = {2010}, volume = {39}, pages = {578-584}, } @Article{XiaoBicchieri2010, author = {Erte Xiao and Cristina Bicchieri}, title = {When Equality Trumps Reciprocity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2010}, volume = {31}, pages = {456--470}, } @Article{Camerer2003-CAMBGT, author = {Colin F. 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Mele}, pages = {182--205}, } @Book{Binmore2005PfR, title = {Playing for Real}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Ken Binmore}, } @Article{FehrFischbacher2003, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}, title = {{The nature of human altruism}}, journal = {Nature}, year = {2003}, volume = {425}, pages = {785--791}, } @Article{Lubrano2021Unification, author = {Michele Lubrano}, title = {Unification in Mathematics}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, year = {2021}, volume = {47}, pages = {115--130}, } @InCollection{Lubrano2014-Pluralism, author = {Michele Lubrano}, title = {Alethic Pluralism and Logical Paradoxes}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Truth}, publisher = {Cambridge Scholars Press}, year = {2014}, editor = {Fabio Bacchini and Stefano Caputo and Massimo Dell'Utri}, pages = {132--142}, } @Article{SchoenbrodtWagenmakers2018, author = {Schönbrodt, Felix D. and Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan}, journal = {{Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review}}, title = {{Bayes factor design analysis: Planning for Compelling Evidence}}, year = {2018}, pages = {128--142}, volume = {25}, owner = {grenache}, timestamp = {2017.01.02}, } @Article{Carnap1931, author = {Carnap, Rudolf}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, title = {{Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache}}, year = {1931}, pages = {219–241}, volume = {2}, } @Book{Schupbach2022, title = {Bayesianism and Scientific Reasoning}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2022}, author = {Schupbach, Jonah N.}, series = {Elements in the Philosophy of Science}, collection = {Elements in the Philosophy of Science}, doi = {10.1017/9781108657563}, place = {Cambridge}, } @Article{Rubinstein1982, author = {Rubinstein, Ariel}, title = {Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {97--109}, } @InCollection{Ramsey1929, author = {Ramsey, Frank P.}, title = {{General Propositions and Causality}}, booktitle = {Philosophical Papers}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1929/1990}, editor = {Mellor, David H.}, pages = {237--257}, address = {Cambridge}, note = {reprint of the original 1929 paper}, annote = {Edited collection published in 1990}, keywords = {Subjective Probability;Ramsey}, } @Article{Hempel1942, author = {Carl G.~Hempel}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, title = {The Function of General Laws in History}, year = {1942}, pages = {35--48}, volume = {39}, } @Book{Misak2020, author = {Misak, Cheryl}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {{Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers}}, year = {2020}, address = {Oxford}, } @Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:bibtex;}